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Preface
I believe that there are only a select few topics, which arouse a similar level of 
interest and curiosity among academics and laymen alike, as does the study of mind 
and brain. Although mind and brain have been capturing the attention of philosophers 
for centuries, it is the “scientific investigation” of age old philosophical queries by so-
called cognitive scientists, which is distinctive of the developments of the last few 
decades and which, in times to come, may well be considered the hallmark of the 
study of mind in the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries. In the past, advances in the natural 
sciences underlay or boosted a plethora of developments in the technological, 
economic and political spheres that not only improved the standard of living and 
prolonged the average life span for a vast number of people, but also fuelled hopes 
that a new and improved understanding of the nature of man was also within reach. 
Despite all the benefits mankind derived from scientific and technological progress 
past and present, the success of the natural sciences also helped spread and foster 
a virulent and nowadays quasi-ubiquitous and unquestioned believe in the 
omnipotence of science and technology. In the context of the study of mind, in 
particular, it fostered the widespread (mis-)conception that in order for an 
investigation leading to insight and understanding a “scientific” approach is a sine 
qua non.
This thesis highlights the danger of such an approach.  By investigating the 
framework of explanation adopted by cognitive scientists, the cognitive view, and by 
examining its inherent conceptions of mind and thought, it will be shown that the 
scientific, or rather scientistic, approach inherent in the views depicted above is 
highly questionable, and in the case of the study of mind and brain, does not further 
insight and understanding, but rather prevents it. In the 20
th
 century, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein has been one of the few philosophers who recognized the 
fallaciousness of these ideas and who opposed the inherent scientism. His later 
philosophy, which provides the philosophical mise en scène for the following 
investigations, provides a much-needed antidote against the misconceptions 
common among cognitive scientists today. Although, many of the shortcomings of the 
ideas and views of cognitive scientists have, with a certain regularity, been discussed 
by philosophers working in the tradition of the later Wittgenstein (e.g. Kenny, 
Hanfling, Hacker, Hyman and Glock) their criticisms, more often than not, fell on deaf 
xiii
ears. I believe that one of the main reasons underlying the imperviousness of the 
community of cognitive scientists to the criticism of the kind of analytic philosophy 
inspired by the later Wittgenstein, is that it mainly focused on select misconceptions 
inherent in the cognitive view, but regularly failed to point out their place in the overall 
framework of thought for cognitive scientists. As a result, it was easy to dismiss these 
criticisms with excuses of the sort “but that does not bear any direct relevance to the 
work I do…”.
For this reason, this thesis aimed to portray and examine the cognitive view in 
its entirety, i.e. to depict the intricate interconnections existing between the premises 
that provide the foundation of the cognitive view, and to point out their disastrous 
consequences for our understanding not only of a select view aspects of mental 
phenomena, but to our understanding of the mind (and consequently of human 
nature) in its entirety. In order to provide such a “big picture”, and to describe the 
numerous often very subtle interconnections between the various ideas making up 
the cognitive view in all their breadth and depth,  a lot of well-trodden ground had to 
be revisited and reviewed. Thus, Anthony Kenny’s and Peter Hackers’ discussions of 
the mereological fallacy (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 first half)  will provide the “base camp” 
from which we will visit less familiar aspects of the cognitive view via novel routes on 
our way to the peak of this “philosophical mountain”. Where required, my 
indebtedness to the works of these philosophers will be highlighted throughout the 
text. 
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Zusammenfassung
Mit dem Aufstieg der Kognitionswissenschaften in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, traten die klassischen Fragen und Probleme bezüglich der Natur des 
menschlichen Geistes aus dem Schatten reiner philosophischer Betrachtung heraus 
und rückten ins Zentrum naturwissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen vor. Das breite 
Interesse welches diesen Fragen von Seiten verschiedener Psychologen, Linguisten, 
Computerwissenschaftlern, sowie Medizinern und Neurowissenschaftlern 
entgegengebracht wurde, führte schließlich zur Erschließung eines neuen 
interdisziplinären Wissenschaftszweiges, - den Kognitionswissenschaften. Die 
Kognitionswissenschaften bilden ein Amalgam verschiedener 
geisteswissenschaftlicher und naturwissenschaftlicher Disziplinen, die gemeinsam 
das Ziel verfolgen das Mysterium des menschlichen Geistes und geistiger 
Phänomene wie Denken, Sprache, Gedächtnis, Wahrnehmung etc., durch die 
Anwendung vermeintlich komplementärer und synergistischer Methoden zu 
enträtseln. Seit ihrer Geburtsstunde in den fünfziger Jahren, wurde diese neue 
Wissenschaft des Geistes  als der Schlüssel zur Erklärung und zum Verständnis der 
Grundlagen intelligenter Handlung und intelligenten Verhaltens  angesehen. Es ist 
allgemein Anerkannt dass die menschliche Fähigkeit sich in einer komplizierten und 
sich ständig wandelnden Umwelt zurecht zu finden auf die bemerkenswerte geistige 
Leistungsfähigkeit des Menschen zurückzuführen ist. Die Fragen denen die 
Kognitionswissenschaften nachgehen, sind somit aufs innigste mit unserem 
Selbstverständnis als menschliche Wesen verknüpft, und die Beantwortung dieser 
Fragen verspricht ein tieferes Verständnis der menschlichen Natur und des 
vernünftigen Handelns.   
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es die Erklärungsgrundlage, d.h. das 
wissenschaftstheoretische Erklärungsmodel, der modernen  
Kognitionswissenschaften, die so genannte cognitive view , einer kritischen 
begrifflichen Analyse zu unterziehen. Die Grundlage dieser Analyse bildete dabei 
Ludwig Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie. Nach eingehender philosophischer 
Untersuchung der der cognitive view zugrunde liegenden Prämissen, und in Folge 
der Darstellung und Diskussion der mannigfaltigen begrifflichen Unzulänglichkeiten 
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und Missverständnisse, wurde diese als für die Untersuchung und das Verständnis 
des menschlichen Geistes und geistiger Phänomene als unzureichend und defizitär 
entlarvt. Das durch die cognitive view vermittelte Bild des menschlichen Geistes als 
einen biologischen Informationsprozessor,  erweckt nur den Schein Aspekte des 
menschlichen Geistes verstehen und erklären zu können, was vor allem durch den 
im Rahmen dieses Bildes verwendeten modernen Technologiejargon erweckt wird. 
Der Grossteil der Kognitionswissenschaftler ist sich dieser Tatsache nicht bewusst, 
und arbeitet im Schatten einer gewaltigen Illusion. Die Bedeutung der vorliegenden 
Arbeit entspringt somit nicht zuletzt aus der ungeheueren Popularität und dem 
Respekt welche den Kognitionswissenschaften von Akademikern und 
Nichtakademikern gegenwärtig entgegengebracht werden. Die Ideen und 
Vorstellungen von bekannten Kognitionswissenschaftlern wie z.B. Daniel Dennett, 
David Chalmers, Antonio Damasio, Francis Crick, Gerhardt Roth oder Wolf Singer, 
üben einen enormen Einfluss auf das Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes und der 
menschlichen Natur der breiten Öffentlichkeit aus. Themen wie Bewusstsein, 
Denken, freier Wille, das Wesen des Ichs, oder auch die Rolle von Emotionen 
dominieren die Diskussionen vieler akademischer Fachzeitschriften. Über deren 
Stand und Ergebnisse wird jedoch mittlerweile regelmäßig in den Feullietons 
verschiedener Tageszeitungen und Nachrichtenmagazine berichtet wird. Es war ein 
Anliegen dieser Arbeit, durch das Aufzeigen der der Erklärungsgrundlage der 
modernen Kognitionswissenschaften zugrunde liegenden Missverständnisse, und 
der Rückbesinnung auf ein Aristotelisches Verständnis des Geistes als der Fähigkeit 
Intellektuelle Fähigkeiten zu erwerben,  der Verbreitung verschiedener 
Neuromythologien entgegenzuwirken.
Im ersten Kapitel, wurde nach einer allgemeinen Erläuterung der Ziele und 
Absichten der vorliegenden Arbeit (s.oben), eine detaillierte Darstellung der 
fundamentalen Prämissen, welche dem Erklärungsmodell der 
Kognitionswissenschaften zugrunde liegen, erarbeitet. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit 
wurde dabei der kognitionswissenschaftliche Darstellung des menschlichen Geistes 
als einen biologischen Informationsprozessor, der Information empfängt, speichert, 
umwandelt und übertragt, geschenkt. Diese Darstellung hat Ihre historisch 
philosophischen Wurzel in den repräsentationalistischen Vorstellungen von 
Descartes und Locke, und kann als eine moderne Version dieser klassischen Ideen 
xvi
betrachtet werden. Die begrifflichen Probleme und Unzulänglichkeiten der modernen 
cognitive view, welche in den darauf folgenden Kapiteln diskutiert worden sind, sind 
zum Einen als eine Manifestation des anhaltenden Einflusses dieser klassischen 
Ideen, zum Anderen als Folgeprobleme welche aus der mit diesen Ansichten 
verbundenen philosophischen Grundlagen entstehen, zu verstehen. Die Darstellung 
des Einflusses und der Bedeutung klassischer philosophischer Ideen auf die 
moderne kognitionswissenschaftliche Forschung diente somit einerseits der 
Erläuterung relevanter historischer Zusammenhänge, als auch der Identifizierung der 
Ziele der nachfolgenden philosophischen Untersuchungen. Zu diesen Zielen 
gehörten, 
- die Vorstellung des menschlichen Geistes als einen biologischen 
Informationsprozessor, und das damit verbundene Bild des Geistes 
als eine nur dem Individuum durch Introspektion zugänglichen  
privaten Welt.
- die Vorstellung von Denken als einer Interaktion zwischen den vom 
Gehirn bearbeiteten mentalen (geistigen) Repräsentationen 
- die Vorstellung von mentalen Repräsentationen, als Symbolen in 
„Mentalesisch“, einer dem Denken eigenen Sprache (sog. language 
of thought hypothesis), welche als Medium des Denkens dient,  
- die Ansicht das mentalesisch die Grundlage von Intentionalität 
darstellt und dass durch die kausale Zusammen Wirkung mentaler 
Repräsentationen rationales Handeln erklärt werden kann, 
- die Ansicht das die Struktur und Normativität geistiger und 
sprachlicher  Inhalte durch mentale Repräsentationen erklärt werden 
kann.    
In zweiten Kapitel, wurde eine Übersicht über die Entwicklung und den Inhalt 
der Wittgensteinschen Spätphilosophie, welche den methodologischen Rahmen und 
das philosophische Rüstzeug für die im Laufe dieser Arbeit angestellten 
philosophischen Untersuchungen stellte, verfasst. Besonderen Wert wurde dabei auf 
eine ausführliche Darstellung des revolutionären Charakters von Wittgensteins 
Auffassung vom Wesen philosophischer Probleme und dem Zweck der Philosophie 
gelegt. Viele Missverständnisse und Fehlinterpretationen von Wittgensteins 
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Spätphilosophie haben in der Vergangenheit an diesem Punkt ihren Anfang 
genommen.  Die Philosophieauffassung des  späten Wittgensteins,  das Verständnis 
von philosophischen Problemen als sprachlicher, d.h. begrifflicher, Probleme, sowie 
Wittgensteins Einführung eines neuen Erfolgsmaßtabs in die Philosophie (viz. die 
Beseitigung und Auflösung begrifflicher Probleme, im Gegensatz zur Beantwortung 
philosophischer Probleme durch Theoriebildung nach dem Vorbild der 
Naturwissenschaften), wurden Anhand der für Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie 
zentralen Begriffe wie z.B. Übersicht und Übersichtliche Darstellung, Therapie,
veranschaulicht. Darüber hinaus wurden sowohl die sprachlichen wie auch die nicht-
sprachlichen (kulturellen und historischen) Quellen und Ursachen philosophischer 
Probleme erläutert. Außerdem wurde das Verhältnis zwischen Wissenschaft und 
Philosophie kritisch beleuchtet. Dabei wurde gegen die unter 
Kognitionswissenschaftlern (und vielen Philosophen) weit verbreitete Meinung 
argumentiert, dass die Fragen und Probleme bezüglich des menschlichen Geistes 
mit denen sich die Philosophie seit jeher beschäftigt hat, mit den Mitteln moderner 
naturwissenschaftlicher Technologien im Rahmen eines hypothetisch-deduktiven 
Verfahrens gelöst werden können. Diese Ansicht beruht jedoch auf einem 
tiefgehenden Missverständnis des Wesens der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie. 
Naturwissenschaftliche Methoden können nur zur Beantwortung empirischer Fragen 
erfolgreich herangezogen werden. Da jedoch philosophische Probleme und Fragen 
(nach dem Verständiss Wittgensteinscher Spätphilosophie) begrifflicher und nicht 
empirischer Natur sind, können diese von den Naturwissenschaften unmöglich 
beantwortet werden. Insofern sich die modernen Kognitionswissenschaften also mit 
Problemen und Fragen beschäftigen die auf Begrifflichen Missverständnissen 
beruhen, können diese mit deren Methoden nicht gelöst werden. Die gegenteilige 
Einschätzung kommt einer Selbsttäuschung gleich. Es ist vielmehr die Aufgabe der 
Philosophie solche im Kern sprachlichen Probleme durch begriffliche 
Untersuchungen aufzulösen. Naturwissenschaft und Philosophie stehen somit in 
einem komplementären Verhältnis zueinander. Das Fehlen dieser Einsicht ist ein 
grundlegender Fehler der modernen Kognitionswissenschaften, der einem Verstehen 
des menschlichen Geistes im Wege steht. Erfolgreiche naturwissenschaftliche, d.h. 
empirische, Arbeit  setzt begriffliche Klarheit voraus. Diese Klarheit aber, fehlt den 
modernen Kognitionswissenschaften oftmals (s.unten).  
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Im dritten Kapitel, wurden zunächst die als allgemein gültig betrachteten 
Behauptungen und Erklärungsansätze die von Kognitionswissenschaftlern und 
Philosophen in jüngster Zeit aufgestellt wurden erläutert, und gezeigt dass vielen 
dieser Annahmen eine degenerierte Form des Cartesianismus zugrunde liegt.  Das 
Hauptaugenmerk wurde dabei auf die weit verbreitete Zuschreibung psychologischer 
Attribute zum Gehirn oder zu Teile des Gehirns gerichtet. Durch die Untersuchung 
der Grammatik psychologischer Prädikate (bzw. Prädikatoren) wurde gezeigt dass 
solche Zuschreibungen eine Verletzung mereologischer Prinzipien mit sich führen. 
Dadurch wird üblicherweise Übersehen, dass das für die Erhellung geistiger 
Sachverhalte verwendete Explanans in Wirklichkeit nichts Erklärt, sondern nur den 
Schein einer Erklärung erweckt. Nach der Erläuterung dieser Problematik, wurden 
außerdem die Ursachen dieser Problematik und ihre Verbindung mit einer Vielzahl 
weit verbreiterter Vorstellung des Geistes und des geistigen, die allesamt auf 
verschiedenen sprachlichen Missverständnissen beruhen, untersucht. Unter diesen 
Vorstellungen war die analyse des Bildes des Geistes als ein privates nur dem 
individuellen Subjekt durch Introspektion exklusiv zugänglichem Reich, und die damit 
verbunden Behauptung epistemischer Privatheit die sich in Aussagen wie z.B. „Nur 
ich kann wissen dass ich Schmerz empfinde“ ausdrückt. Das mit diesen Ansichten 
verbundene Verständnis der Sprache wurde ebenfalls diskutiert. Im Laufe der 
folgenden Diskussion wurde aufgezeigt, dass solche Aussagen irrtümlich als 
epistemische Behauptungen missverstanden werden, tatsächlich aber grammatische
Aussagen verkörpern. Somit können verschieden Individuen sehr wohl die gleiche 
Empfindung verspüren: Innere Zustände und Empfindungen bedürfen äußerer 
Kriterien. 
Im Verlauf des vierten Kapitels wurde der Begriff des Geistes einer 
philosophischen Untersuchung unterzogen, und gezeigt das entgegen dem 
Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes als einer biologischen Entität, d.h. als einen 
Informationsprozessor der Informationen empfängt, speichert, umwandelt und 
überträgt, der Geist weder eine materielle noch geistige Entität darstellt. Als 
Alternative zu dieser Vorstellung, wurde für eine Rückbesinnung auf die 
Aristotelische Vorstellung des Geistes als der Fähigkeit zum Erwerb Intellektueller 
Fähigkeiten argumentiert. Da diese Position, den menschlichen Geist weder als 
materielle noch geistige Entität betrachtet, entgeht sie die mit dem klassischen Leib-
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Seele Problem verbundenen Erklärungsschwierigkeiten. Im Anschluss an diese 
Diskussion wird die Vorstellung mentaler Repräsentationen einer genauen 
Untersuchung unterzogen. Dabei wird u.a. argumentiert, dass dadurch dass Symbole 
generell einem durch Regeln bestimmten Gebrauch unterliegen , die Vorstellung von 
mentalen Repräsentation als symbolischen Beschreibungen in einer dem Denken 
eigenen Sprache unsinnig ist, da Beschreibungen in diesem Sinne nicht im Gehirn 
vorfindbar sind. Neuronale Aktivitäten selbst können nicht als Symbole interpretiert 
werden, da Sie keinen durch Regeln bestimmten Gebrauch unterliegen. Um den 
Status eines Symbols zu erwerben, muss aber mit dem Zeichen die Möglichkeit 
dieses korrekt oder inkorrekt anwenden zu können verbunden sein. Von den 
Nervenzellen des Gehirns kann jedoch weder gesagt werden das sie wissen noch 
dass sie nicht wissen was ein bestimmtes Symbol bedeutet oder nach welchen 
Regeln es angewandt wird. Ähnliche Schwierigkeiten und Probleme wurden im 
Zusammenhang von „Hirnkarten“ diskutiert. Obwohl Sinnesreize sehr wohl mit 
neuronal Aktivität korreliert werden können, und somit eine quasi kartographische 
Ordnung der Funktion gewisser Hirnabschnitte möglich ist (siehe z.B., Motor-
Homunculus), ist die unter Kognitionswissenschaftlern weit verbreitete Vorstellung 
dass solchen Karten der neuronalen „Kommunikation“ dienen unsinnig.  Im 
Schlussteil des Kapitels, wird dann die Vorstellung der Speicherung mentaler 
Repräsentationen im Gehirn untersucht, eine ebenfalls Zentrale Vorstellung 
innerhalb der cognitive view und der modernen Neurowissenschaften.    Diese 
abschließende Diskussion zeigte, dass diese Vorstellung nur Sinn machen würde, 
wenn eine solche gespeicherte Repräsentation einer dem Lesen mächtigen  Person
zugänglich wäre, die einer anderen Person z.B. erklären könnte was eine spezifische 
Repräsentation darstellt.  Kognitionswissenschaftler und Philosophen haben bis dato 
aber keine Kriterien, im Sinne einer nicht-induktiven Evidenz für eine Behauptung, 
die den Sinn eines behaupteten Satzes festlegt, bestimmt, die Angeben was als 
solch eine Repräsentation zählt. Somit bleibt die Vorstellung einer mentalen 
Repräsentation Sinnleer.   
Das fünfte Kapitel behandelte die der cognitive view inhärente Vorstellung des 
Denkens, viz. die Ansicht das Denken einem Zusammenwirken geistiger 
Repräsentation in mentalesisch entspricht. Zunächst wurde durch eine grammatische 
Untersuchung des Begriffes denken gezeigt, dass diese Vorstellung den 
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polymorphen Charakter des Denkens vernachlässigt.  Zudem kommt in der 
kognitionswissenschaftlichen Vorstellung des Denkens auch die zwischen dem 
Denken und dem Ausdruck des Denkens bestehende innige Verknüpfung zu kurz, 
die außerdem eng mit den durch normative Bestimmungen zum Denken 
verwendeten Begriffe sowie der mit deren Anwendung und Zuschreibung 
verbundenen Urteilen, vernetzt ist. Im Anschluss an diese Diskussion wurde dann für 
Konzeption des Denkens argumentiert die im Einklang mit der Aristotelischen 
Vorstellung des Geistes steht. Denken, so wurde argumentiert, sollte als die 
Fähigkeit verstanden werden sich in ein eng verflochtenes Netzwerk von durch 
Regeln bestimmten Handlungen einzubinden. Denken besteht nicht in der 
Zusammenwirkung geistiger Repräsentationen, sondern kommt in den 
verschiedenen Formen sprachlichen und nicht-sprachlichen Verhaltens zum 
Ausdruck. Die enge Beziehung zwischen denken, dem Ausdruck des Denkens und 
durch Regeln bestimmten Verhaltens, bildet außerdem auch die Grundlage des 
strukturierten und allgemeinen Denkens.
Kapitel sechs untersuchte schließlich die der cognitive view innewohnende 
Erklärung von Intentionalität, welche sprachliche Inhalte zunächst auf geistige Inhalte  
zurückführt, und diese dann im Rahmen eines reduktionistischen Ansatzes zu 
erklären sucht. Zusätzlich zu diesem Erklärungsansatz wurde außerdem die damit 
verbundene Annahme diskutiert dass geistigen Zuständen eine kausal Rolle in der 
Genese von Handlungen zukommt, und die Plausibilität der 
kognitionswissenschaftlichen Erklärung der Normativität und Struktur geistiger und 
sprachlicher Inhalte untersucht.  Im Laufe der Diskussion wurde gezeigt, dass die für 
den kognitionswissenschaftlichen Erklärungsansatz zentrale Unterscheidung 
zwischen intrinsischer und hergeleiteter Intentionalität inplausibel ist, da sie entweder 
zu einem infiniten Regress führt oder impliziert das man niemals die Bedeutung eines 
Zeichens vollständig verstehen könne. Als Kapitalfehler des 
kognitionswissenschaftlichen Denkansatzes wurde zudem die Vernachlässigung des 
normativen Aspekts von Sprache und Geist identifiziert. Kognitionswissenschaftler 
neigen dazu sprachliche Normen als metaphysische Behauptungen 
misszuverstehen, und fügen somit häufig banale Aussagen und Ausdrücke zu tiefen 
metaphysischen Bildern und Vorstellungen zusammen. 
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Die zahlreichen begrifflichen Misverständnisse die im Laufe dieser Arbeit 
aufgedeckt und diskutiert wurden, zeigen dass die cognitie view auf völlig 
unzureichenden, defizitären und oft sinnfreien Annahmen und Prämissen basiert. 
Zudem wird gezeigt dass die cognitive view nicht nur das Produkt verschiedener 
begrifflicher Missverständnisse und metaphysischer Spekulationen ist, sondern auch 
selbst eine Quelle philosphischer Misverständnisse darstellt, und dadurch einem 
unverzerrtem Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes und, wie z.B. die gegenwärtig 
geführte  Diskussion um die vermeintliche Ilusion des freien Willens zeigt, der 
mensschlichen Natur im Wege steht. Im Gegensatz zur cognitve view, erweist sich 
die Aristotelische Vorstellung es Geistes als der Fähigkeit Intellektuelle Fähigkeiten 
zu erwerben nicht nur als die philosophisch unproblematischere Variante, sondern 
birgt auch das Potential die Grundlage für eine Kognitionswissenschaft zu bilden, die 
frei  von den hier diskutierten begrifflicen Problemen ist. 
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Chapter I
Setting the Scene: 
The Study of Mind, Representationalism and the Cognitive View –
Main Currents, Basic Tenets and Fundamental Premises
1. The Contemporary Study of Mind and Thought: Origins and Influences
With the rise of the brain sciences in the second half of the 20
th
 century, 
questions about the nature of the human mind and its defining features of language 
and thought transcended the domain of purely philosophical reflection, while 
attracting the attention and interest of psychologists, neuroscientists, linguists and 
computer scientists. This diversification of interest provided the crucial momentum for 
the creation of a new and interdisciplinary field of research, an amalgam that has 
come to be known as cognitive science. In cognitive science, philosophical reflection 
and empirical investigation have joined forces in order to unravel the mystery of mind 
and mental phenomena such as thought, language, memory, perception etc., while 
using complementary, and it is thought potentially synergistic methods of 
investigation. Since its inception in the early 1950s, it was hoped that this new 
science of the mind would provide an explanation and understanding of the 
mechanisms, which underlie intelligent behaviour and agency. It is generally 
acknowledged that the human ability to adapt to a complex and ever changing world 
is grounded in the remarkable mental capacities of human beings. The questions 
which cognitive science pursues are thus intimately tied to the very heart of our 
human self-conception, as the answers it strives to provide seem to hold the promise 
of a deeper understanding of human nature and rational agency.
Together with investigations in cosmology and genetics, the study of the 
(human) mind and mental phenomena has adopted a pivotal position within the 
program of twentieth century natural science. Historically, the integration of the study 
of the mind into the program of the natural sciences is partly due to the dissent that 
developed between the spirit and methods of the natural sciences and the 
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humanities or Geisteswissenschaften, whose humanistic spirit
1
 they had hitherto 
been allied with
2
. The rifts, which ensued in the wake of this feud, had a profound 
impact not only on the study of the mind, but also on intellectual life and academia in 
western society as a whole. For the dissent between the natural sciences and the 
humanistic studies precipitated in the general erosion of humanistic values and the 
decline of a high culture as evident in the transformation of the conception of the 
value of education and its harnessing to the needs of a post-industrial society. This 
development culminated in the devaluation of the role of the humanities in education 
widely visible in modern societies. In philosophy, this trend precipitated in the 
promotion of the scientific method in philosophy, and its related spin-offs of logical 
positivism, naturalized epistemology and contemporary neurophilosophy
3
. It 
culminated in the establishment of a distinctly scientistic so-called empirically 
informed philosophy of mind as the main form of philosophical reflection informing the 
thinking of cognitive scientists.   
One of the main reasons, which underlay the growing rifts between the natural 
sciences and the humanistic studies, was the immense success that the sciences 
enjoyed, particularly in the twentieth century
4
. This led to the nowadays wide spread 
believe that an understanding of humanity can only be arrived at by applying the 
1
 The term ‘humanism’ is of 19th century origin and was initially used to refer to the spirit and work 
ethos of the Renaissance humanists. Beginning with Francesco Petrarca, the Renaissance humanists 
strived for a revival of classical learning (e.g. literature, art, history, philosophy and the law). The 
advocating and practicing of studia humanitatis  (e.g. grammar, rethoric, poetry) by Petrarca and his 
followers, the umanisti, aimed for the development of the human excellences in all their forms (e.g. 
Porter & Teich 1991, p.26ff). In doing so, they created not only a mere intellectual movement but a 
movement that actively pursued the rebirth of a cultural ideal of life which was to transform the cultural 
self-consciousness of Europe. This cultural ideal did not only inspire a distinct vita contemplativa but 
also precipitated in the idea of a vita activa to whose success self-knowledge and self-understanding 
derived from the studia humanitatis was a sine qua non. For the umanisti, the studia humanitatis was 
at the heart of men´s endeavour to live the life of a morally autonomous being. Today, the precise 
conception of the humanities is somewhat ambivalent and sometimes extends even to the study of 
certain branches of economics. The following are generally acknowledged to form the core of the 
humanities: the classics (ancient Greek and Latin), Literature, jurisprudence, art and art history and 
criticism, music and musicology and, of course, philosophy.
2
 See: Hacker (2001), p.33f
3
Neurophilosophy is a project within the analytic philosophy of mind. It has been initiated and 
promoted by the philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland. The foundation of neurophilosophy is 
provided by eliminative materialism. The champions of neurophilosophy believe that a scientifically 
acceptable theory of ind is only possible if the mentalistic discours of folk-psychology is substituted by 
models and theories from cognitive scence and neurobiology. (see e.g.: Churchland 1986, 1992, 
2002, Metzinger 1995,  Pauen & Roth 2001) 
4
 In a wider context, the advances in the natural sciences and subsequently advanced scientific 
technology provided the main momentum for the unleashing of powerful economic forces that 
furthered the rifts between the natural sciences and the humanities (Sen 2001, p.3f). (See also: Snow 
1993)
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causal hypothetico-deductive framework of explanation encountered in the natural 
sciences. Combined with their tremendous economic potential and the promise of 
financial gain the natural sciences thus continuously undermined the value of 
humanistic understanding - the distinctive forms of explanation and understanding 
characteristic of humanistic studies
5
. At the same time, the triumphant increase in 
popularity, which the natural sciences enjoyed, gave rise to scientism - the illicit 
extension of the methods and forms of explanation of the natural sciences. A 
prominent (early) example of scientism is the doctrine of the Unity of Science. This 
doctrine, which alleges the methodological homogeneity of scientific and humanistic 
understanding, was vigorously propounded by the logical positivists earlier this 
century, but is rooted in the positivism of the 19th century and in earlier post-
Cartesian mechanism. At its most extreme scientism is reductive taking, for example, 
the form of ontological reductionism (i.e. physicalism). As such it has become the 
defining credo of much of contemporary philosophy of psychology and cognitive 
science, affirming the identity of the psychological with the neural and informing the 
explanatory framework of cognitive science (see section 2 below). In its non-
reductive form scientism is methodological and views the study of man as being 
tantamount to the study of nature. In accord with this view, it is believed that in order 
to be of any value, the logical structure of explanation in humanistic studies has to 
take the form of explanations of the natural sciences (e.g. in the form of a 
hypothetico-deductive causal explanation of human thought and action as attempted 
by cognitive science). On this view, a full understanding and explanation of the 
nature of human mind and thinking would require a knowledge of causes and the 
laws that describe and determine them. In an attempt to account for mental 
phenomena, physicalism in modern cognitive science, for instance, deems these 
causal laws to be abstract computational algorithms executed by the neural circuitry 
of the brain (see sections 2 and 3 below, for details). 
In the course of this thesis the scientistic views underlying the accounts of the 
nature of the human mind and thinking provided by contemporary cognitive science 
will be exposed as deeply misguided and incoherent. At the heart of this endeavour 
lies the application and development of the philosophical ideas of the later 
5
 Hacker (2001), p.36f.
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Wittgenstein, who took an explicitly anti-scientistic view in his writings
6
 (e.g. BB18) 
(see section 5 below for details). The relevance of the present enterprise arises out of 
the enormous popularity and respect cognitive science enjoys nowadays among 
academics and non-academics alike. Today, the ideas of cognitive scientists have an 
enormous influence on the public’s understanding of the human mind and 
accordingly of human nature. Yet, the ‘popularisation’ of their often warped scientistic 
ideas does have a detrimental influence on disciplines and areas of human activity 
that implicitly acknowledge and depend upon an understanding of human mind and 
nature. Among the disciplines suffering from a distorted scientistic picture of human 
mind and nature are, for example, modern psychiatry and neurology as well as 
contemporary political and economic theory and the study of human rights and 
criminal law. By outlining the approach adopted in this study, delineating the views of 
cognitive scientists and identifying the targets for philosophical investigation, the 
present chapter constitutes an essential first step in achieving what is the major aim 
of this thesis, viz. to expose the reductionist
7
 representationalism of modern cognitive 
science as flawed and misconceived. As a result of exposing representationalism and 
its inherent conception of mind and thought as pseudo-theories, it will be 
demonstrated that as a model for explaining the workings of the human mind the 
cognitive view is inadequate.
2. Strategy in Context
In the attempt to understand and explain the nature of the human mind and the 
possession of psychological attributes by human beings, cognitive science, like any 
other academic discipline adopts its own characteristic point of view. This point of 
view is manifest in the set of basic tenets, premises, assumptions and beliefs, which 
form the explanatory framework within which mental phenomena are studied and 
explained by cognitive scientists
8
. The explanatory framework adopted by cognitive 
scientists, the cognitive view, will be at the heart of the following discussions. The 
objective is to excavate and expose the basic tenets and premises underlying the 
6
 See e.g.: Vossenkuhl (1995), p.15ff.
7
Note: Reductionism is no target of this thesis per se.
8
 Although cognitive science includes (strictly speaking) philosophy as an autonomous discipline, and 
the term cognitive scientist denotes philosophers as well as neuroscientists, psychologists, linguists 
etc., philosophers will be referred to independently in what follows. The term will thus denote 
philosophers who would consider themselves cognitive scientists as well as those working in the 
philosophy of mind who would not consider themselves as members of the cognitive science 
community.
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cognitive view in order to identify the targets, which are to be subjected to 
philosophical investigation in the subsequent chapters. In particular, the retracement 
of the origins of these fundamental assumptions and the reconstruction of their use in 
the creation of the causal mechanistic picture of the human mind and thinking 
propounded by contemporary cognitive science, will benefit the examination of the 
bounds of sense (see Chapter II for details). 
Fundamental to this philosophical undertaking is the method of connective 
analysis, which is the term Strawson chose to denote the kind of philosophical 
investigation in line with the ideas and spirit of the later Wittgenstein (see Chapter II 
for details).  Connective analysis thus is, 
`…the description, for purposes of philosophical elucidation, of the interconnectedness of 
related concepts, of their implications, compatibilities, and incompatibilities, of the conditions 
and circumstances of use of philosophically problematic expressions. Such analysis does not 
terminate in logically independent elementary propositions, or in simple, unanalyzable names 
or concepts. It terminates in the clarity that is obtained with respect to a given question when 
the network of concepts has been traced through all its relevant reticulations.´
9
Connective analysis emphasises the elucidation of conceptual connections and their 
ramifications (i.e. of the concepts which are constitutive of the basic assumptions 
underlying the explanatory framework of cognitive science) in order to delineate the 
bounds of sense. It thus allows for the excavation and exposition of the conceptual 
confusions embedded in the cognitive view. Once these confusions are exposed and 
their sources identified it will be possible to disentangle the knots in the thinking of 
cognitive scientists. In order for a connective analysis to be successful, it is essential 
to describe the basic premises and fundamental tenets under scrutiny as clearly and 
accurately as possible. Only in doing so is it possible to make somebody see the 
error(s) in his thinking: 
`We can bring someone’s mistake home to him only when he acknowledges it as the right 
expression for what he feels…The point is: only when he acknowledges it as such is it the 
right expression (MS 213,410) ´. 
9
 Strawson (1991), Ch.II
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The task one is up to is comparable to weaning an alcoholic or drug addict of his 
addiction. In such cases it is often the biggest problem to get someone to 
acknowledge their addiction in the first place. More often than not the mere 
suggestion of the existence of an alcohol or drug problem will be denied and fiercely 
resisted. Yet, it is common knowledge that the first step for the treatment of an 
addiction is to get the addict to acknowledge that they in fact have a problem. It is the 
same with cognitive scientists and philosophers. Because cognitive scientists and 
many contemporary philosophers suffer from a lack of training in attending critically to 
the use of concepts, combined with a general adherence to the misguided view that 
philosophical problems can be answered by constructing hypothesis and theories on 
the model of modern science, they will have to be convinced of the existence of a 
confusion in their thinking in the first place, before a step towards dispelling the 
confusion can be undertaken. Consequently, in order to convince a cognitive scientist 
or philosopher of the existence of a particular confusion he must be prepared to say 
of the description of his views: ´Yes, that is what I think. That is exactly what I think.´
Yet, doing justice to the views of cognitive scientists is not the only motive for 
making the exposition of the basic assumptions underlying the cognitive view the 
starting point of the present investigation. Another reason is the fact that it is 
characteristic of philosophical confusions that one is lead astray by them right from 
the very beginning of an enquiry. The confusions, it has been pointed out, 
‘are liable to run through an elaborate and sophisticated empirical theory precisely because 
these conceptual incoherencies are present in the very form of the questions the theory 
addresses.’
10
I suggest that the modern representationalist stance embodied by the cognitive view 
is a misguided attempt to provide an answer to questions concerning the nature of 
human mind and thinking and more generally to problems concerning the possession 
of psychological attributes by human beings per se. The attempt is misguided 
because it relies on a number of misconceived philosophical doctrines and pseudo-
theories while it is believed that their deficits (if they are recognized as such at all) 
can be overcome by the powers of modern scientific technology. However, no 
scientific technology, regardless of how powerful it may be, can be of any use in the 
10
 Hacker PMS (1991b), p.122 
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attempt to answer questions or problems, which are based on conceptual confusion. 
Equally, our understanding of the human mind will not be advanced by answers, 
which rest on conceptual confusions and transgress the bounds of sense (see 
Chapter 2).
Finally, in order to do justice to these methodological considerations the basic 
assumptions underlying the cognitive view will be put into their historic context. 
Adopting a historical perspective is particularly called for as many of the 
misconceptions the current investigation will deal with manifest the lasting influence 
of a largely forgotten or neglected philosophical heritage. Both scientific and 
philosophical arguments rely on multiple layers of hidden assumptions. And both 
scientists and philosophers are often unaware of the subliminal ways in which these 
hidden assumptions guide their thinking, direct their explanations and ultimately 
mould their understanding. Yet, it is crucial to understand the subliminal influence of 
such hidden assumptions as
`… in the active up-to-the-minute concerns of contemporary science some of the most basic 
issues are in a sense, not matters of deliberate, “rational” consideration, but are better 
understood as the residual effects of largely forgotten historical backgrounds 
11
´.
In the case of cognitive science the problematic historical background is of 
philosophical nature and largely comprised by the representationalist ideas of 17
th
and 18
th
 century philosophers like Descartes and Locke, which have been uncritically 
adopted by the initiators of the cognitive revolution in the mid-20
th
 century and which 
have been combined with ideas of modern computer technology (see below). 
3. Representationalism and the Cognitive View – A Brief Historical Sketch
Representationalism is the view that without a medium of internal 
representations intelligent systems could not act in the way they do:
‘…nothing binds the methodologically diverse research fields named by cognitive science as 
does their conviction that without internal representations over which to operate (e.g. to 
compute, to use, to manipulate, or to store), no intelligent system could do what it does. 
11
Horder (2001),  p.122
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Consequently, cognitive scientists of nearly all stripes and theoretical persuasions tend to posit 
internal representations to explain how intelligent systems work.’
12
Representationalist ideas lie at the heart of both a popular folk-psychological and 
cognitive scientific picture of mind and thought. They occupy a pivotal role in 
explaining the possession of psychological attributes by human beings. As Sterelny 
points out, for example, 
`the scientific and the folk picture converge on the idea that representation is central to human 
minds´.
13
Cognitive scientists describe and explain the display of often-intricate behavioural 
strategies by invoking the notion of representations, which are derived from and 
constituted by our sensory input. Accordingly, we are able to competently navigate 
our way through the world and apparently effortlessly relate present to former 
situations by analysing sensory information and by using it to direct and redirect 
behaviour. Thus, we dash off when a lion or an overly ‘enthusiastic’ English bulldog is 
after us, for example, but we stop and wait when a friend is calling. Similarly, we are 
prompted to console a friend who returns from the exam schools in a flood of tears, 
but we would share her relief and joy (usually, by applying ample amounts of 
champagne, flower, whipped cream and confetti to said friend) if she emerges with a 
victorious smile on her face after having sat her last paper. For both the cognitive 
scientist and the layman it seems natural to ascribe understanding, knowledge or 
beliefs to any system that acts adaptively in response to complex environmental 
stimuli of the kind just depicted. 
Historically, the modern representationalism underlying the cognitive view is 
deeply rooted in Descartes’ vision of the mind and consciousness on the one hand, 
and Lockean empiricism on the other
14
. Descartes, for example, postulated that ideas 
are essential to consciousness and that every idea is a representation. As he 
regarded thought as the defining feature of consciousness having ideas or operating 
on ideas, pace Descartes, is to think. A similar position was held by Locke. Like 
12
 Stufflebaum (1999), p.637
13
 Sterelny (1990) p.19
14
 It is noteworthy, however, that the likeness or resemblance assumption between object and its 
representation which is central to representationalism has been adopted by various philosophers since 
the times of Plato and Aristotle. (See for example: Watson (1995), Chapter 1)
9
Descartes, Locke believed that ideas rather than objects are the constituents of 
thought. In opposition to the Cartesian notion of innate ideas, however, he postulated 
that the human mind is furnished with ideas through the exercise of the senses. Our 
experience, so Locke thought, is constituted by ideas, which are representations of 
the objects inhabiting the real world. Each human being combines these ideas to 
construct his own individual inner mental world (E 2.2.2). Thus, ideas are 
representations of objects outside the mind. According to both Descartes and Locke 
representations, while including both general and particular features of the world, are 
to be thought of as events or going ons within an individual’s head or mind, reflecting 
events outside it. 
The kinds of philosophies that in the wake of Descartes and Locke have come 
to be associated with representationalism are best conceived of as a family of related 
doctrines. These doctrines share a number of key assumptions but should not be 
thought of as constituting a single rigidly defined metaphysical point of view
15
. While 
Descartes and Locke conceived of representations as ideas, contemporary cognitive 
science, on the other hand, thinks of them as bundles of information, i.e. symbolic 
representations, on which mental processes operate. And rather than being a 
Lockean storehouse of ideas modern cognitive science pictures the human mind as 
an information processing system similar to a computer. Analogous to the Cartesian 
and Lockean ideas, however, the mental representations of cognitive science are 
conceived of as mental causes and their interactions are thought to constitute mental 
processes. Influenced by modern computer technology the cognitive view takes the 
human mind to be a complex system, which operates on or computes information 
constituted by mental representations. And while rejecting the Cartesian notion of an 
immaterial mind, thus attempting to cast off the shadow of dualism, many cognitive 
scientists and contemporary philosophers believe the brain to be the material basis of 
mind. As a result, the terms mind and brain are often used interchangeably and 
synonymically
16
. 
15
 Stephen Stich points out that the “market” offers a dizzying variety of theories of mental 
representation and content ranging from causal covariation theories, teleological theories, functional 
role theories, to single factor theories, multiple factor theories, narrow theories, wide theories as well 
as variations of all these themes (see: Stich 1992).
However, rather than concerning itself with a discussion of either one of these theories the 
present investigation aims to examine and refute the common premises underlying all of these 
theories of mental representation.
16
 See for example: Chomsky 1966, 1995. Also: Stillings et al 1998
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The mind/brain is envisaged as a form of biological information processing unit 
or biological computer, which receives, stores, retrieves, transforms and transmits 
information. These operations on information are subsumed under the term 
computations or information processes, indicating that in any case, whatever the 
mind does, some sort of information (i.e. representation) is processed and worked 
upon or worked with
17
. As a result, cognitive scientists are prone to explain the 
possession of psychological attributes by human beings by applying psychological 
predicates to the brain. Statements like the brain or a sub-system of the brain thinks, 
believes, remembers, hopes, fears or recognizes are common phrases applied in 
explanations of mental phenomena. However, the meaningfulness and intelligibility of 
such claims is questionable. The criteria for the application of psychological 
predicates are constituted by the various behavioural patterns which are displayed in 
specific contexts and which are applied against a background of widely ramifying and 
complex capacities manifest in human behaviour (or systems that behave in 
sufficiently similar ways like human beings). Yet, none of these criteria are met by the 
brain, and unless the ascription of psychological attributes to the brain is meant to be 
taken figuratively or metonymically the bounds of sense are being transgressed. The 
ascription of psychological attributes to the brain (or parts of the brain) constitutes a 
violation of the logic of whole/parthood relationships and the error underlying this 
violation has by various authors been described as the Homunculus Fallacy (e.g. 
Kenny 1987) or the Mereological Fallacy (e.g. Hacker 1993; see also: Ryle 1990). 
The consequences of the violation of the logic of whole/parthood relationships will be 
discussed en detail in chapter III (see also 3.1 below).
Fundamental to the consistency of the idea of a causal interaction of mental 
representations (mental processing) is the claim that mental representations possess 
content or intentionality
18
. This claim is motivated by the thought that without the 
17
 Note: The cognitive view is sometimes also referred to as the information processing view of the 
mind.
18
Intentionality denotes the property of mental states of being about something. According to Franz 
Brentano (1874) all and only mental states possess intentionality: ‘Every mental phenomenon is 
characterised by what the scholastics of the middle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence 
of an object, and what we might call…reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not 
to be understood here as meaning a thing)´ (Brentano 1874, p.88ff.).
Intentional in-existence, meaning existence in the mind as an essential component of a mental 
act, thus distinguishes mental from physical phenomena. Everything cognitive is intentional, and 
intentional inexistence is the key aspect of the mental. Furthermore, it implies that any non-mental 
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basic property of being about something, there can be no intentional causation and 
consequently no causal explanation of behaviour (see also 3.2 below). In the context 
of folk psychology, for example, the mental causes, or propositional attitudes (PAs)
as they are commonly referred to, are conceived of as psychological dispositions
(e.g. an agent’s desires, beliefs, hopes, fears etc.), which are directed towards a 
specific intentional-state
19
 (for example, mental states with representational content 
such as ‘that I have to meet my professor today to discuss my thesis’ or ‘that Achilles 
is a lovely English bulldog’). The interaction of different propositional attitudes (i.e., 
the mental processing of representation) is conceived of as the basis for an 
explanation of human agency. An agent’s behaviour is thus explained by invoking the 
mental causes, his propositional attitudes, for the agent’s doing thus-and-so
20
. The 
propositional attitudes are taken to constitute an inner representation or inner map of 
the world, as it were, according to which an organism plots its course of action. While 
these ideas provide a rough sketch of the human mind and an explanation of thought 
and behaviour, the cognitive view manifests the attempt to provide an understanding 
of these features in causal mechanistic terms. 
3.1 Medium and Nature of Representation 
Besides the claims that information processes are representational and 
characterised by intentionality another central postulate of cognitive science is the 
idea that the central processes of the human mind constitute a physical symbol 
system, which encodes meanings
21
. This claim is motivated by the functionalist 
dilemma of not being able to account for the intentionality of mental phenomena. 
Contemporary computationalist, i.e. representationalist, theories are the offspring of 
functionalist theories of mind which originated in the 1960s. Inspired by Turing’s work 
state that seems to possess content must do so in virtue of some mental state, which possesses that 
content. This leads to a distinction between `underived/natural´ and `derived´ intentionality.
19
All propositional attitudes are characterised by intentionality. Their intentionality or content can be 
described by a that clause. 
20
 Colin McGinn, for example, elaborates this idea thus: ‘First reference is made to a particular person; 
then some attitude is ascribed to that person; finally a content is specified for that attitude. Assertions 
of this form tell us who has what attitude towards which proposition. By making and receiving such 
assertions we come (it seems) to understand other people: what they do, why they want such and 
such, what made them hope for so and so, and so forth. Varying the three elements in the person-
attitude-content structure gives us a seemingly powerful system for describing the minds of others 
(and our own), a system both antique and ubiquitous. Thinking of this system as a (tacit and 
unformalized) theory, we can say that folk psychology is a theory that centrally employs an 
explanatory ontology of persons and contentful attitudes; with these basic theoretical resources it sets 
about its explanatory and descriptive work.’ (See: McGinn 1989, p.120)
21
See e.g.: Newell 1980, Newell et al 1989, Stillings et al 1995, p.20.
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on machine tables, Hilary Putnam (1967) put forward his theory of functionalism, the 
idea that mental states are to be identified with respect to the causal or functional role 
they mediate between sensations and behaviour. The functional role it was 
supposed, would determine the nature or identity of a particular mental state. 
However, though a functionalist analysis and definition of mental states has its merits 
with regard to such states as pain, for example, a functionalist theory falls short of 
explaining the decisive feature of such mental phenomena like thoughts, believes, 
hopes etc.. In addition to the functional role these phenomena are playing they are 
characterised by being about something. Functionalism fails to explain intentionality 
as it does not provide a clear connection between playing a particular causal role and 
being about something. This problem is addressed in representationalist theories of 
mind through the additional claim that the mental states identified and accounted for 
by functionalism encode meanings.  Consequently, in a computationalist context 
cognition is viewed as a multitude of formal symbol manipulation processes which 
can be interpreted semantically. The possibility of giving a semantic interpretation of 
cognitive processes allows for giving an account of their 
meaningfulness/intentionality. 
3.2 The Language of Thought
The idea that the human mind encodes meanings is itself not without 
problems, however.  The claim that mental states encode meanings begs the 
question as to how the physical implementation of meaningful information processes 
is achieved. Trying to gain an understanding of the medium in which computational 
processes are implemented in is now one of the key problems concerning an overall 
understanding of cognition
22
. A highly influential answer to the problems surrounding 
the physical encoding of meanings has been provided by Jerry Fodor (1975). Writing 
from a representationalist perspective, Jerry Fodor regards cognition as consisting in 
computational operations on internal mental representations in a language of thought 
(LOT). This LOT, so-called mentalese, is pictured as an innate language providing a 
22
Characteristic of the attempts to solve this problem is the renunciation of the idea of an immaterial 
Cartesian mind. Instead, cognitive scientists have by and large opted for a materialist position and 
declared the brain to be the physical medium in which cognition occurs. Adopting the view that 
cognition is the result of the workings of a material biological structure and not the product of the 
mysterious workings of an immaterial substance is reminiscent of the change in point of view which 
occurred among biologists in the 19
th
 century. Then it was no longer thought that life is not the result of 
a special life force but rather is the result of a characteristic organisation and interplay of matter and 
energy.
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medium of thought, while containing all the necessary conceptual resources to 
express any belief or hope a human being might ever harbour:
‘At the heart of the theory (of representationalism) is the postulation of a language of thought: 
an infinite set of mental representations which function both as the immediate objects of 
propositional attitudes, and as the domains of mental processes. More precisely, the 
representationalist theory of mind is the conjunction of the following 2 claims:
Claim 1(the nature of propositional attitudes): For any organism O, and any attitude A toward 
the proposition P, there is a (computational/functional) relation R and a mental representation 
MP such that MP means that P, and O has A iff R to MP…
Claim 2(the nature of mental processes): Mental processes are causal consequences of 
tokenings of mental representations.‘ 
23
Closely linked to these ideas is Fodor´s aim to give a reductionist naturalistic account 
of content claiming that
‘…sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they have been compiling of the 
ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm and 
charge will perhaps appear on their list. But aboutness surely won’t; intentionality simply 
doesn’t go that deep. It’s hard to see…how one can be a realist about intentionality without 
also being a, to some extent or other, a reductionist. If the semantic and intentional are real 
properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with…properties that are neither
intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else.’ 
24
Thus conceived, the LOT is an attempt to provide a foundation for thought and 
meaning and consequently of rational human agency within causal reductionist 
terms. While few have followed Fodor in adopting this extreme hypothesis, some 
weaker form of a LOT view, i.e., that there is a mental language that is different from 
human spoken languages, has been adopted by a wide variety of cognitive scientists.
4. The Implications of the Cognitive View – Targets Revisited
After having outlined the basic tenets and believes underlying the cognitive 
view it is now necessary to spell out their implications for the explanations of mind 
and thought proposed by cognitive scientists. The contemporary form of 
23
 Fodor (1987), p.16f
24
 ibid.p.97
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representationalism endorsed by cognitive science (and exemplified in Fodor´s LOT 
hypothesis, for example) constitutes a modern attempt to provide an answer to the 
question as to the nature of mind and thought. In particular, it attempts to offer an 
account of how human agency is possible by explaining the possession of 
psychological attributes by human beings and by accounting for the question as to 
how mental states can be about something. How can the mental be part of nature? 
How, it is asked, can such apparently puzzling and mysterious properties be 
integrated into our existing sophisticated scientific picture of the world? It is the 
purpose of the following section to illuminate the consequences and ramifications of 
the answer given by cognitive science to these questions.
4.1 Modern Representationalism and its Cartesian Legacy
As the brief historical sketch provided above indicated modern 
representationalism is a descendant of both Cartesian mind body dualism and 
Lockean empiricism. The link between the classical representationalism of Descartes 
and Locke and the cognitive view is philosophically of the utmost significance as it 
shows some interesting parallels between the classical and the modern way of 
thinking about the mind. First, the modern representationalist position depicts thinking 
and other mental phenomena such as language, memory, perception etc. as 
cognitive processes that require the use, manipulation and storage of internal mental 
representations. In doing so, it retains a distinctly Cartesian/Lockean point of view. 
Both Descartes and Locke deemed the operation of ideas to be the basis of mind 
and cognition. Thus, it would appear that with regard to the operations of the mind 
the modern cognitive science point of view has not advanced substantially beyond 
the basic ideas articulated by Descartes and Locke. In essence, it seems that the 
information processing view of the mind is nothing but the classical 
Cartesian/Lockean view clothed in fancy dress, woven out of threads of updated 
terminology
25
, as it were. Yet, despite the fancy dress the basic logical features of 
classical representationalism are retained in its modern pendant. For example, it is 
characteristic of both classical and modern representationalism that it implies an 
asymmetry with respect to the access and content of mental states by assuming that 
25
In terms of development and progress or thought, it appears that all that has happened is that a 
modernised jargon has been introduction into the debate. This, in turn, is indicative of the influence 
which modern computer technology has exercised over philosophy and cognitive science over the last 
decades.
15
the mind is asymmetrically accessible from first and third person perspectives. That 
is, while mental states can be ascribed to others on the basis of behavioural 
evidence, no such evidence is needed for the self-ascription of a mental state. 
Accordingly, it seems that I can only know that someone else is in pain if another 
person exhibits pain behaviour or if he or she is saying so. I on the other hand, do 
know immediately whether I am in pain. It seems that I have direct unmediated 
access to the contents of my mind
26
.This apparent asymmetry between the first and 
third person access to the mind ultimately precipitates in the assumption that the 
mind is a private inner realm to which I have privileged access to. On the other hand, 
one readily believes that one has only indirect access to other people’s minds. These 
are part of an outer public realm, which is independent of the goings on in our own 
minds and which is equally accessible to everyone. This Inner/Outer picture of the 
mind plays a crucial role in the characterisation of mental states as directly
accessible and private and has an immediate impact on the questions regarding the 
explanatory priority regarding linguistic and mental content as it is intimately bound 
up with ideas regarding the nature of language (see 3.3 below). The Inner/Outer 
picture of the mind has been introduced into philosophy by Descartes and adopted 
by both his followers and the British empiricists. As part of the Cartesian legacy it is 
an integral component of the cognitive view. The examination of the intelligibility of 
this picture will be an integral part of the present philosophical investigation (see 
Chapters III and IV, also Bennett and Hacker 2003, Hacker 1997b, Kenny 1984, 
1989 ). 
 Second, the link between classical representationalism and the modern 
representationalist stance also sheds some interesting like on the change in point of 
view that has occurred with regard to the mind brain relationship. It is characteristic of 
modern cognitive science that it renounces Cartesian dualism. Rather than 
conceiving of an immaterial substance as the bearer of mental/psychological 
properties like Descartes and his followers did, cognitive scientists view the brain as 
possessing psychological attributes. This change manifests itself in the fact that 
26
 It is noteworthy, that this asymmetry also seems to apply to linguistic meaning. While it seems that I 
always know the meaning of my own words (under usual circumstances) I sometimes seem to have to 
rely on some kind of indirect clue or evidence to understand the meaning or words or sentences 
uttered by somebody else. I.e., I might have to ask that person if the meaning of certain words or a 
sentence are not clear to me, or I might have to infer the meaning from the linguistic or behavioural 
context in which the words or sentence were used. In either case it seems that there exists a similar 
first/third person asymmetry with the respect to linguistic meaning as exists between my mental states 
and other person’s mental states.
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cognitive scientists use the terms mind and brain more often than not 
interchangeably. Thus, it is the mind/brain which is viewed as a biological information 
processing unit which encodes amongst other things the meanings of our thoughts, 
believes, desires, hopes, fears etc. rather than an immaterial substance. As a result 
cognitive scientists often explain mental phenomena by claiming that the brain sees, 
hears, thinks, recognizes etc. and is engaged in a variety of other activities which are 
accounted for by the ascription of psychological predicates to the brain. However, 
such claims still have a distinctly Cartesian ring to them, as cognitive science 
ascribes a similar range of properties to the mind/brain in its explanations as 
Descartes did to the soul. The explanation of the possession of psychological 
attributes by human beings by reference to the brain (which Cartesians ascribed to 
an immaterial mind or soul), thus, seems to be an incidental corollary of the 
repudiation of Cartesian substance dualism by cognitive scientists. Despite this 
repudiation, however, cognitive science retains an important aspect of Cartesian 
philosophy, viz. its conceptual framework. Yet, the logic of this conceptual framework 
is deeply flawed. To ascribe psychological attributes to the mind or the brain makes 
no more sense than ascribing them to the soul. 
As mentioned earlier, both cases constitute a violation of the logic of 
whole/parthood relationships and are the result of conceptual confusion. What, we 
have to ask ourselves, does it mean to say that the brain thinks, sees, hears, 
recognizes etc. What counts as the brain thinking, seeing, hearing, recognizing? In 
the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein points out that the application of 
psychological predicates makes only sense if they are applied to human beings or to 
what behaves sufficiently like a human being (PI §281). Following Hacker (1997b) 
and Kenny (1984,1987) Chapter III will investigate the implications of this claim for 
the cognitive view, and illuminate the sources of conceptual confusion, which underlie 
the violation of whole/parthood relationships. 
4.2 Mental Representations – Issues regarding Content, Normativity, 
Systematicity and the Structure of Thought and Language
A vital feature of the cognitive view is the claim that mental representations 
encode meanings. This claim underlies the idea of a causal interaction of mental 
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states and the explanation of human agency, which follows in its wake. It links the 
idea of mental content/intentionality with an explanatory theory of speech and 
meaning. Because the content of mental representations can be described as 
attitudes or relations towards propositions it is also called propositional content and 
the content laden mental states are often referred to as propositional attitudes (PAs) 
(see above). According to cognitive science PAs are mental causes and provide the 
basis for the explanation of behaviour in our everyday lives. The possession of 
propositional attitudes is, in turn, explained by hypostatizing the existence of internal 
states, which encode those propositional attitudes. The attempt to provide an 
explanation of agency in terms of propositional attitudes demands that an account of 
the characteristic properties of content, systematicity and normativity, is provided. 
The cognitive view satisfies this demand by implying the claim that there exists some 
logical relational structure between the content-laden mental states, which account 
for the systematicity of content
27
. 
The rational logical relations in which mental states stand in respect to each 
other are taken to be a manifestation of the normativity of content. The normativity of 
content is further underlined by the characterisation of intentionality in terms of 
propositional content. It consists in the fact that words can be used correctly and 
incorrectly (according to certain rules which provide the standard for their correct 
application) and/or that believes can be true or false (i.e. the instantiation of certain 
matters of fact substantiates or refutes a certain believe). The meaning of a word or 
sentence is determined by the circumstances, which warrant their application, i.e. the 
situations in which it would be correct to use it. Propositional attitudes specify a 
condition for the world to satisfy if the attitude is to be fulfilled. For example, the truth 
of my belief that it will not rain tomorrow depends on the absence of rain and the 
presence of a cloudless sky and sunshine the next day. This link between normativity 
and content bearing phenomena is described by Wittgenstein as follows:
‚Der Wunsch scheint schon zu wissen, was ihn erfüllen wird, oder würde; der Satz, der 
Gedanke, was ihn war macht, auch wenn es gar nicht da ist! Woher dieses Bestimmen, 
dessen, was noch nicht  da ist? Dieses despotische Fordern? („Die Härte des logischen 
Muß?.“)’ (PU§437)
27
 see for example: Frege G (1987), ‘Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik’
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‘‘A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a thought, what 
makes it true--even when that thing is not there at all! Whence this determining of what is not 
yet there? This despotic demand? ("The hardness of the logical must.").’ (PI§437)
The notions of normativity and systematicity point at an important similarity 
between linguistic meaning and mental content, or rather, between language and 
thought. Normativity and systematicity are both distinctive features of language and 
thought. The language of thought hypothesis has emerged as a philosophical attempt 
to provide an explanation of the link between this features and account of the relation 
of language and thought. The systematicity and normativity of language is 
understood as resulting from the compositional structure of sentences. This 
compositional structure is thought to be paralleled by the compositional structure of 
inner mental representations, which constitute the linguistic vehicles of thought. 
Fodor’s mentalese is pictured as an innate language providing a medium of thought, 
while containing all the necessary conceptual resources to express any belief or hope 
etc., a human being might ever harbour. Thus, the LOT aims to provide not only the 
foundation of thought and meaning, but in the context of human behaviour, also of 
rational human agency
28
. 
4.3 Representationalism and Intrinsic Intentionality – The Relationship 
between, Natural Content and Linguistic Meaning
A further characteristic of the modern representationalist stance exemplified by 
the cognitive view and the LOT hypothesis is the attempt to explain linguistic 
meaning as resulting from mental content, and subsequently to provide a reductionist 
explanation of mental content by using non-intentional concepts. The basic idea is 
that mental content can be explained by the possession of inner mental 
representations. These representations, it is thought, possess natural (underived)
content (also referred to as intrinsic intentionality) because of the causal relationships 
in which they stand. Without postulating that mental content is characterised by the 
possession of intrinsic intentionality a causal reductionist explanation of content 
would not be possible. 
The mental representations by means of which mental content is explained 
are conceived of as internal states, which are ontologically independent of the 
28
 see Fodor (1975), p.26ff
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external world. This claim is reminiscent of Descartes’ and Locke’s theories of mind 
according to which ideas are discrete, freestanding, immaterial particulars which exist 
in an (inner) mental realm that is discontinuous and independent of the external 
world. Contrary to the Cartesian and Lockean view, however, contemporary cognitive 
science adopts a materialist position, claiming that mental states are states of the 
body and realized in the brain. As states of the body the mental states possess 
intrinsic (non-relational) properties, which account for their ontologically independent 
existence of the outside world. The independence of the outside world also accounts 
for the characterisation of the mental states as inner
29
. Furthermore, the internal 
states are hypothesized to be the inner termini of the causal chains (of propositional 
attitudes) that instigate behaviour. This claim partly reflects the functionalist ties that 
exist between representationalism and functionalism.  Both views share the believe 
that behaviour is to be understood as the result of the causal interaction of mental 
representations.  
In addition to the claim that mental representations stand in causal relations to 
each other, representationalism implicitly also claims that mental representations 
stand in a causal relation to the outside world: 
‘Thoughts are inner representations; thinking is the processing of inner, mental 
representations. These representations have a double aspect…their role within the mind 
depends on their individualist, perhaps their syntactic, properties…and they are 
representations in virtue of relations with the world. Mental states represent in virtue of causal 
relations of some kind with what they represent.’
30
The fundamental idea expressed in this remark is that mental representations are 
believed to possess content as a result of their causal relations to the external world. 
It is characteristic of both mental states and linguistic tokens that they share 
the property of intentionality. Both possess content. The representationalist idea that 
mental content can be explained as a result of processes, which can be described in 
naturalistic non-intentional terms implies that linguistic meaning is derived from 
mental content and can be accounted for in terms of the reductionist explanation 
29
 The issue of Cartesian scepticism regarding the existence of the external world will not be 
addressed here. 
30
Sterelny (1990), p.39
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given for mental content. The reasons why representationalism gives explanatory 
priority to mental content rather than linguistic meaning is partly due to the fact that 
that linguistic meaning is tied up with conventions for the use and interpretation of 
signs. Yet, causal theories of content as implied by Fodor´s representationalist 
stance, for example, are much more likely to be successful for mental 
representations than for words. This is due to the fact that whether a certain word is 
used in the description or reference to a certain thing, object or person to which it 
refers depends apart from the word meaning, above all, on the intention of the 
language user. Yet, entertaining certain thoughts is, more often than not, not a 
voluntary activity. Thus, I automatically think Achilles and Velvet on seeing my two 
English bulldogs before me. Similarly, on hearing the sound of water splashing 
against my roof top and window pain, I automatically think it’s raining. As a result of 
this, representationalism assumes that a causal link between mental content and 
states of affairs of the outside world is easier to account for (as more consistent) as 
that between linguistic tokens and states of affairs of the outside world. The attempt 
to account for content in non-intentional reductionist terms is more likely to be 
successful if mental representations are ascribed natural content/intrinsic 
intentionality as this makes for a shorter causal chain of events that needs explaining. 
The representationalist attempt to explain linguistic content as resulting from 
mental content and then to give a reductionist account of the latter fails to 
acknowledge, however, that mental content cannot be explained as a result of 
freestanding internal mental representations. Consequently linguistic meaning cannot 
be explained as the result of the “animation of otherwise dead signs by acts of 
understanding”. The discussion in chapter VI will show that words are not injected 
with meaning through acts of understanding. Instead, their meaning is their use. 
Mental states are not internal free-standing states of the mind which have to be 
connected via mechanisms with the world but are intrinsically relational states. Free-
standing internal representations cannot account for the normativity of content as 
they either presuppose what they set out to explain or fail to sustain normativity.
5. Wittgenstein and the Study of Mind
As indicated earlier, the philosophical ideas of the later Wittgenstein will 
provide the foundation for the present investigation. Representational theories of 
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mind are continuous with the Cartesian tradition in various respects, in particular, in 
their commitment to the (scientistic) explanatory role of mental processes and mental 
representation. As Wittgenstein’s rejection of the Cartesian model of mind is closely 
linked to his philosophy of language and his ideas about the role of language in 
human life, his philosophy of language, which in turn is based on his revolutionary 
conception of the nature of philosophy and philosophical investigation, will be 
discussed in chapter II. Such an overview of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy will 
provide a context for the philosophical ideas applied in the course of this thesis. 
An appreciation of the revolutionary character of Wittgenstein’s later views is 
the key to an understanding of the potential and significance of his later philosophy. 
In the past, the failure to highlight the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s later views, has 
contributed significantly to the misunderstanding of his later philosophy, and 
consequently to the demise of its influence on current philosophical trends. Although 
many of Wittgenstein’s insights constitute irreversible advances in the philosophy of 
language and the philosophy of mind
31
, his ideas have yet to be absorbed by the 
majority of contemporary philosophers. By adopting a characteristically 
Wittgensteinian approach in the investigation of the cognitive view, the present study 
also aims to highlight the power and potential of Wittgenstein’s ideas, which in the 
contemporary scientistic climate are all but forgotten. 
31
 See e.g.: Kenny 1973
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Chapter II
On the Significance and Implications of Wittgenstein’s Later 
Philosophy - An Overview
1. A New Philosophy
In the history of philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein stands out by having 
developed two entirely different and unique philosophical “worldviews”. These 
precipitated in the publication of his (early) Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus and his 
(later) Philosophical Investigations respectively. Both works had a profound influence 
on the development of 20
th
 century analytic philosophy in so far as these two works 
constituted the defining landmarks against which much of the philosophy, which 
followed in the wake of the publication of these works, was defined. Despite some 
continuity between the Tractatus of the young Wittgenstein and the Investigations of 
the later Wittgenstein
32
 the two books stand diametrically opposed to each other. 
After ending his self-imposed exile and return to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein 
undermined the major ideas that informed the Tractatus and gradually developed an 
entirely new philosophical worldview and method(s). This development was based on 
a novel conception of language, linguistic meaning and view of the relationship 
between language and reality. Together, the new ideas provided the foundation for 
the unprecedented and revolutionary conception of philosophy, which Wittgenstein 
developed and refined throughout his later years. The radical, revolutionary and, 
quite literally, world-shattering ideas of the later Wittgenstein found their most 
coherent expression in the Philosophical Investigations. Since its publication, 
Wittgenstein scholars have variously depicted the book as ‘…having no ancestors in 
the history of thought ’
33
, or described it as work which ‘…can no more be located on 
the received maps of philosophical possibilities than the North Star can be located on 
32
 There exists continuity between the Tractatus and the Investigations with respect to both theme 
(e.g. the nature of linguistic representation, the relationship between thought and its linguistic 
expression, the intentionality of thought, metaphysics and the nature of philosophy) and philosophical 
judgement (e.g. the Investigations reaffirm the young Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege and Russell, 
underline his denial that philosophy is a cognitive discipline and restate his rejection of psychologism 
in logic).
33
 v. Wright (1984), p.14
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maps of the globe.’
34
 However, most people fail to come close to even a partial 
understanding of the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought, which has been 
highlighted by these remarks. From the days when fragments of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy
35
 were first circulated among Oxbridge philosophers and the posthumous 
publication of the Philosophical Investigations until today, Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy tends to suffer from gross misrepresentation and misunderstanding.
The controversies surrounding Wittgenstein’s thought and the abundance of 
misrepresentation and misinterpretation have led to a relative demise in the study of 
Wittgenstein, and the kind of analytic philosophy inspired by his later works to the 
point where, as Anthony Kenny has remarked, his insights are in danger of being 
lost
36
. Today, this neglect is particularly problematic for the philosophical novice, who 
is indoctrinated early on with the theories and hypotheses of those scientistically 
minded philosophers, whose works tend to dominate the mainstream of 
contemporary philosophical thinking. In addition, it prevents the illumination of the 
crucial problems and understanding of the central questions, which the ever-
expanding community of cognitive scientists concern’s itself with. It is this community, 
in particular, for which Wittgenstein’s later ideas could be invaluable: 
‘I…believe that there are many areas of philosophy, and many fields of scientific endeavour, in 
which really fruitful work is unlikely to be done by anyone who has not absorbed what 
Wittgenstein has to teach. Those who ignore Wittgenstein’s critique of false philosophy and 
pseudo-science take the risk of constructing imposing edifices of thought which turn out to be 
nothing but houses of cards.
37
’
The present chapter will provide an introduction to Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and give a synopsis of its central tenets.  A particular emphasis will be put 
on contemporary issues regarding the clarity of Wittgenstein exegesis and accuracy 
of the interpretation of his later philosophy. Despite the myriad of (introductory) 
textbooks and essays on Wittgensteinian thought, even the most eminent of 
Wittgenstein scholars are more often than not unsuccessful in their attempts to 
convey the relevance of Wittgensteinian ideas to an audience, which has already
34
 Hacker PMS (1996a), p.103 
35
 Note: Of course, Wittgenstein’s earlier philosophy is not immune to misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding either, as the dispute about the ”New Wittgenstein” shows. 
36
 Kenny A (1984), p.vii
37
 ibid., p.viii
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been indoctrinated or courted by the writings of empirically minded philosophers and 
cognitive scientists who promise insight into the “mysteries” of mind and brain. The 
fact that the efforts to prevent misrepresentations of Wittgensteinian thought and to 
correct false judgement regarding the character of his ideas have met with little, if 
any, success has lead to a dramatic demise in the reputation of Wittgenstein 
scholarship among empirically minded philosophers and cognitive scientists. In 
addition, these developments have been conducive to the fostering of a virulent 
scientism in philosophy evident in the widespread misunderstanding of the 
relationship between science and philosophy. Without a profound understanding of 
the relationship between science and philosophy, however, any interdisciplinary 
study of the mind and brain is likely to get entangled in a misguided scientistic routine 
of theory construction and hypothesis testing as evidenced by the development of the 
cognitive view (see Chapter I). Consequently, the exposition of this relationship within 
the course of this chapter is crucial to delineating and correcting the philosophical 
problems surrounding the defining credo of classical cognitive science, which lies at 
the heart of this thesis. Finally, by sharpening the awareness and understanding of 
the revolutionary character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy it is hoped that the 
ground for preventing the undeserved and entirely ill judged dismissal of 
Wittgensteinian ideas
38
 in the future, can be prepared. 
1.1 A Break with Tradition – A New Standard of Achievement in Philosophy
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
39
 (and to some extent also the kind of analytic 
philosophy which followed in the wake of the Investigations) constitutes a radical 
38
 Note: It is precisely because Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has no ancestors in the history of 
thought, that one should be doubly suspicious of philosophers and cognitive scientists who dismiss 
Wittgenstein alternately as a sceptic, constructivist, anti-realist or behaviourist. With regard to the 
misinterpretation of Wittgenstein Peter Hacker remarks, for example: ‘The temptations to pigeonhole 
him (Wittgenstein), to classify his philosophy as a kind of idealism or of anti-realism, to identify his 
philosophy of language as a form of assertion-condition semantics standing in contrast to truth-
conditional semantics or as propounding a ‘use’ theory of meaning, to characterize his philosophy of 
mind as a kind of behaviourism, to think of his philosophy of mathematics as a form of strict-finitism, 
and so on have evidently been difficult to resist. But resisted they must be if one is to understand 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.’ (Hacker 2001, p.ix)
39
 Wittgenstein’s later philosophy developed roughly from 1929 onwards after he had returned to 
Cambridge. As Peter Hacker points out, the reorientation necessary for the development of his new 
philosophy took place remarkably quickly. This is all the more astonishing, he suggests, if one 
conceives of the change Wittgenstein’s thinking had undergone as similar to the radical transformation 
in style seen in the works of painters like Kandinsky or Van Gogh. Wittgenstein himself remarked: 
‘Meine Hauptdenkbewegung ist heute eine ganz andere als vor 15-20 Jahren. Und das ist ähnlich wie 
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break with over two-thousand years of Western philosophical thought, including his 
own earlier philosophical worldview as exposed in the Tractatus. In the early notes 
that Wittgenstein compiled after taking up philosophy again in 1929, and which have 
post-humously been published under the title Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein 
tells us, for example, that,
‘Dieses Buch ist für solche geschrieben, die seinem Geist freundlich gegenüberstehen. 
Dieser Geist ist ein anderer als der des großen Stromes der europäischen und 
amerikanischen Zivilisation, in dem wir alle stehen. Dieser äußert sich in einem Fortschritt, in 
einem Bauen immer größerer und komplizierter Strukturen, jener andere in einem Streben 
nach Klarheit und Durchsichtigkeit welcher Strukturen immer. Dieser will die Welt durch ihre 
Peripherie – in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit – erfassen, jener in ihrem Zentrum – ihrem Wesen. Daher 
reiht dieser ein Gebilde an das andere, steigt quasi von Stufe zu Stufe immer weiter während 
jener dort bleibt, wo er ist, und immer dasselbe erfassen will. ...’ (PB, Vorwort)
‘This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from 
the one, which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us 
stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more 
complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what 
structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery--in its variety; the second at 
its centre--in its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, 
as it were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to 
grasp is always the same….’ (PR, Preface)
The difference in spirit to which Wittgenstein refers to was most clearly discernable in 
his novel conception regarding the nature of philosophy and his unprecedented view 
with respect to the standard of achievement in philosophy. In contrast to the great 
(metaphysical) tradition of Western philosophy, which varyingly conceived of the
subject as an investigation into the essence of all things, an enquiry into the 
indubitable foundation of knowledge or the a priori possibility of knowledge per se
40
, 
wenn ein Maler von einer Richtung zu einer anderen übergeht. (MS 183, 141)’ (see: Baker & Hacker 
2005, p.257)
40
For Plato, philosophy was an investigation of eternal truths and a path to knowledge of the 
essences of all things.  Aristotle, on the other hand, conceived of philosophy as an investigation into 
the fundamental premises and methodological principles of the sciences, to which philosophy stands 
in a continuum. Thus, Aristotelian metaphysics, for example, deals with the first principles of scientific 
knowledge and the ultimate conditions of all existence (e.g. by reflecting on existence in its most 
fundamental state (i.e. being qua being), and by pondering the essential attributes of existence). With 
Descartes, philosophy became an enquiry into the indubitable foundation of knowledge (e.g. clear and 
distinct ideas) in order to establish the unity of all knowledge. In contrast, the British empiricists led by 
Hume, Berkeley and Locke thought of philosophy as an investigation into the nature and limits of 
26
philosophy, according to the late Wittgenstein, is not a contribution to human 
knowledge but to human understanding. Thus, Wittgenstein disposed of the hitherto 
uncontested view of philosophy as a cognitive discipline, i.e. the belief that there are 
philosophical propositions expressing philosophical knowledge. Instead, the later 
Wittgenstein held that philosophical problems are wrongly conceived of as 
demanding a solution. They are wrongly conceived of as questions looking for an 
answer. Philosophical problems, so the later Wittgenstein holds, are not solvable 
because their very status as problems is the result of a misunderstanding about the 
ways we use our language
41
. The very idea of a problem or question suggests that 
somewhere out there is a solution or answer to be found (if we only apply our minds 
hard enough). But,
‘there are no great essential problems, only great and compelling illusions of such problems 
(BT 407). (…)‘Philosophical problems are an awareness (not typically a self-conscious one) of 
a disorder in our concepts. (BT 421)’
Rather than striving for answers and solutions Wittgenstein suggests that the 
philosopher strive for an informed perspective about the way we use certain 
concepts. In doing so, we will arrive at conceptual clarity, which is accompanied by 
understanding of how a particular philosophical problems arises. The clarity and 
understanding the philosopher thus achieves will make philosophical problems 
disappear (PI§133). Consequently, for the late Wittgenstein achievement in 
philosophy is to be gauged by how successful a philosopher is in dissolving 
philosophical problems, and not by an assessment or evaluation of the complexity of 
human understanding. With the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a paradigm shift 
occurred with respect to the orientation of philosophy. Kant proposed that instead of concerning itself 
with knowledge of objects (i.e. the objects themselves) philosophers should concern themselves with 
the question as to how knowledge of objects is possible a priori. In doing so, philosophers would gain 
knowledge of synthetic a priori propositions, which constitute the pre-conditions of all experience. And, 
following in this great tradition, the young Wittgenstein of the Tractatus aimed to disclose the a priori
order of the world by means of logical investigation.
41
To be exact: It is important to note that Wittgenstein was not the first to associate philosophical 
problems with misunderstandings of language. Michael Dummett quotes Gottlob Frege in a series of
lectures published as `Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie/ Origins of analytic philosophy´(p.14): 
`So besteht denn ein großer Teil der Arbeit der Philosophie... in einem Kampf mit der Sprache´. With  
Frege´s `Grundlagen der Arithmetik´, a book which for some made him the father of analytic 
philosophy, came a `linguistic turn/ die Wende zur Sprache.´ The difference between Frege and the 
later Wittgenstein on this matter is that Frege (like Russell in the `Principia´) saw  the solution of the 
problem in the design of an ideal(-logical) language. This was regarded as one of the main tasks. 
Wittgenstein repudiated  this idea in both the `Tractatus´, as well as in the `Investigations´. The 
peculiarity of the `Investigations´ is the turn towards an investigation of `ordinary language´. (see: 
PR§3, PI§108)
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the theories he proposes as solutions to philosophical problems. Because 
philosophical problems are to be understood as conceptual problems philosophy 
cannot be an investigation into the most general features of the universe
42
. A 
philosophical investigation is a conceptual investigation (Z§458).  
The difference in spirit which Wittgenstein alluded to in the Philosophical 
Remarks constituted nothing less than a radical reorientation with regard to the 
nature of philosophy, philosophical problems and the standard of achievement in 
philosophy. This reorientation stood not only in stark contrast to the views of most of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical contemporaries like Moore and Russell
43
, for example, 
but also stands diametrically opposed to the conception of philosophy currently en 
vogue. This is particularly true for those areas of the philosophy of mind and 
psychology whose manifold philosophical propositions inform theories about mind 
and brain in cognitive science. With regard to its significance, Wittgenstein remarked 
about his “change of perspective” that,
‘Wenn wir z.B. unsere Untersuchungen mit “Philosophie” bezeichnen, so erscheint dieser Titel 
einerseits angebracht, andererseits aber hat er sicherlich manch einen irregeführt. (Man 
könnte sagen, dass der Gegenstand, mit dem wir uns beschäftigen, einer der Erben des 
Gegenstandes ist, den wir „Philosophie“ zu nennen pflegten.’ (BB
D
, p.53)
‘If, e.g., we call our investigations „philosophy“, this title, on the one hand seems appropriate, 
on the other hand it certainly has misled people. One might say that the subject we are dealing 
with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called philosophy.’(BB
E
, p.28)
44
Nothing but Houses of Cards
Why did Wittgenstein feel the need for such a reorientation? Writing in the 
tradition of Western philosophy, the young Wittgenstein had deemed logic and 
metaphysics to be the principal constituents of philosophy, with logic, which he 
thought of as the mirror of the essence of the world, providing the foundation of 
philosophy (NB 39, 106). Consequently, he thought of logical investigation as the 
method par excellence to explore the nature of all things (PI§89). These ideas found 
42
 See e.g.: Moore GE ‘What is Philosophy?’, p.1f  in: Moore GE (1962) Some Main Problems of 
Philosophy; also: PP
43
 ibid. p.1ff
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their culmination in the Tractatus. After the completion of this book Wittgenstein 
abandoned philosophy thinking, with characteristic modesty, that he had solved all 
the problems of philosophy. Like the great philosophical systems of the past, 
Wittgenstein’ philosophical vision of the Tractatus was founded on a set of 
metaphysical premises: 
‘Die  logischen Sätze beschreiben das Gerüst der Welt, oder vielmehr, sie stellen es dar. Sie 
„handeln“ von nichts. Sie setzen voraus, daß Namen Bedutung, und Elementarsätze Sinn 
haben: Und dies ist ihre Verbindung mt der Welt. (...)’ (TLP 6.124)
‘The logical propositions describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they present it. They 
“treat” of nothing. They presuppose that names have meaning, and that elementary 
propositions have sense. And this is their connexion with the world. (…)’ (TLP 6.124)
Yet, after returning to philosophy Wittgenstein realized that this metaphysical vision 
of the world rested on a fundamental error. Baker and Hacker have remarked that the 
sublime metaphysics of the Tractatus was ‘purchased with illusion and distortion’ for 
as the later Wittgenstein himself realized, the idea of logic as the mirror image of the 
world rested on the misconceived notion that the proposition must do something 
remarkable (PI§93), thereby mistakenly projecting the properties of the chosen mode 
of representation on the linguistic entities thus represented
45
 (PI§104).  Metaphysics 
will not lead us to knowledge of necessary truths, which disclose truths about 
objective necessities in nature. Rather, metaphysics (i.e. metaphysical questions), 
express an unclarity about the grammar of our concepts (BB35); it is nothing but 
houses of cards that need to be destroyed (PI§118), as these have been built out of 
misunderstandings in the way we use our language (see above). 
Investigating the Essence of the World 
‘Philosophische Untersuchungen: Begriffliche Untersuchungen. Das Wesentliche bezüglich 
der Metaphysik ist: sie verschleiert den Unterschied  zwischen faktischen und begrifflichen 
Untersuchungen.’ (Z
D
§458)
45
 Baker & Hacker (2005), p.257
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‘Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about 
metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations.’ 
(Z
E
§458)
The problem when doing metaphysics is, as Wittgenstein points out in this 
remark, that philosophers mistakenly think of metaphysical propositions, which are of 
conceptual (normative) nature, as being akin to or even identical with scientific 
propositions, which are factual and descriptive
46
. In contrast to the propositions of the 
empirical sciences, which describe contingent truths of reality, metaphysical 
propositions are traditionally deemed to express necessary truths not merely of this 
world but of any possible world. In doing so, they often take a modal form. It is said, 
for example, as Hacker points out that 
• what is coloured must also be extended, that
• nothing can be read and green all over, or that
• one cannot
47
 travel back in time.
As modal sentences like these are used in descriptions of causal connections or 
practical statements in the empirical sciences (i.e. modal sentences have an 
empirical use in descriptions) philosophers are inclined to view such metaphysical 
propositions as descriptions too. But in doing so, they fail to distinguish between the 
factual and the conceptual, i.e. what is (really) descriptive and what is (merely) 
normative. The necessity ascribed to a metaphysical proposition is merely one of 
convention, of grammar
48
 as it were, the later Wittgenstein holds, expressing a rule
for the use of a word or expression:
46
 For the following passage I am indebted to Hacker (1996a) p.118f.
47
 The metaphysical use of ‘cannot’ does not describe an impossibility or human inability, rather it is 
indicative of a rule for the use of a word (see e.g.: BB54) 
48
 Note: Wittgenstein’s use of the term grammar is much broader than its customary use. Grammar in 
Wittgenstein’s writings refers not only to our actual uses of words, but also extends to impossible uses 
of words. Hilmy, for example, points out that in a Wittgensteinian sense ‘grammar’ … is the ledger of 
our actual linguistic transactions, it is as it were, the ledger of the sorts of moves that are (can be) and 
are not (cannot be) made in a given “language game”.’ Grammar, ‘ refers not only to the ledger of our 
linguistic practices but also to the ledger of meaningful actions of every kind – facial expressions 
people make in various circumstances, modes of dress, ways of playing games, assembling furniture, 
worshipping god, gardening, preparing food and so on.’ (See Hilmy: (1987, p.129))
30
‘The ‘necessity’ which we ascribe to such (metaphysical) ‘truths’ is the mark not of ‘a 
necessary fact’ (since there is no such thing), but of our commitment to these concepts, of our 
inflexibility in employing these expressions in accord with these rules.’
49
By disclosing necessary truths, metaphysics has traditionally been thought to 
provide insight into the essence of the world, thus giving philosophy a subject matter 
of its own
50
. Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysical investigations as obliterating 
factual and conceptual investigations (Z§458) shows this conception to be profoundly 
misconceived. ‘Essence’, Wittgenstein holds, ‘is expressed by grammar’ (PI§371). 
The grammar of our words and expressions specifies what is to count as instances of 
this and that. Accordingly, our grammar is determining the nature of things rather 
than describing it (as is assumed of metaphysical propositions). Talk of essences is 
nothing but talk of (linguistic) conventions. It is the task of the philosopher to show 
that a metaphysical proposition “hides” a grammatical rule (BB55). According to 
Wittgenstein, it is the philosopher’s task to untie these knots in one’s understanding 
by means of conceptual clarification, which will not increase our knowledge of the 
world but bring about an insight into where our understanding goes wrong. After all,
‚Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel 
unserer Sprache. (PU§109)
‚Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. 
(PI§109) 
1.2 Conceptual Investigations, ‚Übersicht’ and ‚übersichtliche Darstellung’
The battle against the bewitchment of our understanding is to be fought by 
means of conceptual investigations. Instead of engaging in speculative metaphysics 
Wittgenstein holds that what philosophers need to do is to substitute wild conjectures 
and explanations by quiet weighing of linguistic facts (Z§448), i.e. by describing the 
use of language (PI§133). The use of language is determined by grammar, laying 
down the rules for the use of concepts and expressions. The conceptual 
investigations the philosophers is to undertake are thus to be understood as 
49
 Hacker (1996a) p.119
50
 A subject matter distinct from the natural sciences, which study the contingent properties of objects 
of reality.
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normative investigations in so far as they are investigations into the rules governing 
our use of language. 
‘When philosophers use a word and enquire after its meaning, one must always ask oneself: 
Is the word ever actually used like this in the language for which it was made. One will find 
that it isn’t so, and that the word is being used contrary to its normal grammar.’ (MS 109 
(Vol.V) 246)
This practice not only implies the specification of the use of words in the practice of 
speaking a language but also involves the tracing of conceptual connections and 
their ramifications. Strawson later coined the term connective analysis
51
for this type 
of investigation (see also chapter I, section 2). For example, in PI§558 Wittgenstein 
remarks that the rule which shows us that that the word ‘is’ has different meanings in 
the sentences “the rose is red” and “two and two is four”, is the one allowing us to 
replace the word ‘is’ in the second sentence by the sign ‘=’ while at the same time 
forbidding this substitution in the first sentence. Similarly, the statement that while it 
makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain makes 
sense, but that I it does not make sense when I say it about myself, e.g. I don’t know 
whether I am in pain (PI§246) describes a rule governing the use of the word ‘to 
know’. Alternatively, we may simply remind us of certain aspects of use of a word or 
expression as Wittgenstein does in PI§183:
‘ Wir können sagen…, wir sagen auch..., oder….’ (PU§183)
‚We may say..., but also that…, or… .’ (PI§183) 
Sometimes, however, one may choose not to state a grammatical rule explicitly, but   
prefer to merely hint at it. The expression ‘an inner process stands in need of outward 
criteria’ (PI§580), for instance, which is part of the repudiation of conception of 
believing as an inner process, hints at the fact that expressions which signify ‘inner 
processes’ or ‘inner states’ are grammatically bound up with behavioural criteria for 
51
`What this amounted to was the description, for purposes of philosophical elucidation, of the 
interconnectedness of related concepts, of their implications, compatibilities, and incompatibilities, of 
the conditions and circumstances of use of philosophically problematic expressions. Such analysis 
does not terminate in logically independent elementary propositions, or in simple, unanalyzable names 
or concepts. It terminates in the clarity that is obtained with respect to a given question when the 
network of concepts has been traced through all its relevant reticulations.´ Strawson (1991), p.10
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their application in the third person case
52
.  These few examples by no means 
exhaust the myriad of ways in which we may state grammatical rules to remind us of 
the way certain words are used. But they suffice to demonstrate how one might go 
about conducting a philosophical investigation à la Wittgenstein. Furthermore, they 
show that grammatical rules in a late Wittgensteinian sense comprise
`…not just school-grammatical or syntactical rules, but also explanations of meaning 
(PG§68,143; PR78). (...) Such rules include 
(a) definitions whether in formal (`”Bachelor” means “unmarried man”´) or material mode 
(´Bachelors are unmarried men´);
(b) analytical propositions (´All bachelors are unmarried men´); 
(c) colour-charts and conversion-tables (BB4, LFM 118); 
(d) ostensive definition (BB12, 90); 
(e) explanations by exemplification (PI §§69-79); 
(f) expressions of the ‘geometry’ of colour like `Nothing can be red and green all over´(PR51-
2;LWL 8); 
(g) propositions of arithmetic and geometry(PR 143,170,216,249;LWL 8,55; PG 319,347).´
53
All of these various instantiations of grammatical rules set standards for the correct 
use of a concept or expression, and thus determine their meaning. To give the 
meaning of a word is to specify its grammar
54
.  These examples also illustrate that 
there is not one single unified approach one can follow in investigating the grammar 
of words and in striving to make philosophical problems disappear. As Wittgenstein 
remarked,  
‘…Es gibt nicht eine Methode der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt es Methoden gleichsam 
verschiedenen Therapien.’ (PU§133)
‘…There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different 
therapies.’ (PI§133)
Although a picture of Wittgenstein’s later ideas is emerging, the suggestion 
that the description of rules for the uses of language will ultimately lead to the 
dissolution of philosophical problems, may still seem a bit of a leap. To gain a firmer 
52
 See e.g.: Baker & Hacker (2005), p.292
53
 See: Glock (1997), `A Wittgenstein Dictionary´, p.152
54
 ibid, p.150
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grasp on this idea it is helpful to consider the following remark from the Philosophical 
Investigations:
‘Es ist eine Hauptquelle unseres Unverständnisses, dass wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter 
nicht übersehen. – Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit. – Die übersichtliche 
Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, dass wir 
‚Zusammenhänge sehen’. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des Erfindens von 
Zwischengliedern.
Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung  ist von uns von Grundlegender 
Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen. (Ist dies 
eine ‚Weltanschauung?’).’ (PU§122)
‘A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use 
of our words.--Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation 
produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance 
of finding and inventing intermediate cases. 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It 
earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) 
(PI§122)’
Here Wittgenstein identifies the lack of an overview
55
 (Übersicht) of the various uses 
of our words, as one of the main sources of conceptual confusion. By tabulating the 
various grammatical uses of words in the form of a surveyable representation 
(übersichtliche Darstellung), however, one achieves the kind of clarity in the use of 
our language in the light of which philosophical problems will disappear. The 
philosopher will not only gain an insight into the various ways a word is used (and 
thus demarcate the bounds of sense) but also obtain an understanding of its 
conceptual connections and their ramifications. Consequently, one may think of an 
overview as helping us to put our ideas as to what can be said about the world in 
order.
‘What one can do when one has an overview, is survey the linguistic environs of a problematic 
expression. One can ‘see’ (take in) the use of the problematic concept, its manifold 
55
 Following Peter Hacker, Übersicht will be translated as ‘overview’ and übersichtliche Darstellung as 
‘surveyable representation’. See Baker and Hacker (2005), p.308
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grammatical connections with related concepts, as well as the differences between it and the 
concepts with which it is liable to be confounded.’
56
By gaining an overview of the grammar of a particularly problematic concept, the 
philosopher will gain an understanding of a specific segment of our language, which 
ultimately culminates in an insight where our understanding went wrong and how we 
came to tie the knots into our understanding in the first place. It is in this way that the 
new way of dealing with philosophical problems resolves or dissolves problems 
rather than providing answers to them (AWL 27f.)
57
. 
From the Quest for Truth to the Quest for Sense
Wittgenstein’s call for an overview of a segment of our language to dissolve 
philosophical problems is linked to his critique of metaphysical investigations as 
confusing factual and conceptual investigations (Z§458) (see above).  When 
investigating the essence of the world the metaphysician is prone to take words like 
“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I” etc. and use them in ways not specified by their 
grammar. That is, metaphysicians are prone to violate the bounds of sense. Doing so 
results in the knots in our understanding, which Wittgenstein aims to resolve by 
means of conceptual investigations. Instead, he advises us to ask whether the words 
found in metaphysical questions and propositions are ‘ever actually used in this way 
in the language, which is its original home’ (PI§116). Gaining an overview of a 
segment of our language helps the philosopher to answer this question and untie the 
knots in his understanding by bringing
‘…Wörter von ihrer metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre alltägliche Verwendung zurück.’ 
(PU §116)
‘… words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’. (PI§116)
In the Tractatus the young Wittgenstein wrote:
56
 Baker & Hacker (2005), p.309
57
 However, conceptual clarity does not consist in the accumulation of fresh knowledge or new facts, 
i.e. the measures by which scientists gauge their success or failure. Rather conceptual clarity consists 
in the ‘Übersicht’ (the surview or perspicuous representation) the philosopher gains over a (specific) 
segment of our language. 
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‘Die meisten Sätze und Fragen, welche über philosophische Dinge geschrieben worden sind, 
sind nicht falsch, sondern unsinning. Wir können daher Fragen dieser Art überhaupt nicht 
beantworten, sondern nur ihre Unsinnigkeit feststellen. Die meisten Fragen und Sätze der 
Philosophen beruhen darauf, daß wir unsere Sprachlogik nicht verstehen. 
(Sie sind von der Art der Frage, ob das gute mehr oder weniger identisch sei als das Gute.) 
Und es ist nicht verwunderlich, daß die tiefsten Probleme eigenlich keine Probleme sind.’ 
(TLP4.003)
‘Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not 
false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state 
their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact 
that we do not understand the logic of our language. 
(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than 
the Beautiful.)
And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems.‘ 
(TLP4.003)
58
Although the later Wittgenstein’s views on logic, language and the logic of our 
language differed dramatically from his earlier ones his view, that most philosophical 
questions and propositions constitute transgressions of the bounds of sense, 
remained constant
59
. In a series of lectures given in the early 1930s Wittgenstein 
explains that to say of a combination of words that they constitute nonsense is 
tantamount to saying that they are meaningless combination of marks or sounds. As 
such they do not belong to language, (although their constituents do) and lack any 
use (see: LWL 48). That the bounds of sense have been transgressed can be shown 
by explaining the language game
60
 to which these marks or sounds belong and 
58
 Note: The suggestion, that ‘Most propositions and questions, that have been written about 
philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless’ undermines the conception of philosophy as a 
cognitive discipline. Traditionally, philosophical questions have been conceived of as deep and 
significant. Flawed attempts to answer them were simply false but not nonsensical. To deny that 
philosophical questions constitute questions in search for an answer is tantamount to denying the 
possibility of philosophical knowledge (expressed in philosophical propositions).
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‘Nonsense according to the Tractatus, results from failing to observe the rules of the logical syntax 
of language. Within philosophy, this typically occurs when philosophers endeavour to say what can 
only be shown, ask questions about the essential nature of things and try to answer them, rather than 
pointing out their illegitimacy. For such questions characteristically employ formal concepts as if they 
were genuine, material concepts. And attempts to answer them involve the use of pseudo-propositions 
which try to assert that certain internal properties and relations obtain (TLP 4.12-4.1272). The result is 
combinations of signs that do not satisfy the logical requirements of representation, that violate the 
formation rules for propositions by employing what are in effect variables as if they were names.’ See:
Hacker PMS (2000a), p.94f.
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 Wittgenstein uses the idea of language games to illuminate the conception of language as a rule-
guided activity. The understanding of a language involves the mastery of techniques concerning the 
applications of rules, for our language games. In this context, it is also important to note that such 
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demonstrating that they have in fact no use within that game. To say that a 
combination of words, marks or sounds is nonsense is to exclude it from language. 
Importantly, however, this does not imply that they could no be given a sense. 
Rather, it requires that if one wishes to include a certain sign or combination of signs 
into language, one needs to specify rules for their use (i.e. one needs to specify what 
counts as doing thus and so, for example).
Metaphysical questions and theories provide the paradigm example of such 
transgression of the bounds of sense. The theories or hypotheses, which 
scientistically minded philosophers are prone to propose in answer to a metaphysical 
problem or question are nothing but symptoms of their conceptual entanglement and 
not, as some believe, answers to general questions about the universe, which 
increase our knowledge of the world. According to the later Wittgenstein, it is the 
philosopher’s task to untie these knots in one’s understanding by means of 
conceptual clarification. Wittgenstein scholars have generally characterised this part 
of Wittgenstein’s approach as the negative or therapeutic aim of philosophy, i.e the 
destruction of houses of cards resulting and the disentangling of conceptual 
confusion. The purpose of this is to convey to the confused philosopher an 
understanding of the absurdity and illusory nature of the basic claims and premises 
informing his views. This is complemented by what has commonly been regarded as 
the positive aim of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, i.e. to gain an overview of the 
grammar of a problematic concept or expression, which helps the philosopher to gain 
insight into where one’s understanding goes wrong (where imagination takes over 
the task of the intellect) by delineating the workings of language
61
. Or to put it in 
Wittgenstein’s own words, what is necessary is to put 
‘ …in order our ideas as to what can be said about the world...
62
´
rules are not applied according to a theory. Rather, the rules governing the use of words in our  
language are determined within the public realm of our language community. These rules thus 
constitute an integral part of the form of life of a given language community. In a Wittgensteinian 
context this term is meant to stress the intertwining of culture, worldview and language:
‘Das hinzunehmende, Gegebene – könnte man sagen – seien Lebensformen.  What has to be 
accepted, the given, is - so one could say – forms of life.´ Wittgenstein, PI (II) p.226/226e; See also:
`...Und eine Sprache vorstellen heißt, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen. / ....And to imagine a language 
means to imagine a form of life.´(PI§19)
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 Naturally, the negative and positive aims of philosophy overlap.
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Moore (1970b), p.323
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2. Sources of Conceptual Confusion
It has been remarked earlier, that Wittgenstein identified the lack of an 
overview of the grammar of certain concepts and segments of our language as one 
of the main sources of philosophical confusion (see above). This “deficiency” makes 
us prone to fall victim to a variety of features of our natural language, which in the 
past have frequently entangled the understanding philosophers of as well as 
scientists. A variety of these sources of conceptual confusion have been identified
63
:
a) Analogies in the Surface Grammar of Language
Expressions like ‘to have a car’ or ‘to have a house’ look like the expression ‘to have 
a mind’. Yet, while the former indicates some kind of ownership, the latter does not. 
And while ‘to have a house’, for example, denotes a concrete entity, i.e. ‘a house’, ‘to 
have a mind’ does not (except in the confused views of (neo-)Cartesian philosophers, 
and cognitive scientists (see chapter III for details). Similarly, activity verbs like ‘to 
row’, ‘to sail’, ‘to play’ and process verbs like ‘to evolve’, ‘to grow’, look like the 
psychological verbs ‘to think’, or ‘to believe’. Yet, these superficial analogies gloss 
over the fundamental differences in the uses, and thus the meanings, of these verbs. 
The circumstances, under which thinking, for example, can correctly be said to be an 
activity or a process, are very narrowly defined by the rules for the use of the 
concept. Importantly, this does not include uses which allow for conclusions like 
‘thinking is a mental process’, ‘thinking is an activity of the mind’ etc. as encountered 
in contemporary cognitive science. An investigation of the use of the concept of 
thinking shows, for example, that thinking is neither an activity of the mind nor a 
process going on in the mind. Neither the “mind”, nor the brain meet the criteria that 
would warrant the ascription of thought in such cases  (see chapter IV).
b) Pictures and Metaphors Embedded in Language
Numerous pictures and metaphors are tied to the wide-range of expressions, which 
are part of a natural language, and which are a natural part of everyday discourse as 
turn of phrase or facon de parler. However, in philosophical or scientific contexts they 
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 E.g., Hacker, `Insight and Illusion´, p.168ff.
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are frequently misconstrued and understood figuratively, rather than being taken as 
the metaphors or synonyms they are. Thus, philosophers and cognitive scientists 
have been prone to interpret expression like ‘I am out of my mind’, ‘or what is going 
on in his mind’, as talk about an entity with an inside and an outside, for example. 
The prevalence of this ‘Inner/Outer Picture of Mind’, which is prevalent in cognitive 
science, philosophy as well as popular culture is but one consequence of this 
misunderstanding (see chapter III for details). Similarly, Rodin’s famous depiction of 
Le Penseur is partly the precipitate and partly invited the perpetuation of the picture 
of thinking as talking to oneself privately in foro interno, as it were (see chapter V). 
Expression of this kind, tempt us to believe that they are a genuine if picturesque 
description of reality, and that somehow the facts conform to them. Yet, as Bennett 
and Hacker point out, it is no conceptual confusion in calling the lower reaches of a 
mountain its foot, but there would be if one went looking for its shoe.
c) Projecting Grammar onto Reality
The tendency to project grammar onto reality is rooted in the conception that all 
names and all sentences are descriptions. For example, it seems natural to think of 
the statement ‘nothing can be red and green all over’ as a description of reality, like 
‘English bulldogs have a unique character an personality’. Likewise, one tends to 
conceive of a statement like ‘5 >1’ as a description of these numbers. We take these 
statements as descriptions of reality, as certainties, and we are convinced of their 
truth. If distinct at all, these certainties are different merely in degree, with 
mathematical certainties enjoying the highest degree of certainty. Yet, this is 
mistaken, as there are different kinds of certainties, with different kinds of grounds (or 
none at all), and different kinds of consequences. In other cases, substantives make 
us look for a thing that corresponds to it (BB1).  Traces of this particular sort of 
mistake can be found in the non-technical German term for substantive, Namenwort, 
which suggests the association of an entity or object with a word. This picture of 
language
64
, thus has led philosophers and (today) also cognitive scientists to believe 
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This ‘Augustinian picture of language’, which Wittgenstein describes and discusses in the opening 
section of the Philosophical Investigations, is generally regarded as an `Urbild´ or `proto-theory´ of the 
nature (Wesen) of language. Among the implicit assumptions of this picture are, e.g., the ideas that 
`describing´ and `ostensive´definition belong to the essence of language, or that to understand the 
`meaning´of a word is tantamount to knowing which object the word stands for. (see: PI§1,2), also 
Baker & Hacker (2005), Chapter I 
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that the word ‘mind’ denotes and entity of some kind, and that memories are stored 
as neural engrams in the brain mediated through neurophysiological mechanisms like 
long-term potentiation (LTP). It is not surprising then, that if one tends to think of 
substantives as names of objects, one will also tend to conceive of psychological 
expression as names of psychological objects, processes, states or events.
d) Projecting the Features of one Language Game onto Another
Another source of confusion is linked to the tendency of employing an expression 
belonging to one language game on analogy with the use that belongs to another, 
but which has no place or quite a different one. In such cases, to say that an 
expression is nonsense is tantamount to saying that this expression is not part of the 
language game to which it seems to belong (PG§81). Thus, one may hold for 
instance, that horses are larger than donkeys, that blue is darker than white, that it is 
true that either p or not –p, etc. Yet, we do not reflect on the differences in what it 
means to say, that it is true that. The truth of a proposition in mathematics is no more 
akin to the truth of an empirical proposition than a chess queen is akin to a queen
65
(see also: preceding paragraph). Because of the particularity or specificity of each 
language-game, each confusion requires independent treatment. Each misguided 
analogy must be investigated in its own right, and in each case a separate 
demonstration of non-conformity with the rules of the specific language-game in 
question is required.
Despite the crucial role of our grammar in the genesis of conceptual 
confusions, not all confusions are the result of misunderstandings of language per 
se. Human culture and human nature provide additional sources of conceptual 
confusion:
e) Scientific Theory and Explanation 
‘Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted 
to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.’ (BB
E
,p.18)
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 Hacker (1997a), p.170
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The tremendous success which the natural sciences have enjoyed particularly in the 
twentieth century, have led many philosophers to think that in order for philosophical 
investigation to be successful, it must be modelled on the natural sciences
66
 (see 
chapter I, also section 3 below). Like scientists, philosophers thus should make use 
of hypotheses and theories for the explanation of philosophical puzzles. However, 
this conception rests on the misunderstanding of the nature of science and 
philosophy, and neglects the important distinction between empirical and conceptual 
problems.  While empirical problems are amenable to the tools and means of 
scientific investigation, conceptual problems cannot be solved by applying the 
hypothetico-deductive approach encountered in the natural sciences (see section 3 
below). The consequence of this development is the obfuscation of the conceptual 
nature of philosophical problems, and the promotion of a speculative metaphysics 
which follows in the wake of the failure to distinguish factual and conceptual 
questions. 
f) The Craving for Generality and Unity
Human beings display a craving for generality, i.e. a tendency to look for something 
in common to all the entities, which we commonly subsume under a general term. 
This also leads them to metaphysical speculation and consequently to transgression 
of the bounds of sense.
‘We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that 
this common property is the justification for applying the general term "game" to the various 
games; whereas games form a family the members of which have family likenesses. Some of 
them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way of 
walking; and these likenesses overlap. The idea of a general concept being a common 
property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the 
structure of language. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things 
which have the properties; e.g. that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is 
of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by anything 
that is beautiful.’ (BB
E, p.18)
A historical example helps to illuminate this point. Plato, for instance, yielding to the 
craving for generality, thought that whenever we encounter one or more examples of 
66
 Wittgenstein’s contemporary and former mentor Bertrand Russell was a great champion of this idea.
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a phenomenon X there must be something, which is implicit in all these examples 
and that entails the Xness of X. According to this principle, one might postulate 
beauty as underlying all beautiful things. In the same way, justice may be postulated
as underlying all just acts. Plato considered the ideas of justice and beauty as the 
common nature or essence of all just acts and all beautiful things. According to Plato 
these universals cannot themselves exist in the world of sense as their instantiations, 
the particulars do. They are considered to be immutable and indestructible. This 
theory of ideas leads Plato to the assumption of his (metaphysical) realm of ideas in 
which these universals supposedly exist. The universals are supposed to enjoy 
existence independent of their respective particulars, rendering the distinction 
between universals and particulars a distinction between two things. 
`He (the metaphysician) moves from the supposition that there must be something in common 
to two examples of Xness, namely X itself, to the supposition that there must be some thing in 
common between them and, therefore, that X itself or Xness is a sort of thing other than those 
things which are examples of Xness.
67
´ 
In a similar manner, human nature’s craving for unity, informs the search for ever 
more general theories. However, this may incline us to subsume a variety of distinctly 
different phenomena under one special case, as in the case of thinking for example 
(see chapter V). 
3. Science and Philosophy
 Throughout his career scientism in philosophy was Wittgenstein’s bête 
noire
68
. Philosophers, Wittgenstein pointed out, constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does (BB18). Today, with few exceptions, the presence of scientistic currents 
within the mainstream of contemporary philosophy is stronger than ever, and has 
contributed considerably to the diminishing influence of Wittgensteinian ideas. This 
“triumph of scientism”, however, is the result of misunderstanding the relationship of 
science and philosophy, and the power and limits of the respective disciplines by 
many philosophers and cognitive scientists. As a result, cognitive scientists tend to 
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 White (1989), p.12
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 See e.g., Vossenkuhl, (1995) p.17f.
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believe that scientific investigation can bring new insight to problems and questions 
where philosophical thinking faltered in the past. The champions of this view fail to 
acknowledge the crucial difference between factual and conceptual questions, and 
consequently are likely to end up under the spell of some illusion, which is the result 
of crude speculative metaphysics. The following discussion will substantiate this 
claim by juxtaposing the nature of empirical scientific investigations with 
Wittgenstein’s latter conception of philosophy as a conceptual investigation.
Empirical Investigations and Conceptual Investigations
Today it is common to answer the question ‘What is science?’, by immediately 
invoking the description of various experimental methods and their application like, 
PET, fMRI, PCR, single cell recordings, titration etc.. This tendency to identify 
science with scientific methodology and experimental technique implies the belief that 
it is sufficient to point at a few examples of scientific practice, in order to convey the 
nature of scientific investigation. The understanding of science, which emerges as a 
result, is one of a continuous series of experimental activities, which go on and on 
apparently oblivious to outside influences. Within the grip of this picture, scientific 
disciplines seem to distinguish themselves from each other only by the kind of 
experimental method applied (e.g. cognitive neuroscience may thus be conceived of 
distinguishing itself from physics only by the type of experiment conducted and the 
type of experimental method applied). However, such views neglect the fact that 
scientific practice cannot be reduced to experimental procedures. It fails to 
acknowledge the manifold explicit and implicit assumptions informing the design of 
experiments and the interpretation of experimental outcomes. Above all, it fails to 
recognize that science embodies a rich and intricate cultural tradition with a complex 
history. To be sure, science is a hypothetico-deductive endeavour, which proceeds 
by constructing and testing hypothesis through experiment. By means of hypothesis 
testing scientists proceed to the construction of theories, which describe, predict and 
explain the behaviour of the scientific phenomenon under investigation. Yet, as a 
result of the intricate interplay of culture and history of ideas, the interpretation of 
scientific results is also susceptible to influences that cannot be controlled by the 
most sophisticated and up to date experimental methods.
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Human practices like scientific investigation are based on certain taken for 
granted principles and premises, which reflect the subject matter they occupy 
themselves with and the social contexts in which they take place. Such practices 
presuppose the ability to adopt and make us of a system (or systems) of concepts.  
The ability to use systems of concepts is integral to the practice of science, in so far 
as it allows for the definition and classification of the types and kinds of phenomena 
of interest to scientists. Thus, a taxonomy is created and an ordered catalogue of 
phenomena for investigation is established. This catalogue of phenomena, i.e. a 
catalogue of what is taken to be really real in the domain of scientific enquiry, 
constitutes the ontology of science
69
. An ontology will be among the presuppositions 
of a science at each moment in its development, and involves the postulation of the 
existence of observable entities like proteins, cells, cloud clusters, planets or 
galaxies, as well as of the existence of unobservable entities like rays, tectonic plates 
or inner mental representations, for example. By identifying and classifying 
phenomena, scientists form conceptual presuppositions about the meanings and 
interrelations of concepts.  In addition, scientists also employ factual presuppositions 
to describe the behaviour, constitution, connection and interrelations of or between 
the various scientific phenomena. Importantly, while factual presuppositions can be 
tested by observation and experiment, conceptual presuppositions can only be 
evaluated by means of philosophical investigation, that is, by examining their 
plausibility, utility and coherence.  For example, is it just a matter of fact, that I cannot 
feel your pain, or is it a matter o how the word pain is to be used in everyday 
language? If it is a matter of fact, it could have been otherwise. But, if it is a matter of 
the uses of words, one should not even be able to make sense of the alternative. In 
contrast to such conceptual matters, matters of fact can be adjudicated by 
observation and experiment. Thus, matters of fact are amenable to the kind of 
hypothetico-deductive form of investigation characteristic of science. Science, it can 
be said is the province of factual questions. Conceptual matters, on the other hand, 
do not relate to aspects of truth and falsehood. Rather, they relate to the rules for the 
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 Note: The ontology of a science is also revealed in the ways in which scientific theories are created 
and tested. Theory building and hypothesis testing are based on a system of models and metaphors, 
patterns of analogy through which concepts are modified and extended into new domains. The choice
of models and metaphors involves presuppositions about what sorts of beings exist in the domain of a
science. (E.g. Inner mental representations, which are ascribed a propositional structure, and which 
are encoded in the physical symbols system (of the brain) in a language of thought. Volitions as the 
source of willed action etc.)
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correct use of concepts, and are adjudicated by an analysis of meaning. An analysis 
of meaning may reveal unnoticed confusions, contradictions or other faults in what 
may appear a coherent conceptual system. Such flaws can only be revealed by 
investigating the interrelations and ramifications among the meaning of concepts, 
and thus the rules for their use. Such investigations, as the later Wittgenstein pointed 
out are the province of philosophy. Philosophy is concerned with the analysis of the 
meaning of conceptual presuppositions. As the adjudicator of the bounds of sense, 
its concern is not with matters of truth and falsehood, but with matters of sense and 
nonsense.
The distinction between factual and conceptual presuppositions, and 
consequently between empirical and conceptual questions has important implications 
as to how the relationship between science and philosophy is to be understood. In 
contrast to the claims of philosophers past and present, philosophy is neither the 
queen nor the under labourer of science. Philosophy is not an investigation into the 
most general features of the universe, nor does it hand over its subject matter to 
scientists as soon as scientific technology has sufficiently advanced. There is no 
room for the application of scientific methods in philosophy. In contrast to the 
grandiose claims of some scientists, science will not be able to solve conceptual 
problems, as their very nature as questions of meaning does not render them 
amenable to empirical investigation.  Yet during their training, scientists tend to 
acquire a picture of science, which leads them to believe that the majority of the 
problems encountered during the planning, implementing and publication of research 
is taken care of by sophisticated technology and continuing empirical investigation. 
For example, meaning is generally presumed to have been taken care of by the 
positivistic principle of giving an ‘operational definition’. However, such an approach 
often leads scientists to focus on one use (i.e. meaning) of the concept of e.g., 
thinking or memory, which is only part of a field of (closely) related uses. This neglect 
results in a distortion of the polymorphous character of the phenomena under 
investigation (see e.g., Chapter V). Hence, it is important for scientists to realize the 
interplay of factual and conceptual issues influencing their work. Scientific 
understanding is articulated in the form of cognitive claims and hypotheses, which 
are expressed by means of propositions. As all such claims and hypotheses involve 
the use of concepts, they may therefore either be defective in point of truth or in point 
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of conceptual coherence, with the matter being an important precondition of the 
possibility of the former
70
. Philosophy and science should thus be understood as 
independent yet complementary forms of investigation, each of which can contribute 
in its own unique way to the genesis of insight and understanding. 
4.  The Difficulty of Philosophy 
The difficulty of unravelling and dispelling conceptual confusions and to 
dissolve philosophical problems, is directly correlated to the degree of entanglement 
of our understanding:
‘Die Philosophie löst die Knoten in unserem Denken auf die wir unsinniger Weise hinein 
gemacht haben; dazu muss sie aber ebenso komplizierte Bewegungen machen wie diese 
Knoten sind.’ (PB§52)
‘Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but 
to do that, it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. The 
complexity of philosophy is not in its matter, but in our tangled understanding.’ (PR§52)
It is the bumps in his understanding, which the philosopher must suffer through whilst 
striving for that overview of the grammar of a philosophically problematic concept, 
and which will ultimately allow him to uncover a piece of nonsense, that will make him 
see the value of his discovery (PI§119). What makes the philosopher’s task even 
more difficult is the fact that disentangling one’s understanding is not only a difficult 
intellectual exercise, but also tends to take a heavy emotional toll on him. On the one 
hand, this is because philosophical problems irritate us, like a persistent itch or 
personal conflict with a parent or friend. On the other, this is because disentangling 
one’s understanding means parting with ideas, which tend to be deeply engrained in 
our thinking, and which philosophers tend to cling to like the friendship of an old 
comrade. The philosopher’s treatment of a question, Wittgenstein says, is like the 
treatment of an illness (PI§255). The notion of philosophy as a form of therapeutic 
endeavour is illuminating hear (see above), as the problem one faces, is comparable 
to the dilemma of the alcohol or drug addict. In both cases, the first stop towards 
salvation is the acknowledgment of the existence of a problem, but in order to arrive 
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at this point usually a great deal of resistance and self-denial has to be overcome. In 
addition, the philosopher steeped in confusion and accomplished in the creation of 
metaphysical systems and theories, will find it very difficult to appreciate the power 
and significance of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, as this new way of thinking tends 
to be exceedingly hard to establish (CV§48). The idea to study the use of a concept 
and trying to gain an overview of its grammar, for example, tends to sound rather 
repulsive to the ears of both the mainstream philosopher and cognitive scientist. It 
seems deeply counterintuitive, and one may wonder why the understanding of the 
use of a word should be so important to us (RPPI§548).  This problem gets even 
worse when the emphasis is shifted from the understanding and clarification of a 
philosophical problem, to such seemingly evident and apparently instinctively 
intelligible psychological phenomena as introspection and thinking. The fact that we 
can seemingly watch ourselves think or introspect creates the illusion of an intuitive 
understanding of these phenomena (PI§314), which stand in the way of 
acknowledging the existence of misconception and conceptual confusion. 
Besides these “emotional” difficulties, which stand in the way of fruitful 
philosophical investigation, there are also general cultural challenges to overcome 
that obstruct the path to clarity of understanding. Our understanding of mind and 
substance like accounts of the soul for example, are closely linked to practices and 
beliefs rooted in the Christian religion. While soul and mind have always been 
related, they were welded into one by Descartes in the seventeenth century. To swim 
against the current of thought established by this great tradition is a formidable 
challenge. Wittgenstein was not unaware of the fact that his revolutionary ideas 
called for a radical reorientation with regard to the idea and practice of philosophy, 
and as such posed a substantial intellectual and emotional challenge. He once 
remarked that if his name will be remembered, then only as the terminus ad quem of 
Western philosophy, like the name of the one who burnt down the great library of 
Alexandria (MS183,63).  In the context of this thesis, this remark foreshadows the 
intellectual and emotional challenges lying ahead, but also highlights the significance 
of this endeavour.
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Chapter III
Crypto-Cartesianism, Brain-Body Dualism and Related Confusions 
– A Prelude
1. Crypto-Cartesianism and Brain-Body Dualism
At its most basic, the endeavour which cognitive science embarks on can be 
described as the attempt to explain and understand the possession of psychological 
attributes by human beings.  In the present chapter the meaningfulness of 
explanatory statements depicting the role of the brain in the mediation of mental 
phenomena will be investigated. In doing so, it draws on earlier discussion of this 
issue by Bennett and Hacker (2003), and Kenny (1984, 1989). The form these 
statements take is the result of endorsing the cognitive view of mind and brain as a 
framework for the explanation of the mental (see Chapter I). A characteristic feature 
of these explanatory statements is the ascription of psychological predicates to the 
brain.  As described in the previous chapter, cognitive scientists picture the brain as a 
computational device which receives, stores, retrieves, transforms and transmits 
information. Accordingly, cognitive scientists claim that the brain sees, hears, smells, 
believes, imagines, and even thinks, when explaining cognition: 
‘A hunk of biological tissue (the brain) is known to think, remember, attend, solve problems, 
want sex, play games, write novels, exhibit prejudice and do a zillion other things’.
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Among the zillion other things the brain or rather, a special sub-system within the 
brain, is supposed to be able to do is recognizing faces, for example
72
. Similarly, 
Francis Crick asserts that
‘…what you see is not really there; it is what your brain believes is there….’
73
However, such claims are mistaken. As Wittgenstein points out,
‘Es kommt darauf hinaus: man könne nur vom lebenden Menschen, und was ihm ähnlich ist 
(sich ähnlich benimmt) sagen, es habe Empfindungen; es sähe; sei blind; höre; sei taub; sei 
bei Bewußtsein; oder bewußtlos.’ (PU §281)
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‘It comes to this: Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human    
being can one say: it has sensations, it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.’ (PI §281)
74
The present chapter will develop the philosophical insight, which underlies this 
remark, and illuminate its consequences for explanatory statements in cognitive 
science. Wittgenstein’s remark pinpoints the cardinal error, which cognitive scientists 
are frequently guilty of in their attempts to explain the possession of psychological 
attributes by human beings. They ascribe psychological predicates, which are only 
applicable to human beings or organisms that behave in sufficiently similar ways to 
human beings, to a part of that being: to the brain or to parts of the brain. In doing so, 
cognitive scientists violate the logic of whole/parthood relations and commit a 
mereological error
75
. The danger of mereological errors in cognitive science lies in 
the fact that they often conceal what is left to be explained. They lead us to thinking 
that we have arrived at a satisfactory explanation, when in fact all that has been 
achieved was to thwart the chance of obtaining a proper understanding of the mental 
phenomenon in question. In the following discussion, the tendency of cognitive 
scientists to ascribe psychological attributes to the brain and its parts will be referred 
to as the mereological fallacy.
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 Note: In De Anima Aristotle also urges us ‘not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks but that 
the man does in virtue of his soul  (DA 408b13-15).’
75
part to part within a whole. Its roots can be traced back to the early days of philosophy, beginning with 
the pre-socratic atomists and continuing throughout the writings of Plato (especially the Parmenides
and the Thaetetus), Aristotle (especially the Metaphysics, but also the Physics, the Topics, and De 
partibus animalium), and Boethius (especially In Ciceronis Topica). Mereology has also occupied a 
prominent role in the writings of medieval ontologists and scholastic philosophers such as Garland the 
Computist, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and Albert of Saxony, as well as in 
Jungius's Logica Hamburgensis (1638), Leibniz's Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (1666) and 
Monadology (1714), and Kant's early writings (the Gedanken of 1747 and the Monadologia physica of 
1756). As a formal theory of parthood relations, however, mereology made its way into modern 
philosophy mainly through the work of Franz Brentano and of his pupils, especially Husserl's third 
Logical Investigation (1901). The latter may rightly be considered the first attempt at a rigorous 
formulation of the theory, though in a format that makes it difficult to disentagle the analysis of 
mereological concepts from that of other ontologically relevant notions (such as the relation of 
Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds
(1916, in Polish) that the pure theory of part-relations as we know it today was given an exact 
-speakers of Polish, it is only 
with the publication of Leonard and Goodman's The Calculus of Individuals (1940) that this theory has 
become a chapter of central interest for modern ontologists and metaphysicians. Contemporary 
formulations of mereology grew out of the recent theories of --
Goodman's. Indeed, although such theories came in different logical guises, they are sufficiently 
similar to be recognized as a common basis for most subsequent developments. 
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A historical example helps to illustrate how the mereological fallacy can distort 
our understanding. In his book The Legacy of Wittgenstein Anthony Kenny discusses 
the consequences of mereological errors in the context of Descartes´ writings:
‘If we see some animal approach us, the light reflected from its body depicts two images of it, 
one in each of our eyes, and these two images form two others, by means of the optic nerves, 
in the interior surface of the brain which faces its cavities; then from there, by means of the 
animals spirits with which its cavities are filled, these images so radiate towards the little gland 
which is surrounded by these spirits, that the movement which forms each point of one of the 
images tends towards the same point of the other image which represents the same part of 
this animal. By this means the two images which are in the brain form but one upon the gland, 
which, acting immediately upon the soul, causes it to see the form of this animal.’
76
Kenny, using the term homunculus fallacy to describe the conceptual issue 
surrounding whole/parthood relationships, points out that Descartes commits the 
homunculus fallacy (i.e. a mereological error) when he claims that the soul 
encounters images in the pineal gland. This is due to the fact that according to 
Descartes a soul is no more a human being than a brain is. While it is not 
philosophically flawed to speak of images in the brain per se (e.g. it would not be 
philosophically objectionable to say that a neurologist might observe these images in 
the brain whilst investigating the pineal gland), it is logically incorrect and misleading 
to suggest that there are images in the brain which are visible to the soul, and that 
the perception of those images, appearing on the pineal gland, constitutes seeing 
(i.e. is a satisfactory explanation of human vision). Seeing is not constituted by the 
souls´s perception of images on the pineal gland, but by the various forms of 
behaviour we exercise or are engaged in when we read, walk around, drive a car, 
watch television or numerous other things that involve having a look around, stare at 
a screen, or gaze at the daffodils whilst we “float on high o´er vales and hills…”. By 
claiming that seeing constitutes the perception of images on the pineal gland by the 
soul, our understanding of the nature of seeing, i.e. what seeing really consists in, 
gets distorted. Henceforth, one labours under the illusion of understanding the nature 
of vision, as a conceptual confusion has been cast in the form of an empirical 
discovery. Descartes’ claim constitutes a conceptual confusion, because if it was an 
empirical discovery that there are images in the brain, which are visible to the soul, 
then one should in principle be able to conduct experiments to further investigate this 
76
 Descartes R, ‘The Passions of the Soul’ , in Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch (eds), ‘The 
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observation. But exactly this is not possible, because we do not know what it would 
be like for a brain to see (or to be blind for that matter). Unless the meaning of 
expressions like the soul (or brain) perceives, beliefs, thinks etc. has been explained, 
i.e. unless one knows what counts as the soul (or brain) doing thus and so, and 
unless one has established what could be cited as evidence for the soul (or brain) 
doing thus and one is unable to investigate this “phenomenon” experimentally. From 
a modern perspective, one might offer as a possible correction of the Cartesian claim 
a description of human vision of the following kind: ‘A person is able to see, because 
the light falling on the retina causes the photo pigments in the membranes of the 
retinal cones and rods to change their conformation. This leads to the activation of 
various ion channels. The nerve impulses generated as a consequence of this 
activity are transmitted to the primary visual cortex etc.’ 
The fundamental flaw in Descartes´ explanation is that the very same 
problems arise about Descartes´ explanans, as exist with regard to his explanandum, 
and which prompt an explanation in the first place. Because the meaning of 
expressions like the soul perceives, beliefs, thinks etc. has not been stipulated (i.e. 
there exist no rules for the use of such expressions), for example, it has not been 
specified what counts as a soul doing thus and so, an explanation of the 
explanandum is still to be given. Thus far, however, nothing has been explained (see 
also 1.2. below). The following discussion will further clarify that the brain is not a 
logically appropriate subject for psychological predicates. Wittgenstein’s remark in 
PI§281 is meant to direct our attention to the rules and criteria which underlie the 
application of psychological predicates. It is a grammatical (normative) statement 
pointing out a potential conceptual issue, by making a claim about the correct logical 
application of certain predicates. In order to appreciate the weight and significance of 
Wittgenstein’s insight, however, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the 
causes which underlie the modern mereological error. Furthermore, in order to 
expose the inconsistency underlying the mereological fallacy convincingly it is 
indispensable to examine the grounds which warrant the application of psychological 
predicates to human beings. 
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1.1 The Causes Underlying the Persistence of Mereological Confusion in Modern 
Cognitive Science
In Descartes´ case described above, it is easy to discover and understand the 
gaps in his account. This is mainly due to the fact that his physiological descriptions 
have been shown to be inadequate. Yet, as the examples of modern cognitive 
science illustrate, this particular philosophical error can happily coexist with the most 
detailed of physiological descriptions, and the most sophisticated items of scientific 
information. What is the reason for this? First, it seems that this is partly due to the 
fact that cognitive scientists are unaware of the implications of the Cartesian ideas 
which infuse their chosen field of study. It is not a matter of rational consideration that 
the application of psychological predicates has been shifted from an immaterial mind 
or soul to a material brain, but the residual effect which the Cartesian legacy exerts 
on cognitive science (see Chapter I & II). Despite the fact, however, that this legacy is 
more often than not openly acknowledged, the impact and lasting influence of the 
flawed Cartesian conceptual framework which cognitive science endorses remains 
neglected and misunderstood. Cognitive scientists appear to underestimate the 
subliminal ways in which the Cartesian conceptual framework they work with 
influences their scientific arguments and moulds their explanations and 
understanding. Although the vast majority of cognitive scientists vehemently reject 
the dualist conception of body and mind championed by Descartes, the partial
repudiation of the Cartesian legacy does not mean that other aspects, which still 
exercise their lasting influence, have been equally recognized and repudiated. One of 
the reasons for such carelessness may lie in a false belief in the powers of modern 
science. The repudiation of Cartesian metaphysics often follows in the wake of an
emphatic reference to scientific progress and the ever-increasing power and 
sophistication of scientific technology. The conviction that with the advancement of 
scientific technology and resulting scientific progress philosophical problems are 
solved quasi automatically, is spread widely among cognitive scientists and those 
philosophers, which champion the application of the scientific method in philosophy
77
. 
However, this view rests upon a profound misunderstanding of both the nature of 
science and the nature of philosophy (see Chapter II). It reflects the ideologization 
which science has undergone, particularly in the 20
th
 century. One of the symptoms 
of this affliction is the fact that the claims of (cognitive) scientists are more often than 
77
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not unjustifiably scientistic, and vastly exaggerate the powers of science. Eric Kandel, 
winner of the Nobel prize for medicine in 2000,  and his colleagues are just one 
prominent example who exhibit this misguided belief in the powers of science whilst 
defining the goal of cognitive neuroscience as the examination of
’… classical philosophical and psychological questions about mental functions in the light of 
cell and molecular biology.’
78
However, views like this neglect that no flawed philosophical theory or question can 
be corrected or answered by applying the methods of science. They betoken an 
ignorance of the distinction between factual and conceptual questions, and a general 
disregard for conceptual clarity. A more outspoken example of this kind of 
contemporary scientism is provided by the famous Oxford chemist and science writer 
Peter Atkins, who seems rather keen to underline the “omnipotence” of science: 
‘Although poets may aspire to understanding, their talents are more akin to entertaining self-
deception. They may be able to emphasize delights in the world, but they are deluded if they 
and their admirers believe that their identification of the delights and their use of poignant 
language are enough for comprehension. Philosophers too, I am afraid, have contributed to 
the understanding of the universe little more than poets…They have not contributed much that 
is novel until after novelty has been discovered by scientist…while poetry (and philosophy) 
titillates and theology obfuscates, science liberates.’
79
It is the scientistic attitude underlying those statements, which is rife within the 
community of cognitive scientists, and which is partly responsible for the fact that so 
many cognitive scientists unthinkingly adhere to a mutant form of Cartesian 
metaphysics, and unwittingly trust in technological progress whilst neglecting the 
need for conceptual clarity and hygiene.
The second reason why cognitive scientists are so tempted to ascribe 
psychological predicates to the brain is, in philosophical terms, much more interesting 
and of much greater significance. It gives us an insight into the ways in which “the 
philosopher in us” works and how we fall victim to our “metaphysical disposition” (see 
Chapter II), whilst struggling for an understanding of the human mind. 
Philosophically, it seems that the tendency to commit a mereological error is linked to 
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a misunderstanding of the differences, which exist between the ascription of 
psychological attributes to oneself and to others. While the ascription of psychological 
attributes to others is justified by reference to behaviour, the ascription of a 
psychological predicate to oneself is not. For example, someone’s saying that one is 
in pain does not depend on the observation of one’s own pain behaviour.  If that is 
the case, how is it that we can say what we see, hear, feel and think or belief? It is a 
widespread belief, not only harboured by scientists, that the mental is a special 
private domain accessible only to its subject. We are inclined to think of this private 
domain as an inner mental realm and we speak accordingly of our inner mental life, 
or simply the inner. In contrast, behaviour, observable by anyone appropriately 
situated, belongs to the public domain. The public domain is conceived of as the 
outer. According to this Inner/Outer picture or metaphor
80
 we have direct privileged 
access to our own mind, to the mental events and processes going on in our heads,
by ways of introspection (and thus without having to observe what we do or say). 
Other people, on the other hand, depend on behavioural evidence in order to find out 
what someone thinks or how someone feels. It seems that they can find out how 
things are with me only indirectly. Due to a misunderstanding of the faculty of 
introspection we assume, as Bennett and Hacker point out that: 
‘…the access which introspection gives each person to his own mental states and processes 
is a partial and limited access to processes going on in his brain
81
’.
These assumptions do not represent the latest thinking currently en vogue in 
contemporary cognitive science. Rather, they have already been shared by both 
Cartesian and empiricist philosophers. The difference between the classical and 
modern position(s) lies merely in the fact that both Cartesians and empiricists implied 
a substance dualism, and consequently assumed that introspection provides us with 
direct and immediate access to our own immaterial mind, rather than the going ons in 
our brains. These ideas are crucially linked to the representationalism endorsed by 
these schools of thought, and which continue to be applied by contemporary 
cognitive science in the context of cognitive view (see Chapter II). Cognitive science 
thus replaces the Cartesian dualism of mind and body, with a dualism of brain and 
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body. As a result, the mereological error persists in modern cognitive science, 
despite the application of highly advanced and sophisticated technology. The 
immaterial mind of Cartesian dualism is merely substituted with the material brain, 
while the logical character of dualism is essentially retained in the conceptual 
framework endorsed by cognitive scientists. 
Of course, this claim may initially be somewhat difficult to get to grips with. 
After all, both body and brain are material substances and the suggestion that
dualism is retained is not immediately intelligible and may seem rather absurd. One is 
inclined to point out that body and brain are not two distinct kinds of substance in the 
same way that mind and body are within the context of Cartesian metaphysics. Yet, 
the range of psychological properties cognitive scientists ascribe to the brain are the 
same characteristics that Cartesians ascribe to the mind. But psychological 
predicates are no more applicable to an immaterial mind, than they are applicable to 
the brain or parts of the brain. Cognitive science thus applies a conceptual framework 
to the brain that is roughly identical to that of Cartesian metaphysics. Whilst the 
immaterial Cartesian mind is replaced by the material brain, the logical structure of 
dualist psychology is retained. Consequently, cognitive scientists are prone to explain
the possession of psychological attributes by a human being by ascribing those 
attributes to the human brain. However, the fact that the brain rather than Descartes’ 
immaterial soul is now the subject to which these predicates are ascribed does not 
change the fact that the explanandum is still looking for its explanans. As long as this 
crypto-Cartesianism persists, the endeavour of cognitive science will suffer from 
conceptual confusion, a fundamental flaw, which obscures the fact that no real 
explanation of the mental phenomenon in question has been achieved. The 
persistence of crypto-Cartesianism in contemporary cognitive science thus stands in 
the way of a correct understanding of the mental phenomena cognitive scientists 
strive to illuminate. Under the influence of the Cartesian legacy, the modern 
explanations of mental phenomena provided by cognitive scientist are, although 
much more sophisticated, just as flawed as the much older explanations offered by 
Descartes. Like the explanations of their Cartesian ancestors, the modern versions 
also constitute transgressions of the bounds of sense (see below). 
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1.2 Substantiating the Mereological Principle: The Grounds for the Ascription of 
Psychological Predicates 
The point that Wittgenstein makes in PI§281 is not a factual one, but a 
conceptual one. Whether psychological attributes can intelligibly be ascribed to the 
brain is a philosophical and therefore a conceptual question. It is not a question, 
which can be answered by the means of scientific investigation. It is not factually 
wrong that brains don’t see, hear, believe, desire, remember or think. Rather, it
constitutes a transgression of the bounds of sense to say such at thing, save in a 
metaphorical or metonymical sense. We do not know what it is for a brain to see, 
hear, believe, desire, remember, or think. Neither do we know what it would be for a 
brain to be blind or to be deaf, or to be content, or to be thoughtless. The issue 
addressed here calls for conceptual clarification not for empirical investigation as the 
claim that the brain thinks, hears, sees remembers etc. is not based on the 
observation of (newly discovered) facts. Rather such claims are the product of a
particular line of thought, which cognitive scientists adopt in the interpretation of their 
experimental results. And until one knows what it would be for a brain to do or not to 
do so, i.e. until we know what sort of evidence would support the ascriptions of such 
attributes to the brain, we are not clear about the meaning of such statements. Any 
interpretation or explanation, which involves the ascription of psychological attributes 
to the brain, is flawed, and will not contribute to advancing our understanding. 
Consequently, the conception of the brain as a form of biological information 
processing unit or biological computer which receives, stores, retrieves, transforms 
and transmits information, leading to such statements as the brain beliefs, thinks, 
sees etc, (see Chapter II, Sec.2) constitutes as transgression of the bounds of sense.  
The logical grounds for the ascription of psychological attributes to a subject 
are the behaviour of the subject, of the human being, but not of his brain or any other
part of his body. Nothing a brain does could possibly constitute a ground for ascribing 
vision, hearing etc. to the brain. The brain is not a logically appropriate subject for the 
ascription of psychological attributes. This follows from the mereological principle (the 
principle that psychological predicates which only apply to human beings as a whole 
cannot be applied to parts of a human being) on which these claims are based. The 
mereological principle is best understood as a convention, rule or norm, which 
determines what does and does not make sense. As a convention the mereological 
principle could in theory be changed. Yet, in order to implement such a change a, 
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large number of other things would have to change too. The mereological principle is 
secured by a widely ramified network of conceptual connections manifest in a 
network of rules, which forbid the application of psychological concepts to parts of 
human beings. To change the application of the mereological principle would 
therefore necessitate the reformulation and rearrangement of the rules which underlie 
these conceptual connections, and which form an integral part of the intellectual 
landscape of our socio-cultural environment. In other words, such rearrangement and 
reformulation would lead to the changing of the meanings of numerous familiar 
concepts, which constitute a fundamental part of our form of life (see Chapter 2). In 
fact, we could not resolve to abandon this normative relationship without instigating 
changes in our form of life.
The significance of the mereological principle thus arises out of the conceptual 
commitments or rules relating to the application of expressions, which describe and 
explain the psychology of human beings. An examination of these rules by studying 
language games using psychological expression reveals that the applicability of 
psychological predicates to others is regulated and warranted by their behaviour. For 
example, if I hear my mother, who is just bustling about in the kitchen, suddenly 
scream ‘Ouch!’, and see her assuaging her head or hand I know immediately that 
she is in pain. Her pain behaviour, i.e. her scream, warrants my immediate pain-
ascription to her. Importantly, I ascribe pain ‘to my mother’, not to her head or her 
hand. I don’t think (or say) that her head or her hand is in pain. Similarly, if by rushing 
out of the door I accidentally trap Giacomo’s (i.e. my bulldog’s) paw in the door, I 
think that I accidentally hurt him and that he is in pain because of his wails. I do not 
think (or say) that his paw is in pain. It is my bulldog Giacomo who is in pain. In the 
same way, I would not think that my teacup is in pain, after I accidentally dropped it 
and its handle broke off. Neither would I think (or say) that my armchair beliefs that 
he is going to be up next for bulk rubbish collection, because I just dispensed of my 
sofa in this way. Neither the ascription of pain to my tea cup, nor the attribution of a 
certain belief to my arm chair makes sense, as the mereological principal forbids the 
application of such psychological predicates to something other than human beings 
or anything that behaves like a human being. Both expressions constitute 
transgressions of the bounds of sense. At this point, however, one may be tempted to 
argue that in certain stories and fairytales, for example, psychological predicates are 
frequently meaningfully applied to things like stones, plants and other usually 
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inanimate objects, and that in these cases these ascriptions occur well within the 
bounds of sense. Thus, the Ents
82
 encountered in The Lord of the Rings rose against 
the wizard Saruman because they believed that he was in league with the evil 
Sauron.  Likewise, the little teacup “Tassilo” encountered in Walt Disney’s The 
Beauty and the Beast rubs his nose, i.e. his handle, in pain after the candelabra 
“Lumiere” accidentally dropped some wax on it
83
. While it is true that in these cases 
the bounds of sense have not been transgressed, it is important to note that this is 
because Tassilo, by rubbing his nose/handle behaves just like a human being would. 
Likewise, the Ents display a characteristic human behaviour when they learn about 
Saruman’s alliance with Sauron. They voice their indignation and call for action, also 
a characteristically human behaviour. In such cases the bounds of sense are not 
transgressed because the ascription of belief and pain is modelled on the pain 
behaviour of human beings. Both Tassilo and the Ents display the behavioural 
criteria, which warrant the ascription of pain and belief. The mereological principle is 
(implicitly) acknowledged in these cases. It is the different forms of behaviour 
displayed by human beings, which provide the primary ground for the ascription of 
psychological attributes to others. Thus, when cognitive scientists say that the brain 
sees, hears or thinks etc. the bounds of sense are transgressed because the brain, 
like my mum’s head or hand, and like Giacomo’s paw, (and unlike Tassilo or the 
Ents) does not exhibit the behavioural criteria which would justify the application of 
these predicates. To say that the brain sees, hears or thinks makes as much sense 
as to say that the brain is blind, is deaf or behaves thoughtlessly. Thus, when Antonio 
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Damasio tells us that core consciousness
84
 is the result of first order neural 
representations telling, i.e. “narrating”, a story which is perceived/heard by (higher) 
second order neural representations about,  ‘how the organism’s own state is 
affected by the organism’s processing of an object
85
’ , one may feel inclined to 
question the intelligibility of such an account and press for clarification.  Similarly, if 
someone argues that schizophrenics experience hallucinations because ‘the right 
hemisphere is talking to the left hemisphere
86
’ one should be worried about the 
degree of insight prevailing in modern neuropsychiatry.
It is also important to note, that contrary to the beliefs of some philosophers 
the ascription of psychological predicates to others is neither based on inference nor 
on inductive evidence
87
. The ascription of pain described above, for example, is not 
inferred. Inductive evidence is gathered by establishing the co-occurrence of two sets 
of independently identifiable events. Thus, it pre-supposes a non-inductive 
identification of the phenomena that are observed to stand in correlation to one 
another. Consequently, to understand the notion of some particular mental state, one 
has to be familiar with the kind of behaviour that counts as evidence for its 
occurrence. Pain behaviour is logically good evidence for being in pain. As 
Wittgenstein points out:
‘Ein ’innerer Vorgang’ bedarf äußerer Kriterien.’ (PU§580)
‘An ‘inner’ process stands in need of outward criteria.’ (PI §580)
But, one may want to ask, what kind of behaviour does the brain display when it 
beliefs something for example?  What are the behavioural criteria, which the brain 
exhibits when it perceives, believes, thinks or does the myriad of other things that 
human beings are usually engaged in?  What are the outward criteria, which indicate 
84
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the brains’ believing or not believing something? Like the mereological principle 
described in PI§281, this remark indicates a rule of grammar, which regulates the use 
of psychological predicates. (Pain) behaviour is best thought of as a criterion
88
 for the 
ascription of pain to a subject. Put in more general terms we can also say that the 
physical expression of a mental process is a criterion for that process (i.e. the 
meaning of a psychological predicate is partly constituted by a characteristic 
manifestation of a typical form of behaviour).
‘Criteria, unlike symptoms (inductive correlations), determine the meanings of expressions for 
which they are criteria.’
89
However, to say that the various forms of behaviour are criteria for the 
ascription of psychological predicates is not to say that the meaning of a 
psychological predicate is equivalent to the behaviour that warrants its ascription. 
People can be in pain and not show it. They can also think or believe something and 
not exhibit it or not admit that they are. And it is possible for people to pretend to be 
in a certain psychological state. It is possible to pretend to be in pain by exhibiting 
pain behaviour yet not to be in pain at all (a form of behaviour often displayed by 
centre forwards in the goal zone). That is, any criterial evidence for the ascription of 
psychological attributes to others is capable of being invalidated by evidence to the 
contrary (i.e. a centre forward may pretend to be in pain after having been in contact 
with an opponent in order to secure a penalty. After the referee has blown the whistle 
and decided to award or not award a penalty the centre forward who had been 
pretending to be in pain more often than not “miraculously” recovers form his injury in 
an instant).    
88
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2. Aspects of the Inner and the Outer Investigated: Introspection, Direct and 
Indirect Access, Privacy and Private Ostensive Definition
One of the reasons which has been identified above as underlying the 
tendency of both philosophers and cognitive scientists to ascribe psychological 
attributes to the brain was their inclination to conceive of expressions of thought and 
experience as descriptions of one’s own inner mental states. Like their Cartesian 
ancestors
90
 they hold that psychology studies the human mind from the outside, i.e. 
by investigating human behaviour. The main difference to the thinking of Cartesians 
of previous generations is, however, that contemporary cognitive scientists and 
philosophers belief that with the advancement of scientific technology in the late 20
th
century, brain imaging in particular, one is finally able to find out what lies behind the 
outside (i.e. the behaviour) – the workings of the human brain. The well known British 
neuroscientist and director of the Royal Institution, Baroness Susan Greenfield, 
famously explained to a TV audience that as a result of modern brain imaging 
techniques, scientists can ‘…see the brain think’.   A corollary of the conception of 
expression of thoughts and experiences as descriptions of observations made in foro 
interno, as it were, is the claim that we have direct and privileged access to our 
mental states by means of introspection.  Conversely, it is claimed that we have only 
indirect access to other people’s states of mind, thoughts and experiences. The 
‘inner’ appears to be hidden behind the ‘outer’; what goes on inside is to be inferred 
by observing someone’s behaviour. In other words, we are prone to think that when 
we ascribe psychological predicates to others we can only do so on the basis of 
indirect behavioural evidence. However, this conception manifests a deep confusion 
regarding the nature of first- and third-person psychological propositions. 
The aim of this section is to closely scrutinize this picture of a private Inner 
realm of mind and an Outer public realm of behaviour. By showing that this picture is 
the result of a misconstural of various figures of speech such as natural metaphors 
and similes, which crop up naturally in every day discourse, I hope to provide a 
prophylactic against its seductive simplicity. However, an investigation into the 
muddles which provide the foundation for the Inner/Outer picture of the mind is also 
crucial to obtaining a deeper understanding of the confusions underlying the 
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mereological fallacy. Both the Inner/Outer picture and the mereological fallacy are a 
manifestation of the crypto-Cartesianism persisting in cognitive science. Together 
they provide an example of the intricate links that exist between the analogies, 
pictures and metaphors that often mislead us when we contemplate the nature of the 
human mind. As Wittgenstein put it:
‘Der besonderen Täuschung, die hier gemeint ist, schließen sich, von verschiedenen Seiten, 
andere an. ...’ (PU§96)
‘Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken of 
here. …’ (PI §96)
The contemporary picture of a private inner realm to which subjects have 
privileged access to, and of a public outer realm which is immediately accessible for 
everyone, is of partly Cartesian and of partly empiricist origin
91
 (see also Chapter II). 
This view is problematic as it invites a misunderstanding and misconstural of the 
logical character of experience and its ascription. The difficulty in freeing ourselves 
from this picture lies in the fact that it is so deeply embedded in our language and 
thus appeals to our most basic intuitions regarding our views of mind and the world 
(PI §115). It is equally appealing to the philosopher, as it is to the laymen 
contemplating the intricacies of human psychology. This aspect will become clear as 
the philosophical investigation into the Inner/Outer picture progresses and we try to 
disentangle the knots in our understanding. Some of the claims we are going to 
encounter in the following discussion may strike us as deeply counterintuitive and as 
having no obvious rationale. But as will also become clear, this is because we tend to 
be stuck in viewing philosophical problems and questions from a theoretical , 
speculative perspective rather than the more appropriate grammatical one. If one 
adopts a grammatical perspective, however, we come to realize that, despite 
appearances to the contrary, some of the claims and ideas proposed by philosophers 
and cognitive scientists are not genuinely intelligible.  But as Wittgenstein has 
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pointed out, one  learns to recognize when the bounds of sense have been 
transgressed not least by the bumps one’s understanding gets by running its head up 
against the limits of language (PI §119). 
2.1 The Metaphor Exposed and Examined
The Inner/Outer picture is based on a number of highly questionable 
assumptions, which take us hostage while leading to misconceived assumptions 
about the character of experience. Some of them have already been encountered en 
passent in our discussion of the mereological fallacy. For clarity’s sake it is worth, 
however to restate them at this point of the investigation. The importance of the 
investigation into the Inner/Outer picture is not least due to the fact that some of the 
misconceptions associated with this picture, i.e. misconceptions about the meaning 
of psychological predicates, would undermine our claim that it makes no sense to 
ascribe psychological predicates to brains if they stand uncorrected (see below). The 
following assumptions lie at its core: 
a) The mind is a private inner realm that stands in contrast to an outer public realm of 
material (physical) phenomena and behaviour. This view is exemplified by claims like 
that of Antonio Damasio who in the tradition of William James
92
 views consciousness 
as an
‘entirely private, first-person phenomenon which occurs as part of the private, first-person 
process we call mind.’
93
b) Introspection is a means to get access to the private domain, i.e to what goes on in 
the ‘theatre of mind’, as it were. It is a means for perceiving our mental going ons. 
c) The inner is directly accessible only by oneself, whereas others have only indirect 
access to it. Emphatically propounding a Cartesian position, Francis Crick remarks
92
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‘(that) strictly speaking, each individual is certain only that he himself is conscious.’
94
d) The meaning of psychological predicates can be grasped independently of any 
conceptual connection to behavioural criteria. They are names of inner entities, 
mental experiences like states, events, processes etc. We know what psychological 
predicates mean through private ostensive definitions, that is, by associating them 
with the experiences we have and to which we have privileged access. This 
assumption has not only been tacitly presupposed in the writings of a variety of 
philosophers since Descartes and the British empiricists, but is also presupposed in 
the modern representationalist ideas underlying the cognitive view. Fodor’s ideas on 
a language of thought, as well as Chomsky’s notion of a “language acquisition 
device”, for example, exemplify how the ‘privacy assumption’ influences 
contemporary thinking in cognitive science.  
The outline presented above identifies three closely connected misconceived 
dualities, i.e.  an inner-outer duality, a direct-indirect duality and a public-private 
duality -,  as providing the core our conception of the mental.  They are deeply 
embedded in the ways philosophers, cognitive scientists as well as laymen talk about 
the mind and psychological phenomena. In addition, they are closely linked to 
misconceptions regarding the nature of introspection and the meaning of 
psychological predicates which have attached themselves to these dualities, and 
which necessitate philosophical investigation. The following will investigate each one 
of these misconceptions in turn.      
The Inner-Outer Duality
Antonio Damasio provides an illustrative example of the persistent influence 
which the inner-outer duality exerts on contemporary cognitive science. In The 
Feeling of What Happens , for example, he postulates that
‘the term feeling should be reserved for the private, mental experience of an emotion…this 
means that you cannot observe a feeling in someone else, although you can observe a feeling 
in yourself when, as a conscious being you perceive your own emotional states.’
95
94
 Crick (1995), ‘The Astonishing Hypothesis’, London, Touchstone, p. 107
95
 Damasio (1999), p.42
64
It is immediately obvious that Damasio’s claim is an echo of the voices of his 
Cartesian ancestors. The assumption that one can only observe a feeling in onself, 
but not in others, is not only a clear allusion to both the inside-outside duality but also 
to the direct–indirect duality
96
. It carries the clear implication that when we talk of 
something like feeling we speak of somebody else’s feelings we talk about something 
which lies behind the behaviour. Although the sense of the attributions of 
psychological predicates to third parties appears, at first glance, unproblematic, 
philosophical problems seem to arise with respect to their truth (in particular, when 
compared with first person ascriptions of that kind). But this is where Damasio and 
other cognitive scientists go wrong, as they ‘look for an inside behind that which in 
our metaphor is the inside (NFL, p.280) .’ In order to clarify the insight underlying this 
statement it is of paramount importance to gain an understanding of how the 
metaphor of inner and outer is applied  (NFL, p.280).
A first step in getting an understanding of the application of this picture lies in 
answering the question under which circumstances it is employed? Both Anthony 
Kenny and Peter Hacker point out that it is highly conspicuous that with the exception 
of neuroscientific and philosophical discourse nobody would claim that a feeling like 
pain, for example, is something mental
97
. In fact, quite the opposite is the case. We 
routinely invoke the notion of physical pain, whilst referring to headaches, broken 
legs or arms, or stomach or toothaches. Talk of mental pain on the other hand, if 
invoked at all, refers to states of mind which are characterised by feelings of grief, 
sadness or depression. The verbal expression of such states of mind often involves 
figures of speech like, he is a broken man, or he suffers from a broken heart. But 
things start to become muddled, when we project the relation between entertaining a 
feeling or an experience, i.e. when  experiencing some form of pain like having a 
toothache, for example, and behaviour (e.g. assuaging one’s jaw), onto the picture of 
the inner and the outer (See e.g.: LSD, p.118). In itself this comparison is natural and 
even harmless. After all,
‘We say of another that he has toothache on the basis of observing his behaviour (something 
external), but he says I have a toothache without observing his own behaviour.’ (NFL, p.278)
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It is true that I would never know whether my mother is in pain (after she accidentally 
spilled water whilst preparing tea, for example) unless she reveals it to me by 
screaming ‘Ouch!’, or by rubbing her reddened hand. On the other hand, she would 
know perfectly well whether she is in pain, without having to look for a behavioural 
expression. While I can be in doubt whether my mum is in pain or feels happy or sad 
or whether she is not, she cannot be in doubt about these things. However, it is this 
pattern of thought that is highly misleading, and leads to the hypostatisation of a 
metaphysical inner mental realm whilst engaged in philosophical reflection or 
scientific discourse. It is in such moments, that our understanding is bewitched by the 
means of language (MS 219,11; PI §109) and we tend to  fall victim to our 
metaphysical dispositions, while we project the grammar of the outer upon the 
grammar of the inner. 
Let’s consider the following question: In which cases can it meaningfully be 
said that the mental is inner? Well, I may be angry with somebody but not reveal it. 
Equally, I may think that current neuroscientific thinking about the mind is a lot of 
nonsense, but chose not to disclose it to the audience of Oxford neuroscientists to 
which I present the findings of my memory research,so as not to affront them. And, 
while I may be deeply in love with Cécile, I may decide that now is not the time to tell 
her about it. In contexts like these, that is, in so far as the mental refers to mental 
states that can under certain circumstances be concealed and its behavioural 
manifestations suppressed, it can meaningfully be said that it refers to something 
inner. Yet, if I tell Cécile that I love her, that her smile makes my entire universe 
resonate, or that I feel as if I had been taken hostage by my thoughts of her, unable 
to escape, then I have revealed (rather emphatically so, I believe) what in the 
metaphor of the inner and the outer is the inner. And it would make no sense to press 
me to reveal an inside (i.e. reveal a love) behind the inside that I have just revealed 
(i.e. “behind” my love for Cécile, which I have just declared). It would simply be wrong 
to assume after my declaration of love, that some love is still hidden from view. 
Similarly, it would be wrong to assume that if I scream with pain because Emmy, my 
dance partner, steps on my (already highly bruised) foot, that my pain is still 
concealed, and that my scream is merely a behavioural manifestation. Furthermore, if 
Cécile shows me photographs of her trip to Cambodia, I too can see some of the 
things she saw there, although at that moment I do not look into anything (i.e. I do not 
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look into her mind or brain for example).  It is in this sense that the inner does not 
stand behind the outer. The inner has no explanatory priority over the outer. If we 
watch the famous ‘Glockenspiel’ on Munich’s Marienplatz, for example, we may well 
wonder what it is that makes the owlet figures dance? That is, we may wonder what 
goes on inside the clock, that makes the figure dance? To find out we could climb the 
town hall tower and have a look inside the Glockenspiel. In such a case, it is the 
climbing of the tower and the looking inside the Glockenspiel, which counts as 
revealing the inside. To ask ourselves ‘what, in the case of the human mind, counts
as revealing the inner?’, is the final push in the attempt to free ourselves from the 
deceptive force of the Inner/Outer picture.
If I am unsure whether Cécile is sad or happy or whether she is in pain, if I am 
in doubt about what she thinks about Emmy’s new Latin dress, or about what she 
sees outside the window, she can tell me. Yet, if she does tell me what she sees, she 
does not let me see inside her nor does he turn her insides out (NFL, p.279). Cécile 
can tell me what she thinks, or point out to me what she sees. This is what counts as 
letting me know what she thinks or showing me what he sees.  But to see what she 
sees is not to peer into her soul. That is, the meaning of the sentence ‘I see what she 
sees’ is not identical with the meaning of the sentence ‘I can see into her soul’, for 
example. While the former is a statement of a simple fact, viz. that I see the same 
house, car, dog, tree, or Latin dress, the latter is a statement about the insight and 
understanding I have into Cécile’s character or personality (i.e. I know what moves 
her, I can empathize with her reasons for doing this-and-that and thinking thus-and-
so). Similarly, on a stroll through the London Zoo Cécile can point at an elephant and 
say ‘the elephant I rode in Cambodia looked like this’. Yet, this does not constitute a 
case of indirectly communicating what colour she saw. Rather, this is what is called 
showing me what colour she saw. The purpose of these various examples is to 
illustrate that it is the various behavioural manifestations, which provide the criteria 
for a person’s revealing what goes on in his or her mind. Rather than depending an 
analogical extrapolation from personal experience, the ascription of psychological 
predicates is based on the behavioural expressions of what goes on inside a person. 
And rather than being mere symptoms, that is, inductive evidence, of how things are 
with a person, they are criteria of how things are with a person. Thus, contrary to the 
claims of Damasio and other cognitive scientists and philosophers we do not just 
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have to make do with indirect evidence, i.e. behaviour, when we ascribe 
psychological predicates to other people. It follows then that it is wrong to think that 
behaviour is nothing but externalities, and likewise, to think as Damasio suggests that 
one cannot only observe a feeling in oneself, but not in others
98
. If these claims strike 
us as counterintuitive or even absurd, it is helpful to remind us that they are not to be 
thought of as epistemological but as grammatical statements. They are not to be 
thought of as statements about what is true or false, but as statements about what 
makes and what does not make sense.
The Inner/Outer picture has a particular appeal when we ponder the nature of 
thinking. It is often the case that unless somebody voices his thoughts we cannot tell 
what that person is thinking. But to assume that because of a person may refrain 
from disclosing his thoughts that they are hidden is profoundly confused. To say that 
Cécile’s thoughts are hidden from me, because they are in her mind amounts to no 
more than saying that she thinks her thoughts and I cannot guess what she is 
thinking:
‘ “Was ich im Stillen bei mir denke ist ihm verborgen” kann nur heißen, er könne es nicht 
erraten, aus dem und dem Grunde nicht erraten; nicht aber, er könne es nicht wahrnemen, 
weil es in meiner Seele ist.’ (BPP
II  
§977)
‘ “What I think silently to myself is hidden from him” can only mean that he cannot guess it, for 
this or that reason; but it does not mean that he cannot perceive it because it is in my soul. ‘ 
(LW §977)
Likewise, if my dance teacher Lorraine, tells me that there is still a lot of work to do 
on the Jive, before Emmy and I can even dream of challenging Bryan and Carmen, it 
would be nonsensical to claim that what she told me are only words, and that she has
still kept her thoughts to herself
99
. Both Cécile and Lorraine can tell me what they 
think. But when they tell me that they were thinking this and that, the criteria for the 
truthfulness of them saying so are not the same as those for a true description of a 
process. The criteria for a description are not the same as those for a confession. 
The truth of a description of a process is checked by observation of the process, 
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whereas the criteria for the truth of a confession that he thought this and that are his 
sincerity. Neither Cécile nor Lorraine say that they thought this and that on the 
grounds of observing their thoughts. Rather, they gives expression to their thoughts 
by telling me about them.
2.2 Issues Surrounding the Faculty of Introspection
It has been noted earlier that the inner – outer duality is closely linked to a 
conception of introspection as a form of perception. Many philosophers and cognitive 
scientists believe that it is in introspection that we get access to the contents of our 
own consciousness, which is metaphysically speaking private property, known to 
each one of us in a unique way (LPD p.277)
100
. Philosophers and psychologists alike 
have confused the ability to say how things are with us, i.e. what we are feeling or 
what we are perceiving, with the ability to see (in the case of introspection, for 
example, we readily assume that we see with the mind’s eye, as it were). Thus, we 
think we can say what is within us. David Hume, for example, claimed:
‘Since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must 
necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Everything that 
enters the mind, being in reality a perception, ‘tis impossible anything should to feeling appear 
different. This were to suppose that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might 
be mistaken.’ (THN, Bk. I, Pt. iv, Sect. 2)
Similarly, Immanuel Kant viewed what he called the inner-sense (CrPR A22/B37) as 
the source of our knowledge of the objects of our private mental realm. It is this inner-
sense, which provides us with an immediate, non-inferential, acquaintance with them. 
Furthermore, according to Descartes our knowledge of the inner world is not only 
immediate; it is also indubitable. For many, including the laymen not working in 
cognitive science or its related fields, these assumptions are intuitively appealing. In 
fact, they appear unquestionable.  But once we have investigated the assumptions, 
which lend these ideas their seductive power, once we have taken off ‘the pair of 
glasses which sit on our nose and which shape the form of whatever we look at’
(PI§103), however, the conception of introspection as a form of perception starts to 
loose its intuitive appeal. Instead we recognize that, in fact, this view is distorted by 
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conceiving of introspection as some form of inner vision. This misconception is the 
result of drawing a false analogy between our ability to say what we perceive and our 
ability to say what is on our mind (i.e. what we think, feel, intend, desire etc.). In order 
to gain an understanding what is wrong with this analogy, and why it is in fact 
incorrect to think of introspection as a form of perception, we have to remind 
ourselves of the defining features of our perceptual faculties and how the various 
forms of perception (seeing, hearing, smelling, etc.) are exercised. Above all, we 
have to get an understanding of the set of criteria, which determine what counts as 
the exercise of our perceptual faculties. 
A range of factors influence the exercise of our perceptual faculties, the most 
prominent of which are 
• the state of the relevant perceptual organ, 
• the conditions of observation, and 
• the observational skills of the subject. 
These factors provide us with a rough idea of the range of behavioural criteria which 
are connected to the exercise of our perceptual faculties, and which justify or exclude 
the ascription of predicates of perception to a subject. As in the case of the ascription 
of psychological predicates, it is the various behavioural criteria which circumscribe 
the bounds of sense around the predicates of perception, and within which such 
predicates can meaningfully be ascribed. 
In the case of introspection, however, we are hard pressed to identify any such 
criteria. First, introspection does not involve the use of any perceptual organ. We do 
not use our eyes, ears, nose or any other organ in order to find out what is on going 
on in foro interno, nor do they have any use in the expression of what is on our mind.
And because introspection does not involve the use of any perceptual organ, the 
behavioural criteria, which would warrant the ascription of predicates of perception in 
are absent in the context of introspection. Consequently, predicates of perception 
cannot be meaningfully applied in the context of introspection. Second, the use of 
these sense organs is tied up with the concept of observation. But like the concepts 
of perception, the concept of observation does not get any grip in the context of 
introspection. People do not observe anything in order to be able to say what they 
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think, hope, expect, want or intend. The use of the word observation is bound up with 
the use and consequently the behavioural criteria linked to the exercise of our 
perceptual organs
101
. Again, it is the absence of these criteria, which tells us that no 
observation of any kind underlies our ability to say what is on our mind. For example,  
I might suffer an excruciating headache the morning after Summer Eights. Could I be 
said, other than metaphorically, that I have a headache because the voices of my 
better angels where shouted down by my unnatural craving for ‘just one more pint of 
Pimm’s’? Would better hearing have reduced my Pimm’s Consumption? Surely not. 
Because of the absence of the relevant behavioural criteria there is also no analogue 
of good and poor hearing, or of good or poor eyesight. Neither more light nor having 
a second look will improve my faculty of introspection (or anybody else’s for that 
matter). Finally, in relation to introspection there are also no observational skills that 
might be greater or lesser, and which might be honed with practice etc.. There is no 
more a mind’s eye in anything other than a wholly metaphorical sense than there is a 
mind’s ear, or nose. And where we do invoke the metaphor of the mind’s eye, we 
speak of seeing in not with the mind’s eye. So what enables us to what is going on in 
the minds eye? Surely nothing that is in any way connected to our visual abilities. 
Misled by such metaphors as the ‘mind’s eye’, and by homonyms such as ‘feeling 
pain’ the prevailing tradition in philosophy and cognitive science has confused the 
grammatical exclusion of ignorance with the presence of knowledge. But the 
exclusion of ignorance, for example, the senselessness of the statement ‘I do not 
know whether I am in pain’ also excludes knowledge. I know that I am in pain is not 
an epistemic claim, and I feel that a pain in my right ankle is not a perceptual claim. 
Similarly, that statement that I am aware of a sudden burning sensation in my 
stomach, after I have enjoyed one of those fatal midnight Kebab’s at Hassan’s, is not 
a cognitive judgement.
If introspection is not a form of perceiving the inner vision of our mind’s eye 
what then is it? What is the nature of introspection? In order to answer this question 
we have to look at the grammar of the concept. Once again we have to investigate 
how and under what circumstances a concept - introspection - is applied. To do so, 
let’s start by asking what are the circumstances in which we describe other people as 
introspective? Two conditions stand out. First, people are described as being 
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introspective when they are prone to reflect intensively upon their character, their 
motives for action, their beliefs, their attitudes, their emotions or their moods, for 
example. In this context, introspection is best understood as a form of reflexive 
thought. It is the term under which we subsume kinds of behaviour, which qualify as 
introspective. Thus, understood in this sense introspection is a means by which we 
gain an understanding of ourselves. It is a way by which people acquire self-
knowledge. However, it is not a form of perception, which enables us to arrive at such 
knowledge or understanding of ourselves. Secondly, there may be situations in which 
one may note the waxing or waning of one’s pain or one’s affections for one’s 
girlfriend.  I may, for example, find that the pain in my bruised right foot decreases 
considerably, if I put it on a chair in order to rest it in an elevated position. Similarly, I 
may find that my passion for Beethoven has waned away in favour of an increasing 
obsession with Chopin. Understood in this second sense introspection is a matter of 
paying attention to one’s moods and emotions, sensations and feelings. 
In the light of this investigation, one is led to doubt explanations of mental 
phenomena involving the ‘orthodox’ conception of introspection as perception, and 
which has been revealed as deep misconceived in the above. Lawrence 
Weiskrantz’s, for example, conceives of introspection as a neural monitor, which 
observes incoming ‘visual sensations’, and enables the perception of one’s inner 
goings ons. In the context of the phenomenon of blindsight, he takes the 
disconnection of this neural monitor, i.e. a disconnection of what he calls visual 
sensation and visual perception, from the visual inputs as the underlying cause of he 
blindsight
102
.  Given the results of the investigation into the concept of introspection, 
his ideas seem profoundly confused. Equally ill conceived is Philip Johnson-Laird 
view of introspection as a parallel processing device, which enables the neural 
system to construct a model of its own use of such models in a series of continuously 
ascending neural representations
103
. This suggestion is part of his attempt to 
construct a computational account of introspection. Johnson-Laird’s view is a prime 
example of an attempt to provide a scientific foundation for a nonsensical idea 
(introspection as a form of inner perception). Together, these two examples
104
provide some insight into the confusion prevailing in cognitive science regarding the 
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notion of introspection, and the way this misconception leads to deeply flawed 
accounts of mental phenomena. Weiskrantz’s and Johnson-Laird’s ideas are 
representative of a host of neuroscientific explanations and theories about mental 
phenomena which constitute not so much insight but illusion.
2.3 The Direct-Indirect Duality
A further corollary of the conception of introspection as the means by which 
we perceive the contents of our private inner world is the idea that this inner realm is 
a kind of private property (see e.g.: LPD p.277). The objects of this inner world, one 
is tempted to think, are essentially owned.  As Gottlob Frege pointed out, sensation is 
impossible without a sentient being and the existence of an inner world presupposes 
somebody whose inner world it is. Thus, it seems natural to suppose that every 
individual should have privileged access to his very own mental realm. This is 
enhanced by the fact that other people can apparently only come to know what I 
think or how I feel (i.e. whether I am in pain) if I tell them or show them (i.e. nurse my 
head or cheek, wear a gloomy expression on my face), whereas I do not have to rely 
on such behavioural criteria in my own case. Whilst it is true that it is the behavioural 
criteria which justify the application of psychological predicates to people, it does not 
follow that one has direct access to oneself, because one can say how one feels 
without having too refer to such criteria. This becomes evident once one gets a firmer 
grasp on the concept of getting access to someone or something.
A case in which it makes sense to speak of having access to something or 
somebody might be the following: I do have access to Jesus college library, for, as a 
member of Jesus College, I am granted the permission to use the college’s facilities. 
Similarly, I have access to the world-wide-web via the computers in the college 
library, which I am allowed to use for such purpose. Furthermore, I have access to 
the Principal of Jesus College. Even more so, my access to the Principal might be 
described as privileged, for as president of the graduate common room (GCR) of 
Jesus College I am, unlike other members of college, able to see him on short notice 
or at inconvenient hours. To think that there is anything to such cases of ‘having 
access to something or somebody’ which is comparable to having access to the 
going ons in my mind, which would justify the claim that I have ‘direct or privileged 
access’ to my thoughts or feelings, is misconceived.  When I feel my head ache, for 
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example, I can say so without reference to any evidential grounds (such as my 
affiliation to Jesus College). Any person who has mastered the use of a language
can make assertions
105
. The utterance of such assertions like, I believe that Oxford 
will win the dancesport varsity match, or I think that Bryan Watson is the best jiver in 
the world, does not depend on me having privileged access to my beliefs or thoughts
etc.. Rather, I have reasons or grounds for believing such-and-so or thinking this-
and-that. 
Similarly misconceived is the idea that others only have indirect access to my 
inner world and must make do with indirect evidence for describing me as happy or 
sad, or thinking that I am sincere or that I am a liar. It makes sense to speak of 
indirect access or evidence only in cases where it would make, in principle, also 
make sense to speak of direct access or evidence. It is important to note that the 
characterizing of evidence or knowledge as indirect is tantamount to drawing a 
contrast between two types of knowledge or evidence (i.e. direct and indirect 
evidence or knowledge). Having a pain, as mentioned previously is not to observe 
anything. The lesson to be learnt here is that there is no more a direct a way to 
finding out what a person thinks, believes, intends, experiences, feels etc. than the 
person sincerely telling me what he thinks, believes, experiences. Similarly, there is 
no more direct a way of finding out what another person sees than by his showing me 
what he sees. Although, there are circumstances in which it can be said that I have 
come to know something about somebody ‘indirectly’, such circumstances do not 
imply that I was unable to inspect the nature of the other person’s consciousness. 
Rather, Cécile might find out that I am in love with her because Louisa, who I 
confided in her, told her so. In this case it could reasonably be said that Cécile found 
out indirectly about my feelings for her. In other cases, I might, for example, find out 
indirectly that my new acquaintance is a fan of rock music by having a glance at her 
CD collection. But if I chose to tell Cécile that I love her, or if I am being run away 
with by passions and just walk up to her kiss her, than for sure, Cécile would not 
think, nor could it reasonably be said of her, that she found out about my affections 
for her indirectly. That is, my love would no longer remain hidden. Thus, it only makes 
sense to talk of indirect knowledge, if it also does make sense of direct knowledge, 
as this distinction implies a contrast. In context of the mind and the application of 
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psychological predicates, however, there is no contrast which would warrant the 
meaningful application of expression of direct and indirect access. The direct –
indirect duality is nothing but a metaphysical myth, resulting from a misleading 
analogy (LSD, p.13):
‘…we compare the case of a person saying ‘I am in pain’ as opposed to someone saying of 
him on he basis of his behaviour ‘he is in pain’ with the case of, e.g., knowing that there is a 
penny in my pocket by feeling it (‘directly’) as opposed to knowing that there is a penny in your 
pocket by hearsay (‘indirectly’).’
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2.4 The Public - Private Duality
‘Nobody else has my pain. Someone may have sympathy with me, but still my pain belongs to 
me and his sympathy to him. He has not got my pain, and I have not got his feeling of 
sympathy.’
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This remark by Gottlob Frege nicely illustrates another source of 
misunderstanding regarding the picture under examination. It lies in the idea that 
another person cannot have my experiences. My pain as well as your sympathy are 
inner objects, mental representations in the jargon of modern cognitive science, 
which belong to our respective subjective inner worlds. As described in the 
introduction to the preceding sub-section, a corollary of the idea of introspection as 
the means by which we perceive the contents of our private inner world is the notion 
that this world is a kind of private property. For example, we readily assume that if 
two people do have a headache, there are two headaches not one. Whilst we may 
concede that two people have the same pain, i.e. the same stinging sensation in their 
head, we are at the same time inclined to think that all this means, however, is that 
the head aches are exactly alike. Yet, it does not imply that they are identical. Thus, 
while the pains of two people may be qualitatively identical, we still conceive of them 
as numerically distinct
108
. The inclination to argue this way seems to arise from the 
assumption that the location of a sensation is a criterion for who has it. The burning 
sensation which Michelle feels in her stomach is a burning sensation in her stomach. 
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Alice might feel a similar burning sensation in her stomach, but since Alice’s stomach 
cannot be in the same place as Michelle’s stomach, her burning sensation cannot be 
in the same place either. 
The mistake we fall victim to in such cases is that we project the grammar of 
expression containing physical objects onto expressions pertaining to experience. 
That is, we wrongly take the concept of location of sensation to be analogous to the 
concept of location of a physical object. But, the location of a sensation is not a 
criterion for who has it. 
”Der Andre kann nicht meine Schmerzen haben.”  Welches sind meine Schmerzen? 
Was gilt hier als Kriterium der Identität? Überlege, was es möglich macht, im Falle 
physikalischer Gegenstände von ”zwei genau gleichen” zu sprechen. Z.B. zu sagen: ”Dieser 
Sessel ist nicht derselbe, den du gestern hier gesehen hast, aber er ist ein genau gleicher.” 
Soweit es Sinn hat, zu sagen, mein Schmerz sei der gleiche, wie seiner, soweit 
können wir auch beide den gleichen Schmerz haben. (Ja es wäre auch denkbar, daß zwei 
Menschen an der gleichen  nicht nur homologen  Stelle Schmerz empfänden. Bei 
siamesischen Zwillingen, z.B., könnte das der Fall sein.)
Ich habe gesehen, wie jemand in einer Diskussion über diesen Gegenstand sich an die 
Brust schlug und sagte: ”Aber der Andre kann doch nicht diesen Schmerz haben!”  Die 
Antwort darauf ist, daß man durch das emphatische Betonen des Wortes ”diesen” kein 
Kriterium der Identität definiert. Die Emphase spiegelt uns vielmehr nur den Fall vor, daß ein 
solches Kriterium uns geläufig ist, wir aber daran erinnert werden müssen.’ (PU§253)
‘ ”Another person can´t have my pains.” – Which are my pains? What counts as a criterion of 
identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two 
exactly the same”, for example, to say “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but 
is exactly the same as it”.  
In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible 
for us to have the same pain. (And it would also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in 
the same – not just the corresponding – place. That might be the case with Siamese twins, for 
instance.)
I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and 
say: “Bur surely another person can’t have THIS pain!” – The answer to this is that one does 
not define a criterion of identity by emphatic stressing of the word “this”! Rather, what the 
emphasis does is to suggest the case in which we are conversant with such a criterion of 
identity, but have to be reminded of it.’ (PI §253)
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In order to obtain an Übersicht over the grammar of expressions containing physical 
objects Wittgenstein asks us to ponder what enables us in the case of physical 
objects to distinguish between being identical (dasselbe) and being exactly the same 
(das gleiche) yet not identical. For example, I have two IKEA shelves of the type 
‘Billy’. They are exactly alike, yet not identical. One of them is located in my study the 
other one in my living room. My friend Toby who comes to visit me in my new flat 
may observe that the shelve ‘Billy’ in my new living room is the same shelve ‘Billy’ he 
saw in the living room of my previous flat. Furthermore, as I show him round my new 
home, he may observe that I now have another shelve ‘Billy’ (newly acquired) 
standing in my study. In this case it would make sense for him to say that this is not 
the ‘old’ shelve ‘Billy’ he knows from inhabiting the living room of my old flat, but that 
this is a ‘new’ shelve ‘Billy’, which is exactly like it. Now, does the same distinction, 
between being identical and exactly the same apply to sensations, like pain for 
example? In order to answer this we have to clarify what counts as a criterion of the 
identity of a sensation. What is called ‘having a burning sensation in the same part of 
our body’ is having the same sensation in the same part of the body (i.e. Michelle in 
her stomach and Alice in hers). Doctors, for example, may frequently ascribe the 
same pain to various patients if the respective pains are sufficiently alike in intensity, 
phenomenal characteristics and location. Even if one went on to object that a 
‘corresponding location’ is not ‘the same location’, and that hence two people cannot 
have the same pain one would still be mistaken. For, if we imagine as Wittgenstein 
did the case of two Siamese twins who are conjoined (at identical places) at the head 
or at the back, we must concede that in such a case it is logically possible for two 
people to have the same pain, and not just in corresponding places (PI §253). Thus, 
location is not a criterion for the possession of an identical sensation. Possessive 
phrases like, being mine or being yours, or being his or being hers characterize who
has a headache. They do not single out or identify the headache in question (PI 
§302), nor do they single out or identify any experience as implied by the public-
private duality . 
2.5 The Final Straw that Breaks the Camel’s Back or the Inner/Outer Picture of the 
Mind and the Meaning of Psychological Predicates
77
Thus far, the present discussion has identified various different sources of 
confusion underlying the Inner/Outer dichotomy (e.g. flawed ideas about the faculty 
of introspection and the concepts of direct and indirect access and privacy). The 
resulting distorted picture of mind, which itself is part of the confusion underlying the 
mereological fallacy, is deeply rooted in these conceptual confusions. In order to free 
ourselves from this misguided picture of the mental it is vital that all of its roots are 
identified and pulled up. Only in doing so can we make sure that the weed will be 
thoroughly eradicated, as it were. 
At its most fundamental the metaphor of the Inner and the Outer is linked to an 
erroneous conception of language, which leads to a misunderstanding of the 
meaning of our psychological vocabulary. This flawed conception of language is 
rooted in what with the publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
came to be known as the Augustinian picture of language:
‘Nannten die Erwachsenen irgend einen Gegenstand und wandten sie sich dabei ihm zu, so 
nahm ich das wahr und ich begriff, dass der Gegenstand durch die Laute, die sie 
aussprachen, bezeichnet wurde, da sie auf ihn hinweisen wollten. Dies aber entnahm ich aus 
ihren Gebärden, der natürlichen Sprache aller Völker, der Sprache, die durch Mienen  und 
Augenspiel, durch die Bewegungen der Glieder und den Klang der Stimme die Empfindungen 
der Seele anzeigt, wenn diese irgend etwas begehrt, oder festhält, oder zurückweist, oder 
flieht. So lernte ich nach und nach verstehen, welche Dinge die Wörter bezeichneten, die ich 
wieder und wieder, an ihren bestimmten Stellen in verschiedenen Sätzen, aussprechen hörte. 
Und ich brachte, als nun mein Mund sich an diese Zeichen gewöhnt hatte, durch sie meine 
Wünsche zum Ausdruck. (Augustinus, in den Confessionen I/8)
In diesen Worten erhalten wir, so scheint es mir, ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen 
der menschlichen Sprache. Nämlich dieses: Die Wörter der Sprache benennen Gegenstände
Sätze sind Verbindungen von solchen Benennungen.  In diesem Bild von der Sprache 
finden wir die Wurzeln der Idee: Jedes Wort hat eine Bedeutung. Diese Bedeutung ist dem 
Wort zugeordnet. Sie ist der Gegenstand, für welchen das Wort steht. (PU §1)
‘ “When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I 
saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to 
point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural 
language of all people: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other 
parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, 
rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in 
various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had 
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trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.” (Augustine, 
Confessions, I.8)
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human 
language. It is this: the individual words in a language name objects- sentences are 
combinations of such names. – In this picture we find the roots of the following idea: Every 
word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the 
word stands. (…)’ (PI §1)
The most significant misconception inherent in this picture is the idea that first-person 
present tense psychological statements are descriptions of one’s own mental states. 
The Inner/Outer picture of the mind, endorsed by the rationalist and empiricist 
schools of philosophical thought as well as contemporary cognitive science, is deeply 
rooted in the Augustinian picture of language. Within the empiricist tradition, for 
example, the foundation of knowledge is comprised by the ideas which are obtained 
from the use of our inner and outer senses
109
. Accordingly, the fundamental building 
blocks of language were thought to be the names given to simple ideas. As a result, 
the private mental objects inhabiting our inner world were deemed to provide the 
foundation of language. The most modern upshot of this conception is the idea that 
the fundamental rules of language are innate and given antecedent to any 
experience
110
. This view is endorsed throughout a large part of the cognitive science 
community. Thus, in the ‘classical’ as well as the modern case the roots of language, 
and consequently, the meaning of any psychological expression, are conceived as 
essentially mental. It is in this way that the predominant picture of the mind leads to 
the idea of a private language (i.e. a language that can be understood by nobody but 
it’s owner (PI§243)) A consequence of the received conception of language outlined 
above is that the subject-matter of language is viewed as consisting exclusively in the 
subjective experience of the speaker. It implies that the words of the language, 
referring to the names of sensations, feelings, moods, or sense-data obtain their 
109
 The locus classicus of this conception is to be found in John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. Locke’s philosophy of language is based on the idea that the meaning of words is 
given by their association with the ‘ideas in the mind of him that uses them.’ (Essay 3.2.2)
Contrary to Locke, Descartes, did not reflect deeply on the nature of language. In formulating 
his (in)famous Cogito-argument, he took the meaning of a number of basic terms such as thought and 
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Descartes, Vol.I, p.196) 
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meaning by way of private ostensive definition
111
. In this context, concentrating on an 
experience and associating the experience with a name, for example, is often 
understood as a mental analogue of physically pointing at an object. However, a 
private language thus conceived is impossible and the entire conception of language 
associated with the Inner/Outer picture of the mind rests on conceptual confusion.   
The question we have to examine in order to disentangle us from the 
confusion underlying the idea of a private language is whether psychological 
expressions can be assigned a meaning by means of private ostensive definition? 
We may ask, for example, whether we learn the meaning of pain in this way? Did we 
master the use of ‘I am in pain’ by naming a private experience? Wittgenstein 
considers the following analogy:
‘...angenommen, es hätte Jeder eine Schachtel darin wäre etwas, was wir ” Käfer” nennen. 
Niemand kann je in die Schachtel des Andern schauen; und Jeder sagt, er wisse nur vom 
Anblick seines Käfers, was ein Käfer ist. Da könnte es ja sein, dass Jeder ein anderes Ding in 
seiner Schachtel hätte. Ja, man könnte sich vorstellen, dass sich ein solches Ding fortwährend 
veränderte.  Aber wenn nun das Wort ” Käfer dieser Leute doch einen Gebrauch hätte?  so 
wäre er nicht der der Bezeichnung eines Dings. Das Ding in der Schachtel gehört überhaupt 
nicht zum Sprachspiel, auch nicht einmal, als ein Etwas: denn die Schachtel könnte auch leer 
sein.  Nein; durch dieses Ding in der Schachtel kann ’gekürzt’ werden; es hebt sich weg, was 
immer es ist.
Das heißt: Wenn man die Grammatik des Ausdrucks der Empfindung nach dem Muster 
von ’Gegenstand und Bezeichnung’ konstruiert, dann fällt der Gegenstand als irrelevant aus 
der Betrachtung heraus. (PU §293)
‘…Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘Beetle’. No one can look into 
anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. 
– Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One 
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a 
use in these people’s language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing 
in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box 
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To define a word by means of ostensive definition is to define a word by pointing to its literal 
counterpart. For example, I can give an ostensive definition of a chair by pointing to a chair saying, 
"this is a chair." This kind of definition stands in contrast to dictionary-style definition which only uses 
words to explain the meaning of other words. In ostensively defining a term we obtain a sense that we 
are making a real connection between language and the world. As the Augustinian picture of language 
illustrates we are tempted to regard ostensive definition as the paradigmatic form of definition and the 
kinds of objects that can be so named as the paradigmatic form of words
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might even be empty.- No, one can `divide through´ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, 
whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model 
of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.’ (PI §293)
If ‘beetle’ were to have a use in the common language of the group of people or ‘box 
owners’ referred to in this paragraph of the Philosophical Investigations, the term 
would not be related to whatever is in each persons’ private box. In fact, the content 
of the box cancels out as far as communication in the public language between the 
box owners is concerned. Consequently, with regard to the meaning of those 
expressions containing the word ‘beetle’, the contents of the boxes are utterly 
irrelevant. And the same is true in the case of talk about pain or any other private
experience.  If we assume, for example, that the private experience of pain varies 
significantly from person to person whilst applying the ‘Inner/Outer’ picture of the 
mental, the differences between the various pain experiences would neither be 
verifiable nor falsifiable.  As a result, the public use of the word ‘pain’ could not be 
affected by these private differences either. An entirely private pain sensation, or any 
other private experience in fact, ‘drops out of consideration as irrelevant’. After all, ‘a 
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the 
mechanism’ (PI§271). Two conclusions can be drawn from these considerations. 
First, our public talk about our experiences or sensations like pain, for example, is not 
dependent on the character of a ‘private’ experience. Second, a sensation like pain, 
is not a private experience. The meaning of the word pain or any other sensation or 
experience is not determined by naming an experience in one’s private inner realm.  
3. Methodological Queries: Objections and Replies
Anthony Kenny points out that cognitive scientists often shrug off and defend
their practice of ascribing psychological attributes to the brain as a harmless
pedagogical device
112
. Indeed, in response to the claim that ascribing a psychological 
attribute to the brain makes no sense, cognitive scientists often respond by pointing 
out that actually they didn’t mean it like that or that such statements are to be 
understood in a metaphorical sense. That is to say that the words or expressions 
applied were used in a special sense as analogical extensions of their usual 
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application. They must not be taken to have their ordinary meaning. Rather, the 
words or expressions in question, i.e. that the brain believes that…, has been given a 
new meaning as the predicate is not used in the ordinary sense. Again, Antonio 
Damasio provides an excellent example of the kind of illusion and excuse alluded to 
here. In elaborating his neurobiological theory of consciousness he states that:
`looking back, with the license of metaphor, one might say that the swift, second order 
nonverbal account (=core consciousness) narrates  a story: “that of the organism caught in the 
act of representing its own changing state as it goes about representing something else.” 
…This plot is incessantly repeated for every object the brain represents….´
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Such claims are problematic, however. What could it possibly mean to say that one 
adopts metaphoric licence when proposing a neurobiological theory of 
consciousness. Is this tantamount to saying that certain words adopt a new 
meaning? If it does then there is a problem. For there is no evidence that Damasio, 
or cognitive scientists in general, have really given new meanings to the words they 
use which would legitimise the ascription of psychological attributes to the brain or 
parts of the brain. Let alone render talk of second order neural representations, which 
narrate stories intelligible. When Descartes postulated that the soul sees images 
projected on the pineal gland, for example, he applied the verb to see in its ordinary 
sense (i.e. as applied in statements like, I see an English Bulldog chewing on my 
guitar case). Similarly, Damasio and other cognitive scientists, contrary to any claims 
brought forward, also continue to apply the psychological terms and expressions in 
question in their ordinary sense. Just like Descartes did. If that was not the case, 
cognitive scientists would not draw the kind of inferences from their research which 
they do draw. This is reflected in statements like 
‘…the brain recognizes faces’ …It appears as though a special subsystem in the brain sees 
faces; it is triggered to produce the percept for our conscious lives by the configuration of 
elements. The special face processor does not know or care about what elements it is 
composed of; as long as they are in proper arrangement, a face is perceived. What could be 
more fascinating than to study how the brain does such things?’
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See: Damasio (1999), p. 179. According to Damasio the story narrating core consciousness is what 
in his terms is a second order neural representation: core consciousness occurs when the brain’s 
representation devices generate an imaged, nonverbal account of how the organism’s own state is 
affected by the organism’s processing of an object, and when this process enhances the image of the 
causative object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context.´ (see ibid: p.169) 
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It is important to note that recognizing means ‘recognizing’ here, i.e. to identify 
something or someone as having been encountered before, and being able to make 
a discriminatory judgement as a result of the recognition. Furthermore, it is important 
that the special subsystem sees faces in the ordinary sense of to see. Only thus can 
it pick out or recognize the proper elements of a visual scene and contribute to the 
perception of a face (needless to point out that what is meant here is not that a 
human being perceives a face here, but his or her brain).
Yet, as the previous discussion showed, it makes no sense to say of a brain 
that it thinks, hears, sees, imagines, remembers, recognizes, perceives or believes 
as we do not know what would count as a brain thinking, hearing, seeing, imagining, 
remembering or believing.  Furthermore, if the cognitive scientists really had given a 
new meaning to those kinds of expressions, they would have had to adopt a new 
conceptual framework with new rules for the application of certain familiar terms. 
Again, this is because the bounds of sense are drawn by the rules of language. If one 
wanted to change the rules for the use of certain psychological concepts, like 
believing or recognizing, for example, one would have to change a lot else as the 
rules for the application of certain concepts are part of an intricate and widely 
ramified network of conceptual connections which form an integral part of our form of 
life (see Chapter I, see also above).
Although perception is indeed a fascinating field of study, our understanding of 
this psychological phenomenon will not be advanced by explanations of the kind 
cited above. Rather, in cases like this cognitive scientists engage in a form of 
speculative metaphysics (or psychology) propounding seriously flawed explanations 
and theories. Thus, philosophy can not only add perspective to cognitive science but 
also make a real contribution to moving neuroscience forward, and help to put in on 
sure footing. And philosophy can do this contrary to the perceptions of some 
cognitive scientists:
’...to understand how a biological system works, a laboratory is needed and experiments have 
to be performed. Ideas derived from introspection can be eloquent and fascinating, but are 
they true? Philosophy can add perspective, but is it right? Only scientific method can move a 
topic along on sure footing.’
115
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4. Summary and Conclusion
A variety of misconceptions have been discussed and clarifications proposed. 
Contrary to the common practice in cognitive science it is wrong to ascribe 
psychological predicates to the brain in order to explain the possession of 
psychological attributes by human beings. The behavioural grounds, which provide 
the criteria for the ascription of a psychological predicate, are partly constitutive of the 
meaning of the predicate. They are conceptually connected with the attribute in 
question. Yet, the brain does not exhibit pain-behaviour. There is no such thing as a 
brain engaging in such activities like assuaging it’s limb, or moaning of its aching 
head. Consequently, explanatory claims like those propounded by Gazzaniga, Crick, 
Damasio and others are mistaken. They wrongly assume that they provide 
explanations of psychological phenomena but instead further misconceptions about 
the human mind by distorting our understanding of the phenomena investigated. 
What cognitive science can do, on the other hand, is to observe the neural 
concomitants that might be involved when a person is suffering from pain. However, 
such neural activity is not a form of pain behaviour. Neural phenomena may be 
inductively correlated with being in pain. Yet, the correlation is an empirical discovery, 
which presupposes the concept of pain and its connection with non-inductive 
behavioural evidence that warrants the application of the concept of pain.
The philosophical investigation into the mereological fallacy in cognitive 
neuroscience showed that the misconceptions and conceptual confusions which 
cognitive scientists fall victim to are manifold and profoundly interconnected. The 
mereological fallacy, it has been shown, is closely linked to the Inner/Outer picture of 
the mind which has dominated philosophy since Descartes and the British 
empiricists. This picture, in turn, is the result of profound conceptual confusions 
regarding the nature of introspection, privacy, and the nature and foundation of 
language. Thus, the claim that I know that I am in pain, for example, is not an 
epistemic claim; different people can have the same experience, share the same 
feeling or can harbour the same thought; inner states stand in need for outward 
criteria; a private language is impossible. It is important to understand that these 
statements are not theses constituting improved alternatives, which would override 
other philosophical or scientific theses. Rather, these statements are to be 
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understood as grammatical remarks, arrived at by investigating the uses of certain 
words and expressions. Grammatical remarks pertaining to the use of psychological 
predicates highlight logical connections between words and the psychological 
phenomena to which they relate. They are, as Norman Malcolm remarks, “truisms“ 
since they merely spell out some features of our familiar uses of an expression
116
.
Part of their function is to describe the rules for the use of concepts, and thus, to 
delineate the bounds of sense. They are reminders, which the philosopher 
assembles to provide a prophylactic against conceptual confusions (PI§127). As such 
they are not philosophical claims, which have been proven to be correct (or 
incorrect), but rather they are examples of what it means to provide an overview (PI 
§122). The purpose of these grammatical elucidations is to demonstrate that some 
established ways of providing explanations of mental phenomena are incorrect and 
to demonstrate that what appeals to many as an intuitively comprehensive picture of 
the human mind is, in fact, incoherent and mistaken. In doing so, the achievement of 
this chapter lies primarily in the exposition and destruction of what is a customary but 
profoundly misconceived way of thinking about the human mind and brain. Due to the 
crypto-Cartesianism persisting in the cognitive view, it invites us to conceive of mind 
and brain in the ways examined in this chapter. Besides the critique of the 
widespread ascription of psychological predicates to the brain, the present chapter 
has dealt a first decisive blow to the mentalist tendency to explain cognition in terms
of inner mental states and processes. To expose these defects is central to providing 
alternative ways of understanding psychological phenomena. This will be carried out 
in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter IV
The Cognitive View and the Mind 
1. The Mind: Preliminary Observations
What is the human mind? What is its nature? As described in chapter II, 
cognitive scientists tend to answer these two questions in a broadly physicalist 
manner. First, classical cognitive science views the mind as a biological information 
processor, a representational system, which receives, stores, retrieves, transforms 
and transmits information. Second, the nature of the mind is thought to be material 
and realized in the neural circuitry of the brain. Consequently, the terms mind and 
brain are used as synonyms, and the conception of the mind/brain is widely spread 
among cognitive scientists and philosophers. As a result of the nowadays prevalent 
believe that an understanding of humanity can only be arrived at by applying the 
causal hypothetico-deductive framework of explanation encountered in the natural 
sciences
117
, and the equally wide spread tendency to view the mind as some form of 
biological computer, these reductionist ideas have gained a deceptive appeal. From 
a Wittgensteinian point of view, there is good reason to be deeply suspicious about 
the intelligibility of these ideas. Despite the appealing mix of modern scientistic and 
classic Cartesian and empiricist metaphysics, these ideas are nothing more than wild 
conjectures, a prime example of the confusion that ensues when the need for 
conceptual clarity is neglected. They are nothing but bad philosophical questions and 
theories, which are not amenable to empirical investigation, but demand the quiet 
weighing linguistic facts (Z§447). Following the later Wittgenstein’s principles of 
philosophical investigation, the present chapter will expose this reductionist notion of 
the human mind as a biological information processor as the manifestation of 
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The immense success that the sciences enjoyed, particularly in the 20th century, combined with 
their tremendous economic potential and the promise of financial gain, resulted in a triumphant 
increase in their popularity. This made the rifts between the natural sciences and the humanistic 
studies (which had developed and grown for centuries) finally seem unbridgeable (see e.g. Snow CP, 
1993). Most importantly, this development was accompanied by a general devaluation of humanistic 
understanding, which gave rise to scientism - the illicit extension of the methods and forms of 
explanation of the natural sciences. The wide spread belief in the omnipotence of the causal 
hypothetico-deductive framework of explanation encountered in the natural sciences (methodological 
scientism), and the ontological reductionism informing the cognitive view are but two contemporary 
examples of this development.
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misconceived philosophical theorizing. The investigation of the concept of mind and 
its conceptual connections will provide the starting point of this discussion. 
The reductionist notion of the mind as a biological information processor 
ultimately rests on the misinterpretation of various pictures of the mind, which are 
deeply embedded in our language. These pictures surface, for example, in our 
everyday parlance about our intellectual faculties, our intellectual abilities and 
inabilities or in talk about our intellectual virtues and vices (for details see section 2 
below). Unfortunately, figures of speech like having a broad or narrow mind, like 
having a sharp, cunning, agile or vicious mind are often erroneously taken at face 
value, and believed to refer to a single entity. Furthermore, the adjectives used in 
these expressions are taken to describe distinct attributes of that entity
118
. However, 
substantives are substance hungry
119
, and as a result, what is a mere facons de 
parler  philosophers and cognitive scientists are prone to “take it as read”. This, in 
turn, results in questions with regard to the nature of the entity – the mind - (e.g. what 
is this entity, the mind, made out of?). However, such questions are pernicious as 
they invite the construction of flawed philosophical and/or scientific theories in answer 
to misunderstood philosophical questions (misunderstood in the sense that they rest 
on conceptual confusions which are the result of a lack of an overview over the 
grammar of our concepts). Following the late Wittgenstein, however, we have to turn 
our attention to the way in which the term mind is used, investigate how the concept 
is applied in its natural habitat, in order to arrive at an understanding of the nature of 
mind (PI§370). The challenge we face in order to arrive at an understanding of mind 
is not one of devising sophisticated theories, but to bring back the word mind from its 
metaphysical to its everyday use (PI§116)
2. Investigating the Mind in its Natural Habitat
The notion of mind as an entity is a characteristic misconception featuring in 
discussions among philosophers and cognitive scientists. As a result, it is not 
surprising to find the adherents of the cognitive view give in to the temptation of 
providing a theory and definition of the mind by suggesting that the mind is a 
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 For Cartesian dualists the entity was an immaterial substance, whilst for the majority of modern 
cognitive scientists and philosophers the entity is a material substance, i.e. the brain.
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biological information processing unit, which receives, stores, retrieves, transforms 
and transmits information. The following discussion will provide an overview of the 
grammar of the concept of mind and trace its links to the numerous psychological 
predicates and dispositions of human beings, which it is associated with. In doing so, 
it draws on earlier discussion of the subject by Hacker (1997b) and Kenny (1988),
In ordinary discourse the concept of mind is most readily associated with the 
intellect, that is, in particular with intellectual powers and their deficiencies or the lack 
of such powers. Consequently, the concept frequently features in talk about the 
character and quality of somebody’s intellect or somebody’s intellectual faculties and 
thus, is connected to descriptions of somebody’s personality or traits. For example, 
we readily describe clever, intelligent people as having a potent, powerful or sharp 
mind. Similarly, we speak of someone as having a quick, agile or subtle mind if a 
person easily understands the various nuances of a problem and/or is particularly 
quick at solving it. In contrast, we are prone to describe people who we perceive as 
generally intellectually challenged as having a slow mind if they are prone to err or 
fail in such situations. Furthermore, we would speak of someone as possessing a 
versatile mind if a person is accomplished not only in the sciences, for example, but 
also possesses knowledge and expertise in the humanities.  When talking about 
another person’s character or personality, we might remark that the person at the 
centre of our discourse has a dirty or filthy mind, if this individual uses a lot of swear 
words, or if his discourse is littered with sexual innuendos, for example. Alternatively 
we might describe somebody has having an idle mind, if the person we are aiming to 
portray is particularly lazy and frequently displays a lack of concentration. Finally, 
somebody we think of being in possession of a persuasive mind distinguishes himself 
by his ability to make good arguments and easily convince people of his point of 
view. These few examples provide us with a first vague idea of the extensive 
ground
120
, which the concept of mind covers. Including aspects of one’s ability (or 
inability) to solve problems to one’s powers of persuasion (or lack thereof), the 
concept of mind seems to be applied to more contexts than the simple conception of 
the mind as a biological information processor allows room for, (i.e. there seems to 
be a single minded emphasis/over emphasis of the problem solving abilities of 
human beings. The concept o mind applied in cognitive science seems to put undue 
120
As far as conceptual geography is concerned.
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emphasis on problem solving abilities, things hat can easily be picked up or 
measured by IQ tests, but neglect those aspects of mind, like someone’s powers o 
persuasion, who involve taking into account its more discursive aspects). 
Of equal prominence to the association of mind and intellect, are the 
connections of the concept of mind with the concept of will. A strong-minded 
individual, is not easily influenced or swayed by others, and may go about doing 
something with perseverance. Thus, I may keep on pursuing my philosophical 
investigations, despite the fact that the neuroscientific community chooses to 
disregard their relevance. Similarly, Nick may continue to work on his thesis, despite 
his housemates tempting him with red wine, a curry and the latest episode of The 
West Wing. Strong-minded individuals may also often serve as examples for others, 
and be referred to in the context of the kind of motherly advice delivered in such 
phrases like “anything goes if only you set your mind to it…”. In contrast, a weak-
minded individual may be easily swayed and influenced. For example, if I was 
tempted by Jumin, Sugi, Robin and Nick with red wine, curry and the latest episode 
of The West Wing, I would desperately fail in trying to keep my mind on my thesis 
and off the fact that I could spend an enjoyable evening with my friends
121
. Apart 
from being strong-minded or weak minded, somebody may also be indecisive or be 
in two minds about something. That is, someone may be unable to make up his mind 
or change his mind constantly.  For example, I may be said to be in two mind’s about 
whether this is the right time to tell Cécile that I love her, or not. Or I may be in two 
mind’s about continuing the work on my thesis tonight, or on spending some time 
with my friends. 
Besides connections of the concept of mind with intellectual power and will, it 
has strong links with the concepts of thought, memory and opinion. a) Thought: As 
my brother was just released from hospital, I no longer need to be concerned about 
his health and I can now turn my mind back to my philosophy thesis without having to 
feel guilty about it. And although I am struggling with this chapter I am sure that if I 
put my mind to it I will be able to finish it today. b) Opinion: To make up one’s mind is 
to form an opinion, while to be in different minds about something is for two people to 
have different opinions on a certain matter. For example, I have finally managed to 
make up my mind about Cécile. I am going to tell her. Also, Dave and I are in 
121
 Of course, this is not to say that an evening writing one’s thesis cannot be enjoyable.
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different minds about who is he best jiver in the world. He thinks it´s Slavik, whereas I 
believe that it is Bryan Watson. c) Memory: To bear or keep something in mind is to 
remember something. For something to slip out of my mind is for me to forget 
something. And, somebody who is prone to daydreaming may be described by his 
peers as being frequently absent-minded. On the other hand, the fact that I can’t get 
Cécile off my mind means, that I am unable to forget about her, and that I think about 
her all the time (except for those times when I am writing my thesis, of course).  
This latter case points at an important aspect of the use of the concept of 
mind. In various instances a particular use of the concept can have more than one 
meaning or be applied in more than one context. Its use runs criss cross in all 
directions (PI§67). Thus, the fact that I can’t get Cécile off my mind can mean either 
that I constantly think about her, or that I am unable to forget about her. Similarly, the 
ascription of a great mind to somebody can either be taken as a depiction of a 
brilliant thinker, or alternatively, it can be taken to describe a visionary who 
propounds ideas of great and unprecedented originality
122
. Furthermore, if someone 
is ascribed a beautiful mind, such a person may either be thought of as harbouring a 
particularly strong interest in the arts and the humanities or, alternatively, such a 
person may also be believed to possesses a particularly gentle and caring nature.
Finally, the use of the concept of mind is bound up with various pictures of 
room, space, agency, and of parts. For example, for someone to have a narrow or 
small mind is for such a person to be petty and/or prejudiced.  Likewise, parents who 
lost their child in a car accident, for example, may be out of their mind with grief and 
anger, and various thoughts may have crossed their minds with regard to how to 
punish the drunken driver who killed their daughter. Alternatively, thoughts about 
Cécile may be at the forefront of my mind, whereas I may keep putting thoughts of 
my thesis deadline to the back of my mind.  Expressions like these constitute a 
metaphorical portrayal of our degree of attentiveness to things of importance. Or to 
put it differently, such portrayals indicate the relative importance in which various 
matters stand in relation to our lives. In the context of agency, somebody may be said 
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Of course, these characteristics are not mutually exclusive and can be true of one and the same 
person. For example, Wittgenstein was both a brilliant thinker and a great visionary in as much as in 
his later phase he propounded a radical and revolutionary approach to philosophy. Similar things can 
also be said about Galileo, for instance In both cases, the ascription of a brilliant mind can be used to 
refer to different aspects of the personality or abilities of the person to whom a great mind is ascribed 
to.
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to have a quick or slow mind as a result of solving problems swiftly and adeptly, or 
because of somebody’s inability of doing thus. And, I may be in two minds about 
whether to participate in the foxtrot competition today, and if I am being honest with 
myself come to the conclusion that it’s not worth doing because I have only half a 
mind for doing it. The similarity between the uses of these expressions and the 
pictures of mind discussed earlier on in this section is noteworthy. They underline the 
subtle modulations and shifts in the meaning of the concept of mind, as a result of its 
manifold uses, which run criss-cross in all directions.
The examples described here are by no means meant to provide an 
exhaustive overview of the various uses of the concept mind. They suffice, however, 
to illustrate how one may be mislead by the various uses of the concept and come to 
picture the mind as a single discernable entity who is referred to in these various 
expressions. From there it is only a small and natural step to start asking questions of 
the kind What is the mind?, What is it’s nature?. The lack of an overview of the 
various uses of the concept of mind leads to confusion among philosophers and 
cognitive scientists, who go about their daily business whilst being utterly unaware of 
the intricate ramifications of the concept of mind, and the pictures which are 
associated with it. By conceiving of the meaning of the concept of mind as uniform, 
they distort the character of the phenomenon in question. The cognitive view of the 
mind constitutes the precipitate of this distortion. The misunderstanding of various 
figures of speech containing the concept of mind leads to a mistaken quest for 
definitions and theories, while the true nature of these expressions as convenient 
ways of talking about characteristics human traits, faculties, powers and their 
exercise, remains unrecognised. 
The misconceived definitions, theories and resulting hypothesis delude 
philosophers and cognitive scientists into dreaming up solutions of questionable 
intelligibility to misconceived difficulties (or as Wittgenstein put it, false solutions to 
false difficulties) (RPPI§1063). The difficulties that arise in the wake of these 
misconceived solutions are then attributed to the particular difficulty of the problem 
under investigation, whose impalpable nature makes it seem mysterious 
(Z§125,126). Often, the failure to catch hold of the problem is then attributed to the 
fact that the investigation itself is still in its infancy.  But of course, this is only the 
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result of misunderstanding the nature of science and the nature of philosophy (see 
Chapter II), which induces cognitive scientists to embark on experimentation without 
having gained a proper understanding of what it is, that makes the human mind 
seems so mysterious and unfathomable  (RPPI§1093). 
The present investigation into the natural habitat of the concept of mind 
underlines, that talk of the mind is a metaphorical or figurative means of giving 
expression to the characteristic psychological and personal attributes of human 
beings. And only of human beings (or beings that behave in sufficiently similar ways 
to human beings). The concept of mind could easily be dropped from these figures of 
speech, without rendering the expressions meaningless and without reducing their 
informational content. Applying the concept of mind when referring to one’s own or 
another person’s personality, views, opinions, ideas, mood or intellectual abilities is a 
convenient figure of speech, which makes our talk much more vivid and animated. In 
these contexts it is a harmless rhetorical device, which, however, causes havoc when 
it is torn out of context by philosophers and cognitive scientists, and considered in 
isolation from its natural habitat. Contrary to the prevailing conception among 
philosophers and cognitive scientists, the examples given above demonstrate that in 
speaking of the mind one is not referring to a singular entity. Rather,
‘ when we say that someone changed his mind, that he has a dirty mind, and that he has 
turned his mind to such-and-such a question, we do not imply that there is one thing, a mind, 
which has changed, is dirty and has been turned. Indeed the only thing we are speaking of is 
the person, and from case to case (and phrase to phrase) we are saying different things of the 
person.’
123
The claim that the concept of mind does not denote an entity of some kind may seem 
counterintuitive and puzzling, and thus, may be easily taken amiss. It is important to 
note, that this claim does not imply that minds do not exist. Minds do exist, but they 
are not entities (neither material nor immaterial).  These observations are of a 
grammatical kind, and what is argued for here, is a shift in perspective. Minds are not 
the kinds of objects philosophers and cognitive scientists are aiming to explain, when 
they ponder questions like What is the mind?, and What is its nature?. These 
questions are the result of a profound conceptual confusion, which surrounds the 
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concept of mind, and which makes philosophers and cognitive scientist embark on 
the investigation of a single entity, instead of  turning their attention to the contexts in 
which the word mind is used in (Z§447). The nature of mind can only be grasped if 
the grammar of the concept is investigated
124
. 
The previous investigation has highlighted that minds are not entities. To think 
otherwise marks, as Bede Rundle once put it, a shift from the metaphorical to the 
metaphysical.
125
 In thinking of the mind as a kind of entity, philosophers and cognitive 
scientists fall victim to the bewitchment of their intelligence by means of language 
(PI§109). As pointed out in the above, substantives are substance hungry. 
Consequently, (philosophical) questions of the form What is…?, should be treated 
with care and put our sense for nonsense on high alert. 
3. Aristotelian Psychology as the Foundation of an Alternative Approach to 
Understanding and Investigating the Mind
Modern cognitive science and philosophy have inherited the conception of the 
mind as a kind of entity from Descartes. Descartes’ view of the mind replaced a 
tradition of Aristotelian thought, which provided the first conceptual framework for the 
investigation of human psychology. Following Kenny (1984, 1989), the following 
discussion will provide an outline of Aristotelian psychology and ideas about the 
mind. By comparing the Aristotelian and Cartesian frameworks of thought directly, it 
will be possible to illustrate the misleading features of the Cartesian framework 
concisely, which lead to the entity view of mind. Furthermore, it will provide a 
powerful argument for the (re-) endorsement of the Aristotelian conceptual framework 
in philosophy and cognitive science, which construes the soul or mind not as an 
entity but as a characteristic attribute of (all) living beings. As Jonathan Barnes points 
out, Aristotle’s concept of mind is
124
 Note: Language is the means by which we represent and understand the world. It originates in the 
socio-cultural microcosms of human experience, viz. their forms of life. As such language mirrors the 
intellectual landscape of a culture. It is for this reason that tracing the conceptual connections of the 
concepts of a language can reveal an entire history of thought.
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93
‘at least as good a buy as anything else currently on the philosophical market. Philosophy of 
mind has for centuries been whirled between a Cartesian Charybdis and a scientific Scylla: 
Aristotle has the look of an Odysseus.’
126
3.1 The Aristotelian Conception of the 
In his treatise De Anima, Aristotle lays out his psychology at the centre of 
which lies the idea of the  (anima (lat.)). For Aristotle the or 
soul
127
was not a separate entity existing besides the body, but rather, was to be 
understood as the characteristic powers of a given living being (DA414
a
20-21). This 
conception stands in stark contrast to the immaterial substance which Descartes had 
envisioned, and the glutinous substance contemporary cognitive science envisages. 
In an Aristotelian context, the soul, is to be understood as a biological concept, and 
not as a metaphysical one as in the Cartesian tradition. Consequently, the 
Aristotelian and Cartesian views represent two fundamentally different conceptions of 
the nature of man. For Aristotle, his conception of the soul is the principal of both 
animal and vegetable life (DA, 402
a
7-8). 
Aristotle believed in a hierarchy of three different kinds of soul existing in 
nature:
a. The nutritive soul, which he conceived to be the most fundamental principle of 
life. It is the power in virtue of which all biological organisms are said to have 
life, viz. growth, nutrition and reproduction (DA,415
a
23-26). 
b. The sensitive soul, which comprises the powers of perception, desire and 
locomotion. The sensitive soul is only possessed by higher organisms such as 
non-human and human animals. Plants, on the other hand, only possess a 
nutritive soul. 
c. The rational soul, which is unique to human beings or creatures similar or 
even superior to human beings (DA,414
b
27-28) and comprises the powers of 
intellect (thought/reasoning) and volition. Characteristically, Aristotle’s 
conception of the (rationale) soul is also devoid of any ethical or religious 
connotations. 
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 Barnes J (2003) ‘Aristotle’s Concept of Mind’, in: Articles on Aristotle – Psychology & Aesthetics, 
Barnes J, Schofield M, Sorabji R (eds.), London, Duckworth
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 Henceforth the term soul, which is the traditional translation of the Aristotelian term , will be 
used to refer the Aristotelian conception of the mental.   
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Aristotle’s conception of the soul sprang from his ideas on matter and form. 
The soul, so Aristotle, is the form of a natural body, which has life (DA, 412
a
20). 
Every natural body, which has life is a substance, in the sense of being a composite 
(DA, 412
a
15-16). The concept of substance is related to the concept of matter, as 
substance is an umbrella term denoting, 
‘…matter, which in itself is not a this; secondly, shape or form, which is that precisely in virtue 
of which something is called a this, and thirdly that which is compounded of both.’ (DA 412
a
6-
9)
All natural bodies including non-living and living bodies possess both form and 
matter. In order to describe the form of living bodies one has to describe their souls, 
as they are the forms of those natural bodies, which are (potentially) alive (DA 
412
a
19-21)
128
. Thus, to specify the form of a body is to say what kind of thing it is and 
to define the form is to state what it is to be that kind of thing.
The distinction between form and matter provides the basis for Aristotle’s 
understanding and description of persistence through change. As Bennett and 
Hacker point out, 
‘Aristotle introduced the notion of matter as a technical term to pick out that which has a 
capacity for substantial change, and form to pick out that which makes a certain matter into 
the kind of substance it is.’ 
129
It is in this way that Aristotle came to conceive of the soul as the form of the living 
body. At the same time, Aristotle also thought of the soul as the first actuality of the 
living body, viz. the unexercised dispositional power of an animal (DA412
b
6-7). In 
contrast, Aristotle refers to the exercise of a dispositional power as a second 
actuality. In general, the actualities of a substance are both the things a substance is 
and the things a substance can be engaged in (e.g. the things the substance is 
doing) at a certain time. Aristotle counts the powers of a substance, which includes 
both the active and the passive potentialities the substance possesses, among the 
128
 It has been pointed out that as far as Aristotle was concerned, the Greek language already had a 
term, , to denote the forms possessed by living bodies (a subclass of natural bodies). (see: 
Everson S ‘Psychology’, in: The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Barnes J ed., Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995). 
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substances´ actualities
130
.  It is important to note that Aristotle does not want the soul 
to be understood as being a part of the body or one thing with the body. This, he 
remarked, would be like thinking that the wax is identical to the imprint on it 
(DA412
b
8-9). Rather, soul is in general
‘substance in accordance with the account of the thing. And this is the `being what it was´ for a 
body of this kind. In the same way, if some tool, say an axe, were a natural body, its 
substance would be being an axe, and this then would be its soul. And if this were separated 
from it, it would not continue to be an axe, except homonymously, whereas as it is, it is an 
axe.’ (DA412
b
13-17)  
That is, the axe derives its power to chop from its being constituted by the matter of 
iron and wood formed into matter and handle. The form of the axe is its power to 
chop. The power to chop wood is the first actuality of the axe. 
This short exegesis illustrates how Aristotle came to conceive of the soul as an 
attribute of a living thing, viz. its characteristic powers, rather than an immaterial 
substance as envisioned by Descartes.
‘…substance is, as we said, spoken of in three ways, as form, as matter, and as the 
composite, and of these matter is potentiality, form actuality, and since the composite is in this 
case the ensouled thing, it is not that the body is the actuality of the soul but that the soul is 
the actuality of some body. And for this reasons they have supposed well who believed that 
the soul is neither without body nor a kind of body.’
In conceiving of the soul as the powers of a living being, rather than as an entity 
existing independent of the body, Aristotle’s ideas stand not only in opposition to the 
conception of mind which was offered (much later) by Descartes but also to the 
teachings of his contemporary Plato. Both Plato and Descartes thought of the soul as 
an entity enjoying an existence separate from the body. Consequently, in contrast to 
the dualist Platonic and Cartesian psychological frameworks, Aristotle never runs into 
the difficulty of having to answer questions with regard to the relationship between 
mind and body. Within the Aristotelian conceptual framework, there is no room for a 
mind-body problem. Moreover, as Aristotle does not conceive of the soul as and 
entity, his framework of thought does not invite violations of the logic of 
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whole/parthood relationships. Conceiving of the soul as the powers of a living being 
does not allow for attributing to the soul the distinctive powers of the living being 
whose soul it is. Aristotle’s urges us
‘not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks but that the man does in virtue of his soul ’ 
(DA 408b13-15)
This aspect highlights one of the distinguishing features between classic Cartesian 
and contemporary ideas about mind encountered in cognitive science. Within these 
traditions of thought, psychological attributes are ascribed either to the mind (classic 
Cartesianism) or the brain (modern cognitive science) (see chapter III). The 
Aristotelian conception of the mind on the other hand, is immune to these kind of 
mereological errors, and can be a powerful antidote to transgressions of the bounds 
of sense.  
3.2 Aristotle – From a Contemporary Point of View
Anthony Kenny has adapted and developed the Aristotelian conception of the 
soul in a modern context. In accord with the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the 
characteristic powers of a living being Kenny suggests that if one is to give a 
definition of mind at all, it is best to think of the mind as a second order ability, viz the 
capacity to acquire intellectual skills
131
. Understood in this way, the mind is the 
capacity
132
 that enables human beings to acquire those skills and abilities, which 
form
‘the basis to engage in behaviour of the complicated and symbolic kinds which constitute the 
linguistic, social, moral, economic scientific, cultural, and other characteristic activities of 
human beings in society.’
133
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 Note: Although, the following will emphasize the conception of mind as a cognitive capacity, 
following Aristotle’s conception of the rational soul, the mind is not only a cognitive capacity (i.e. 
comprised of intellect), but also a volitional „capacity“ (i.e. comprised of will). In this context, the human 
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characteristics of practical reasoning.
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The most important skill, which human beings possess, is the knowledge and 
command of language, as it is through our language ability that we acquire 
knowledge of other abilities and learn to master and exercise those abilities. To have 
knowledge of something, simply is to be able to do something. An important 
distinction that is to be made in this context is that between ability, the possessor of 
the ability, and the vehicle or mediator of an ability. I am the possessor of my ability 
to dance, my ability to play guitar, and my abilities to think, imagine, memorize and 
remember. I am the one who has the ability to do all these things and more. Of 
course, it is not only human beings who possess abilities of a certain kind. My laptop 
has the ability to perform calculations with hyper-complex numbers twice as fast as 
my old machine.  Similarly, Neuhauser Zoigl
134
can intoxicate you about twice as fast 
as normal beers can, because of its extraordinary potency. The vehicle of my laptops 
ability to perform very complex calculations very quickly is the processor inside the 
machine. The vehicle of the Neuhauser Zoigl`s ability to induce intoxication is the 
amount of alcohol contained in the beer. Finally, the vehicle of my ability, to dance, to 
play guitar
135
, to think, to imagine, to memorize and to remember is the brain. As 
these examples illustrate, an ability is essentially something intangible. It is, as it 
were, an abstraction from behaviour
136
. In contrast, the vehicle of these abilities 
depicted above is always something solid and concrete. The vehicle of my new 
laptops’ ability to perform calculations with hyper complex numbers twice as fast as 
my old machine is the processor inside my new laptop. Similarly, in the case of 
human beings, the vehicle of their intellectual capacity is the brain. One advantage of 
this conception of mind is that it provides an unambiguous guideline for empirical 
investigations:
‘If one is to say what each of these is, for instance what the capacity for thought is, or for 
perception or nutrition, one should first say what is thinking and perceiving.’ (DA 415a16-17)
That is, in order to understand what the ability to  is one needs to understand what it 
is to . In other words, in order to gain an understanding of the ability to  one has to 
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 Zoigl is an unfiltered, bottom fermented type of beer, and has the status of a Bavarian Delicacy. Its 
production is restricted to certain areas of the upper palatinate (Oberpfalz), where it is brewed by 
private individuals in possession of special legal permission to brew.  
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study the exercise of that ability. And in order to study the exercise of the ability to , 
one needs to have an understanding of the symptoms and criteria adjudicating the 
use of the concept of ing, i.e one needs to know what counts as ing .
The conception of the mind as a second order ability (i.e. capacity), and of the 
brain as the vehicle of this second order ability, has important implications for 
cognitive science. First, it should put a stop to cognitive scientists and philosophers to 
adopt the entity view of the mind, which in the past has lead to the concoction of 
imaginative but logically-flawed (i.e. nonsensical) theories of mind-body interaction 
(e.g. dualism, behaviourism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism etc.). In the 
wake of the entity view of the mind a host of questions arose, which have plagued 
philosophers and cognitive scientists for years. The infamous mind-body problem or 
the problem of the explanatory gap
137
 are but two prominent examples. However, the 
preceding discussion of the concept of mind gives rise to some considerable doubt 
about their status as  (philosophical) problems. It has shown that talk about the 
human mind does not refer to a kind of thing, but rather to constitutes an idiomatic 
way of talking about the characteristic powers of human beings, and their exercise. 
The question ‘what is the mind?’, mistakenly led philosophers and cognitive scientists 
to view questions about the relationship between mind and body as problem in its 
own right; a problem, to which there is a solution if one only probes hard enough. 
With the benefit of an overview of the concept of mind at hand, however, we can see 
how false grammatical analogies and simplistic questions have led to the illusion of a 
problem. Consequently, there can be no solution to the mind-body problem. Rather, 
our informed perspective regarding the concept of mind, should prevent us from 
granting this age old philosophical problem e very status of a problem. The mind 
body-problem, simply disappears. Second, it prevents cognitive scientists and 
philosophers from falling victim to the “substance hunger” of questions like “What is 
the mind?”, which in turn leads to misconceived definitions and explanations of the 
workings of the mind as constituted by the cognitive view. Wittgenstein points out, for 
example, that questions like,  
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 It is commonly believed that human experience cannot be fully explained by the mechanical 
processes implied by reductionist conceptions of the mind such as the cognitive view, i.e. there seems 
to be a gap between mechanics of the brain and the experiential quality of our emotions, sensations 
etc. Consequently, it is thought that something extra, maybe a substance/entity of different 
metaphysical kind, must be added to “fill the gap”, as it were.
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‘”Die Fragen, Was ist Länge?”, „Was ist Bedeutung?“, „Was ist die Zahl Eins?“ etc., 
verursachen in uns einen geistigen Krampf. Wir spüren, daß wir auf nichts zeigen können, um 
sie zu beantworten, und daß wir gleihwohl auf etwas zeigen sollten. (Wir haben es hier mit 
einer der großen Quellen philosophischer Verwirrung zu tun: ein Substantiv läßt uns nach 
einem Ding suchen, das ihm entspricht.) (BB
D
, p.1)
‘"Questions like What is length?", "What is meaning?", "What is the number one?" etc., 
produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet 
ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical 
bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.’ (BB
E
,p.1)
On the other hand, adopting an Aristotelian position by viewing the mind as the ability 
to acquire intellectual abilities illustrates, what kind of insight empirical investigations 
into the human mind can yield: Thus, neural events and processes can be correlated 
with the exercise of a human beings ability to think, perceive, imagine etc. Moreover, 
cognitive scientists can try and discover what neural states, events and processes 
are empirical necessary conditions for human beings to be able to exercise their 
intellectual abilities. Third, if minds are capacities, they not only are not entities, but 
most importantly, they can’t be physical entities. If it is wrong to think of the mind as a 
physical entity, it is wrong to conceive of the mind as biological information 
processing unit. By now, it should be abundantly clear that this view does not 
constitute so much a particularly insightful conception of the mind, but rather a piece 
of sophisticated scientistic  metaphysics; the result of a gross lack of conceptual 
clarity. While one would hardly think of a car’s ability to accelerate from 0-100km/h in 
4,1 seconds as a material entity, mind-brain dualists do so consistently in their 
investigations. Finally, in the Aristotelian tradition, there is no room for talk about an 
inner  and an outer. After all, it would make little sense to conceive of my ability to 
remember the colours of the rainbow, of something inner. What would the outer be? 
4. Representations and Information Processing
The previous section has exposed the serious misconceptions and confusions, 
which underlie the entity view of the mind. The plausibility of accounts of human and 
animal behaviour in terms of the information processing view of the mind, i.e. the 
view of the mind as a biological information processor, seems highly questionable in 
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the light of the preceding investigations and the Aristotelian alternative. However, the 
entity view of the mind is not the only questionable idea that has found its way into 
the body of basic tenets and fundamental premises, which make up the cognitive 
view. Even if one was prepared to dispose of the entity view of the mind, and accepts 
that the exercise of our intellectual abilities is correlated with certain neural events 
and processes, cognitive scientists and philosophers may still insist that these neural 
going ons constitute (mental) representations (of the external world), by means of 
which the brain constructs a map of the world in order to plot its course of action
138
. 
In order to thwart such ideas, the present section will investigate the idea of mental 
representations. The meaningfulness of the notion of internal mental representations, 
conceived of as bundles of information derived from the exercise of our perceptual 
input, will be subjected to a conceptual analysis. 
The contemporary conception of mental representations as physical symbols 
is a rather recent development. While the classical representationalists like Descartes 
and Locke, for example, assumed that the end product of the exercise of our 
perceptual capacities is a pictorial representation
139
, contemporary 
representationalists championing the cognitive view conceive of the result of the 
exercise of our perceptual capacities as a symbolic representation. In their seminal 
article Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing, Lachman, Lachman and 
Butterfield (1979) emphasised the importance of the computer analogy to the study of 
the mind and mental phenomena, defining the subject matter of cognitive psychology 
as being, about how people take in information, how they recode and remember it, 
how they make decisions, how they transform their internal knowledge estates, and 
how they translate these states into behavioural outputs. Accordingly a person driving 
a car through the country side must
138
 Bechtel and Graham (1999), p.48ff
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 Famously, Descartes wrote, ‘If we see some animal approach us, the light reflected from its body 
depicts two images of it, one in each of our eyes, and these two images form two others, by means of 
the optic nerves, in the interior surface of the brain which faces its cavities; then from there, by means 
of the animals spirits with which its cavities are filled, these images so radiate towards the little gland 
which is surrounded by these spirits, that the movement which forms each point of one of the images 
tends towards the same point of the other image which represents the same part of this animal. By this 
means the two images which are in the brain form but one upon the gland, which, acting immediately 
upon the soul, causes it to see the form of this animal.’ (See: Descartes 1984) Passions of the Soul’
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‘have represented the landmark’s appearance in (his) memory, (and permanently) match up 
(his) current perception of the landmark to its stored representation.’
140
Similarly, in the context of the study of vision it has been argued that if we are 
capable of knowing what is where in the world, our brains must somehow be capable 
of representing this information
141
. This dictum implies that
‘there must be symbols inside our heads for the things we see symbols which themselves are 
unlike the things they represent. Upon opening up a patient’s head for a brain operation, the 
surgeon does not find there a miniature stage-set of the world! All he finds there is a pink 
blancmange-like mass of brain cells. So it is an inescapable conclusion that there must be a 
symbolic description in the brain of the outside world, a description cast in symbols which 
stand for the various aspects of the world of which sight (and the other senses ) makes us 
aware. In fact, when we began by asking ‘What goes on inside our heads when we see?’ We 
could as well have put this question as ‘When we see, what are the symbols inside our heads 
that stand for things in the outside world?’…The idea of visual experience as a symbolic 
process may seem a strange one. The likely reasons for this is that the world we see…is so 
very clearly ‘out there’ that it can come as something of a shock to realize that somehow the 
whole of this world is tucked away in our skulls as an inner representation which stands for the 
real outside world.’ 
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It would be wrong to regard these remarks as isolated instantiations of the 
representationalist ideas of a few individuals, working in small restricted areas of 
cognitive science. Rather, they manifest some of the most influential articulations of 
the modern representationalist stance, which have contributed to the fact that 
representationalist ideas very much constitute the orthodox view among cognitive 
scientists:  
‘The principle function of the central nervous system is to represent
and transform information and thereby mediate appropriate decisions and behaviours.
The cerebral cortex is one of the primary seats of the internal representations maintained
and used in perception, memory, decision making, motor control, and subjective
experience…’
143
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The question, which will be investigated in the following, will be whether it really 
makes sense to conceive of mental representations as symbolic descriptions of the 
outside world in the brain. To settle this question we have to examine the ways in 
which the concepts of description and more specifically, symbolic descriptions are 
used. 
4.1 Descriptions and Symbolic Representation
Descriptions, in the ordinary sense of that term, are strings of words or 
symbols and take the form of an expression or proposition, which may depict the 
characteristic features of a certain event (e.g. my account of the last Guns’n’Roses 
show at Docklands Arena) or a certain state of affairs (e.g. that the relationship 
between the Bush administration and ‘old’ Europe is highly strained). Furthermore, 
the proposition or expression can also be a description of the features of an object 
(e.g. Degas´ painting The Blue Dancers is the perfect depiction of female grace and 
beauty without being chauvinist, and it reminds me of Cécile). The descriptions of the 
various features can be objective or subjective, they can be accurate or inaccurate, 
be very detailed or only sketchy and they can be true or false. As such, descriptions 
are on a par with other forms of expression and speech used in ordinary discourse 
such as excuses, apologies, recommendations, justifications, declarations, pleas, 
oaths, questions and answers, for example. The concept of description is sometimes 
also applied in a wider context, however. For example, in certain cases a pencil 
sketch of a part of Oxford can serve as a map, i.e. as a description of the way to my 
house or college. Similarly, a blueprint may be a description of the layout and 
dimensions of a house, a plan may be a description of a process to take action or 
how to find a hidden treasure on an island, and a diagram retrieved from a Kinder
egg may be a description of how to construct the surprise toy contained inside the 
chocolate egg. If one goes beyond these contexts, however, the concept of 
description starts to loose grip. Sometimes, as in the study of visual processes 
pictorial representations like images, e.g. pictures or photographs, are thought of as 
descriptions. However, my picture of Cécile and my photograph of her dancing the 
Waltz cannot properly be said to be descriptions, although descriptions of the picture 
or the photograph may well include a description of what it is a photograph or picture 
of. But, my picture of Cécile doesn’t describe her, it depicts her, and my photograph 
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of Cécile waltzing doesn’t describe her dancing, it shows her dancing. But although 
pictures or photographs may serve the same purpose as descriptions, they could not 
be said to be symbolic descriptions themselves. A picture of a bullet framed with 
guns and roses may be a symbol of Guns’n’Roses, but it is neither a description of 
the band nor their music. Thus, in the ordinary sense of description, or symbolic 
description, their expression may take a written symbolic form or a spoken verbal 
form. These kinds of descriptions can be found in articles, newspapers, books, on the 
world-wide-web, or one may hear them presented on television, radio or at the 
cinema. But in this normal, ordinary sense of the term description, they are not found 
inside a person’s brain. Thus, contrary to the claims of John Frisby, it is not an 
“inescapable” conclusion that there must be a symbolic description in the brain of the 
outside world (see above). 
At this point (as in the case of the mereological fallacy discussed in chapter 
III), it might well be objected that cognitive scientists were applying the concept of a 
symbolic description in an extended or figurative sense. After all, scientists must not 
be refused the right to introduce new terminology or extend the use of existing 
terminology should scientific investigation demand it in order to gain a new 
perspective and novel understanding of a problem or question. Consequently, it 
seems natural to conceive of neural activity, which is elicited by the appearance of a 
stimulus in one’s visual field, as a description of the stimulus or its underlying cause. 
But this is mistaken. Neural activity, i.e. the firing of nerve cells within a specific 
neuronal circuit in the brain, cannot be said to be a form of symbols, as for something 
to qualify as a symbol, it must have a rule-governed use. For something to be a 
symbol there must be correct and incorrect ways of applying it (i.e. the concept of a 
symbol is correctly only applied to those forms of expression to which a standard of 
correctness can be applied). The neurons of the brain, however, do neither know n 
do they not know what any array of symbols means. Agents can be said to employ 
symbols only in so far as they can be said that they are aware of the rules for the use 
of the symbols they use, i.e. only if they are aware of the grammar of the symbols, 
which is given by the explanations of the use of the symbols. Neurons on the other 
hand, do not know any grammar they could deploy in order to provide descriptions of 
stimuli in the outside world. It constitutes a transgression of the bounds of sense to 
think of patterns of electrical activity in the brain as descriptions of features of the 
(outside) world, which can be correct or incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, objective or 
104
subjective. From the observation that our perceptual faculties allow us to know what 
is where in the world, it does not follow that this information must be represented in 
the human brain. In fact, there is no such thing as the brain representing information
in the ordinary sense of that expression. In the context of the Aristotelian view of the 
mind, it would not be false to postulate that certain neural activities can be thought of 
as representations of, e.g. orientation or depth, if all this means is that one can 
correlate certain neural firings with certain features in one’s visual field. However, the 
received conception in cognitive science goes much further than that. In the context 
of the cognitive view mental representations are bundles of information, i.e. formal 
systems for making explicit certain entities or types of information. Together with a 
specification of how the system does this, the result of using a representation to 
describe a given entity (is) a description of the entity in that representation
144
. The 
incoherent idea underlying this line of thought is that there is a description of what 
one sees (perceives) inside one’s head, which  rests on the notion that the brain must 
be capable of representing information by forming internal mental representations. As 
a result of this, representation is conceived of as a method of describing something 
by means of the brain’s rule-governed physical symbol system. David Marr, for 
example, writes that
‘a representation…is not a foreign idea at all – we all use representations all the time. …the 
notion that one can capture some aspect of reality by making a description of it using a symbol 
and that to do so can be useful seems to me to be a powerful and fascinating idea.’
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According to this statement, however, it is not a new and extended sense in which 
the concept of representation is used. Rather, the use is its customary common one. 
Representations here are not the causal correlates resulting from the exercise of our 
perceptual abilities, but the symbols of a system the grammar and meaning of which 
is determined by rule-governed use. This however, constitutes a transgression of the 
bounds of sense. 
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4.2 Representations and Maps
In cognitive science the concept of representation and the concept of a map or 
mapping often occur in related closely linked contexts. For example, JZ Young 
argues that
‘the nerve cells that analyse the information of the senses are laid out on the brain to make 
actual physical maps of the surface of the body or retina. What goes on in the brain must 
provide a faithful representation of events outside, and the arrangement of the cells in it 
provides a detailed model of the world….the information from the sensory surfaces of the 
retina, or skin, or from the ear is laid out in a topographically precise way on the surface of the 
brain. Moreover for each such sense there is a series of such maps, each recombining in a 
new way the words of information provided by the cells. So the grammar of this language has 
something to do with spatial relations. It communicates meanings by topological analogies’
146
By implication, the information contained in these maps is then used by the brain to 
formulate hypothesis as to what is where in the world, hypothesis which in turn 
provide the basis for human action
147
. The problem with the idea of maps in the brain, 
which represent information perceived by our senses, is not altogether unfamiliar as it 
runs into similar difficulties as the idea of there being symbolic representations in the 
bain. Maps, in the ordinary sense of the term, are tools generated by cartographers, 
geologists, astronomers etc., to depict an array of features ranging from the 
topography of a piece of land or the demographic distribution of the population of a 
given town or country, to the location and relative distances of the stars visible in the 
night sky. In this sense, maps are indeed systems of representation. But it is 
important to note that such systems of representation imply the agreement upon and 
the usage of conventions, i.e. rules of representation. Without these, there are no 
maps representing anything. And, as in the context of the notion of symbolic 
representation, there exist no conventions of representation, which are not vindicated 
by their intentional use by creatures of sufficient intelligence, and which makes them 
able to apply these conventions (of course, this can be done either correctly or 
incorrectly). But as pointed out in the previous section, neither brains nor neurons 
can be said to employ symbols (or maps for that matter) as they neither know nor are 
146
 Young JZ (1978) Programs of the Brain, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.11, 57
147
 ibid.p.60, see also: Phillips CG, Zeki S, Barlow HB (1984) Localization of Function in the Cerebral 
Cortex, Brain 107:338-347 p.345 
106
ignorant of what the symbols or maps mean. Similarly, both brains and neurons can 
neither be said to follow nor can they be accused of failing to follow rules for the use 
of symbols. The point here is that it is not an intrinsic  feature of a pattern of neural 
activity in the cerebral cortex whether it is a map or not. It is a conventional one. 
Thus, certain features or stimuli in ones sensory field can be mapped (i.e. causally 
correlated with) onto the firings of cortical neurons as long as nothing more is implied 
than to indicate an inductive correlation. If, however, talk of mental maps implies the 
neural “communication of meanings by topological analogies”, the bounds of sense 
have once more been violated.
4.3 The Storage of Representations 
Another questionable idea, which pops up again and again in discourse about 
mental representations, is that mental representations are supposedly stored in the 
brain. For example, when we drive a car or take a walk our brains match up and 
compare the current representation of our environment with the one stored and by 
doing so direct and re-direct our behaviour (see above). This misconceived notion 
has a long tradition within philosophy and has been propounded, above all, by 
empiricist philosophers. Although, the confusions regarding the notion of storage are 
manifold and run criss cross in all directions (in particular, they are closely associated 
with the concept of memory) the following will concentrate only on those aspects of 
the problem which are of immediate relevance to the representationalist conception 
under scrutiny.
It is tempting to assume that unless what one perceives is stored in one’s 
brain in the form of a symbolic representation one would not be able to direct and re-
direct one’s behaviour: It seems to be the perfect mechanism enabling human beings 
to constantly adapt their actions to changes in their environment. But apart from the 
fact that neither brains nor neurons use symbols (see above), the idea of a neural 
storage of representation in a symbolic or semantic sense per se does not make 
sense. The idea of a stored representation makes only sense if the representation 
can be accessed and is available to a person which could read and recognize the 
representation and potentially tell somebody what it is a representation of. 
Furthermore, it is a person who does the storing. This is how the concept of storage 
would normally be applied. I can pack my books in a box and store the books in the 
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room of a friend while I am leaving college for the summer. The Tate Modern can 
store the paintings and other works of art currently not under exhibition in its cellar. 
Similarly, my friend Paul might store the plan for the guitar he is building for me 
(which can be said to be a representation of the dimensions and layout of my future 
instrument) in a cupboard along with the other plans and blueprints of the instruments 
he is working on. And on opening his cupboard in the morning, Paul discriminates 
between the various plans and blueprints and chooses the one he wants to work on 
that day (e.g. in doing so he might recognize the plan of my guitar as the one in the 
right upper corner of the cupboard). But neither brains nor neurons can be said to be 
doing any of this, nor could anyone put a piece of paper into my head for it to be 
stored in my brain. Importantly, neither brains nor neurons are in the business of 
storing things. The only sense in which it can reasonably be said that there is a 
neural representation is in a non-symbolic, i.e. non-semantic, sense. In this sense a 
neural representation would be a causal correlate of the exercise of one’s perceptual 
capacities. But exercising my ability, to see, hear, smell, etc. has got nothing to do 
with the storage of a representation, let alone with encoding the information 
contained or conveyed by a representation. Unfortunately, this is not how the idea of 
representation and storage is applied in cognitive science. Cognitive scientists, have 
yet to specify the criteria of what the storing of a landscape representation, for 
example, would look like. They have not provided us with a novel rule for the use of 
the concepts of storage and representation in the context of the brain. Instead, they 
use the concepts of representation and storage in their customary way and in doing 
so unwittingly transgress the bounds of sense.     
4.4. Some Clarifications regarding the Notions of Mental State, Process, Activity and 
Event
By now it will not be surprising to find that like the ideas of (mental) maps and 
storage of representations the views about the nature of mental states, processes, 
activities and events are also closely associated with the conception of mental 
representations. For example, cognitive scientists think of mental states as being 
characterized what the internal representations currently specify, and of mental 
processes by how the representations are obtained and how they interact. From the 
preceding discussions it should be clear that these views are nothing but inevitable 
extensions of the confused ideas underlying the reductionist conception of mind 
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endorsed by contemporary cognitive scientists and philosophers.  By effecting the 
collapse of the foundations of the cognitive view, one also effects the collapse of its 
peripheral architectural ornaments. If the idea of symbolic mental representations is a 
chimera, then surely so must be the idea of a mental process as the interaction of 
symbolic mental representations. However, for the sake of conceptual clarity, it is still 
worthwhile to gain an overview of the conceptual landscape covered by the concepts 
of (mental) state and (mental) process. 
When applied according to its customary use, the concept of state denotes, at 
its most general, a combination of circumstances or attributes, which pertain for a 
certain amount of time to a person or thing. As such, states may be temporary and 
short-lived, or they may persist for a considerable period of time. My room, for 
example, may be in a state of disorder, but only as long as I chose not to clean up my 
mess. Similarly, my friends and I are in a state of excitement as we wait for the final 
of the Professional Latin Championships at Blackpool to begin, and we find ourselves 
in a state of confusion when Michael and Beata are not recalled to dance the Paso 
Doble. Furthermore, the concept of state is also applied in relation to being in a 
certain stage or form, as relating to structure, growth, or development, e.g., to be in 
an embryonic state or fetal state or economic state, and it is applied in relation to the 
condition of a physical system, e.g. its phase form, composition or structure as in “Ice 
is the solid state of water”. Finally, the concept of state can also refer to a specific 
mode of government, like in the welfare state, the communist state, or a federal state. 
The concept of state contrasts with the concept of a process to the extent that while 
states consist of patterns of relationships between elements pertaining at a time, 
processes denote dynamic goings on. These go on for a certain length of time, and 
normally consist in a sequential transformation of states. Thus, we can speak both of 
economic, political or physical states and economic, political and physical processes. 
The processes involve the action or activities of people or substances that bring 
about the change underlying the transformation of one particular state into another 
(hot to cold, sweet to sour, bitter to sweet, rich to poor, stable to instable, liquid to 
gaseous). As such, they may be the result of people exercising their intellectual 
powers, or they may be the result of the powers of certain substances or processes. 
It is important to note that when these concepts are moved from their natural 
habitat, as outlined in the preceding overview, and applied in the context of 
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psychology and talk of the mind subtle modulations in the meanings of these 
concepts follow in the wake. The notion of a mental state is primarily applied in 
association with talk about emotions and moods. We speak of somebody being in a 
state of anxiety, depression, love, happiness, despair, excitement, agitation, 
enthusiasm or tranquillity, and beyond that, also of someone being in state of intense 
concentration or fatigue. Such states of mind normally only persist for a certain time, 
and they are distinguished by the tendency to display various characteristic patterns 
of behaviour in certain circumstances.  These behavioural patterns and dispositions 
of people to behave in a certain way, are the criteria for the respective mental state. 
Furthermore, emotional states are directed towards a certain object (i.e. I dislike Paul 
Killick’s dancing, I am in love with Cécile etc.), whereas moods, on the other hand, 
usually lack such object directedness. However, in all these cases, it would be 
confused to invoke the idea of internal representations in order to account for the 
intentionality and object directedness of these states. Mental states are not 
characterized by asserting what the internal representations currently specify (see 
Marr). Rather, they are characterized by a variety of behavioural criteria, which 
specify the emotion, or mood a person is experiencing (see also chapter III).
In contrast to the concept of a mental state the concept of a mental process is 
mainly applied in talk and expressions indicating goings on in the cognitive domain. 
Importantly, the notion of mental processes does, unlike the notion of non-mental 
processes, not involve the notion of a sequential transformation of states although 
the notion of development is retained. One may conceive of thinking through a 
problem or formulating a plan in one’s head as a mental process, as one is thinking 
first of this, then of that and then of that before arriving at a conclusion (importantly, 
this does not involve a transformation of states). The idea of a mental process may 
also intelligibly be invoked in the context of loss or grief and other painful coming to 
terms. For example, overcoming a broken heart may be a painful process, as may be 
the attempt to go on living and overcome the death of a loved one. But, it would be 
mistaken to conceive of a mental process as a matter of interaction between and 
manipulation of various internal mental representations, as in such cases one has 
ventured from the intelligible to (despite appearances) the unintelligible.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The present investigation has revealed the deceptive simplicity of the 
questions ‘what is the mind?’ and ‘what is the nature of mind?’. They imply a picture 
of mind as a concrete entity and obscure the fact, that the mind is best thought of as 
the wide range of characteristic human (intellectual) powers and their exercise and 
the extensive repertoire of human character traits.  It is only after one has gained an 
overview of the concept of mind that the temptation to look for something which 
corresponds to it weakens, as the increasing understanding of the grammar of the 
concept gradually reveals the true nature
148
 of mind. A glance at the history of 
philosophy and cognitive science shows that both Cartesians and materialists have 
been taken in by these questions and consequently adopted an entity view the mind. 
The mind-body problem and the problem of the explanatory gap are but two 
examples, of the confusion this notion has caused. These problems are inevitable 
consequences following in the wake of adopting the cognitive view. Yet, as the entity 
view of the mind collapses, so do these questions, and their true nature is revealed: 
they are mere muddles, which have been elevated to mysteries. One general lesson 
to be learned from this discussion is, that in philosophy nouns are to be treated with 
care. They are substance hungry, and without a clear overview of their use tempt us 
into hypostatisation, i.e., in the case of the mind the ascription of a concrete reality to 
a linguistic chimera. 
On the other hand, viewing the mind as the ability to acquire intellectual 
abilities illustrates what kind of insight empirical investigations into the human mind 
can yield: Neural events and processes can be correlated with the exercise of a 
human beings ability to think, perceive, imagine etc (if conceptual clarity with regard 
to these concepts has been achieved before the start of an empirical investigation, of 
course). Moreover, cognitive scientists can try and discover what neural states, 
events and processes are empirical necessary conditions for human beings to be 
able to exercise their intellectual abilities. Thus, if minds are capacities, they not only 
are not entities, but most importantly, they can’t be physical entities. And naturally, if 
it is wrong to think of the mind as a physical entity, it is wrong to conceive of the mind 
as biological information processing unit.
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In addition, the preceding discussion has demonstrated that the 
misconceptions about the nature of mind extend far beyond its conception as a 
biological entity. The idea of the mind as a biological computer, which operates on 
the basis of symbolic mental representations to provide the mind with descriptions of 
the “outside” world is misconceived, as there the mind/brain can not be said to know 
what an array of symbols means or how to apply them according to a given standard 
of correctness. For something to count as a symbol it must have a rule governed use, 
i.e. there must be correct and incorrect ways of applying it. However, the only way to 
make sense of the notion of mental representations is to think of them as correlations 
between neural firings and certain features in one’s visual field, for example. For 
similar reasons, the conception of mental representations as descriptions inside 
one’s head as suggested by the cognitive view, does not make much sense either, 
nor does the idea that maps in the brain (i.e. mental maps) convey meanings by 
topological analogies. Maps are representational systems and, like symbols, imply 
the application of a system of conventions, which the brain cannot be said to make 
use of.   Finally, the present chapter also investigated the notion of storing 
representations in the brain, a central assumption within the context of the cognitive 
view (see above). Yet, as the investigation demonstrated the notion of a stored 
representation can only make sense if the representation can be accessed and is 
available to a person, which could read and recognize the representation and 
potentially tell somebody what it is a representation of. Cognitive scientists and 
philosophers have yet to specify, however, the criteria for identifying what counts as 
storing a landscape representation, for example, in the brain. As they use the 
concepts of representation and storage in their customary way when talking about 
the storage of representations in the brain, however, they unwittingly transgress the 
bounds of sense.     
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Chapter V
On the Nature of Thinking and the Cognitive Conception of Thought
1. Preliminary Thoughts 
What is thinking? What is the nature of thought? By asking these questions,
human animals characteristically mark themselves out as thinking beings. It is 
interesting to observe, however, that although these questions seem to arise 
naturally in the course of a “thinking life”, as it were,  even the most feeble attempt at 
providing an answer reveals, that there is something slightly queer about them. On 
the one hand, thinking never strikes us as mysterious when we think. On the other, it 
regularly does so when we start to reflect upon our thinking (PI§428). The experience 
one undergoes when one tries to give an account of one’s understanding of thinking 
is not unlike the experience one undergoes when trying to provide an account of 
time. Augustine famously remarked that when nobody asks us, we seem to know 
perfectly well what time is, but as soon as we are asked about it, we are unable to 
give an account of it. The same seems to hold true for thinking. When being asked to 
provide an account of thinking, one tends to struggle, as it appears seems to possess 
some sort of elusive quality, which is difficult to capture in words. In this respect, 
thinking is strongly reminiscent of our musings on the mind (see chapter IV).  On 
reflection, thinking (or thought) sometimes appears to be something immaterial, as 
when it operates on images, for example, while at other times, when it is framed in 
words, it seems to be a substance of some kind; yet in any case, it seems to be a 
complex process occurring in the mind/brain, which operates in a mysterious way 
(Z§125), as when a thought of Pimm’s and Lemonade suddenly strikes me 
unannounced whilst writing this chapter, or when my inability to stop thinking about 
Cécile keeps me distracted from writing my thesis. In these cases, thought appears 
beyond our control, and it looks as if our actions are at the mercy of some enigmatic 
process. Ideas like these not only pervade the scientific and philosophical study of 
thinking, but are also present in contemporary popular culture. For example, we find 
the headmaster of Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, Albus Dumbledore, 
retrieve his thoughts, i.e. a silvery glistening, misty kind of substance, from his 
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temples for storage in a pensive
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. But what are we to make of this host of views and 
opinions regarding the nature of thought? How are we to understand thinking? What 
is thinking? What is the nature of thought? 
At first glance, the cognitive view promises rescue from this quandary. It  
seems to provide insight in the form of an elaborate theory, which many 
contemporary cognitive scientists and philosophers believe to constitute the most 
plausible explanation of thinking:
‘Thoughts are inner representations; thinking is the processing of inner, mental 
representations. These representations have a double aspect…their role within the mind 
depends on their…syntactic properties…and they are representations in virtue of relations 
with the world. Mental states represent in virtue of causal relations of some kind with what 
they represent.’
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According to this cognitive conception of thinking
151
, thoughts are mental 
representations and thinking is to be understood as a mental process, i.e. as the 
processing of mental representations. However, there is reason to be deeply 
suspicious about this explanation. First, because these ideas are an inevitable 
extension of the information processing view of the mind, the significant flaws of 
which have been exposed in the previous chapters. Even if one was to assume that 
the flaws of the latter do, despite the obvious parallels, not impinge on the validity 
and sense of the cognitive conception of thinking, due diligence nevertheless dictates 
a thorough investigation of this particular account of thinking and the nature of 
thought. Second, from a Wittgensteinian point of view philosophical theories of any 
kind should be treated with the utmost suspicion (see chapter II). As Peter Hacker 
points out, it is a distinguishing mark of philosophers (and nowadays also of cognitive 
scientists) that after having tied a knot in their musings about thinking, they respond 
to the knot by constructing a theory.
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 Due to a misguided belief in the powers of 
scientific technology, and a general unawareness of the distinction between factual 
and conceptual questions, it is readily assumed that the mystery and puzzlement 
surrounding thinking can be resolved by devising a sophisticated theory of the nature 
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 I.e., the conception of thought inherent in the cognitive view.
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of thought
153
. Yet, the features of thinking that make it seem mysterious are not 
amenable to empirical investigations, as they are the product of conceptual confusion 
and grammatical misunderstanding (PI§110) (see also: chapter II): 
‘Das Denken ist ein rätselhafter Vorgang, von dessem vollen Verständniss wir noch weit 
entfernt sind.” Und nun stellt man Experimente an. Offenbar, ohne sch bewußt zu sein, worin
das rätselhafte des Denkens für uns liegt. ...’ (RPPI§1093)
‘Thinking is an enigmatic process, and we are a long way off from a complete understanding 
of it." And now one starts experimenting. Evidently without realizing what it is that makes 
thinking enigmatic to us. …’ (RPPI§1093)
As in the case of the human mind, the explanation of thinking which the cognitive 
view offers, does not constitute so much a profound insight, as it does betray deep 
seated illusions resulting from a distinct lack of conceptual clarity. Wittgenstein, used 
to warn his students of “What is…?” questions as characteristic utterances of 
puzzlement and unclarity. The mental discomfort expressed in such questions is, he 
held, comparable with the question "Why?", often asked by children. Importantly, 
while these "Why?" questions are (also) an expression of a mental discomfort, they 
do not necessarily ask for a cause or a reason (BB26). Similarly, “What is…?” 
questions (usually) do not ask for definitions and explanations, but for grammatical 
clarification.
It has already been indicated that the account of the nature of thought as 
symbolic representations, and of thought processes as interactions of such 
representations, is a quasi-inevitable step, which follows in the wake of endorsing the 
cognitive view. Within the course of the present chapter, this account of the nature of 
thinking will be subjected to a thorough investigation in order to show, once again, 
how inattention to conceptual hygiene, can lead to nonsensical conclusions. Although 
the previous discussion of the entity view of the mind, should have robbed the 
association of the brain (and thus by implication the present account of thinking) with 
a physical symbol system much of its allure, the misconceptions regarding the nature 
of thinking are only indirectly linked to the misconceptions underlying the entity view 
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 The tendency to respond to philosophical puzzlement by constructing and elaborate theory on the 
model of the natural sciences, is due the prevailing influence of what Russell called the ‘scientific 
method in philosophy’.
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of the mind. First and foremost, they are the result of a general ignorance pertaining 
to the polymorphousness of the concept of thinking and ignorance of the wide variety 
of phenomena, which are associated with thought. As Gilbert Ryle put it:
‘Only some thinking is excogitation; only some thinking is work; only some thinking has a topic 
or a problem. … Some thinking is just reverie or musing, intellectual doodling or strolling
154
’ 
As the puzzlement and confusion surrounding thinking does not spring from 
the same source as the confusions surrounding the concept of the mind, the 
grammar of the concept of thinking requires independent scrutiny.  Failing to do so 
would be wantonly negligent, as the confusions following in the wake of the main 
body of misconceptions underlying the cognitive view may, if not eradicated, attach 
themselves to or even give rise to other misconceptions of mind and mental 
phenomena. These may then distort the understanding of philosophers and cognitive 
scientists in the future. After all, the modern representationalist stance is merely an 
updated version of the classical representationalism endorsed by Descartes and 
Locke. Conceptual confusions, if not eradicated, clearly have the potential to distort 
our understanding again and again, and the latest hypothesis and theories devised to 
provide relief may prove to be mere variations on the same theme, as it were, while 
being fuelled by similar grammatical misconceptions. Hence, investigating the 
cognitive conception of thought is a necessary step on the way to completely 
dispelling the myth of the cognitive view.
Target Identification
Among the dubious presuppositions informing the cognitive conception of 
thinking are the ideas of thoughts as mental representations and of thinking as a 
mental process. The idea of thinking as a mental process is partly rooted in the 
misconception of introspection as a form of perception (see chapter III). Hence it is 
thought that introspection grants us access to our thinking and the underlying 
mechanism by means of self-observation. This idea plays right into the hands of the 
puzzlement we feel when confronted with the question “What is thinking?”. One feels 
that one can’t point to anything in reply, yet one feels that one ought to (BB1). In the 
wake of the demise of behaviourism and the development of cognitive science 
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(cognitive psychology, in particular) the notion of unobservable cognitive processes 
underlying cognitive activities regained prominence
155
. Consequently, since the 
cognitive revolution of the 1950s, cognitive psychology has favoured the idea that 
speaking and acting are the public representation of a private domain of thought 
processes, i.e. the mental going ons in which cognitive activity really resides. Such 
private and sometimes hidden processes of thought were and still are assumed to 
accompany those actions we take to be “rational”
156
. Among cognitive scientists as 
well as among philosophers, it is widely believed that it is the accompanying thought, 
which endows these processes with their rationality. Consequently, the following 
investigation will also scrutinize the notion that it is an independent process of 
thinking, which is the soul of language, as it were, i.e. a process whose presence or 
absence renders speech thoughtful or thoughtless. 
Despite its “scientific” appeal and deceptive explanatory power, the cognitive 
conception of thought itself leads to a variety of questions and conundrums, in 
response to which more confused theories and hypothesis have been conjured up by 
philosophers and cognitive scientists. The language of thought (LOT) hypothesis, for 
instance, constitutes the most significant and widespread of these 
misunderstandings. If left alone, conceptual misunderstandings may, as in the 
present case, grow to the size of a formidable avalanche of confusions and 
conundrums with the potential to sweep even the soundest and most careful of minds 
of its feet. For example, the notion of thinking as the processing of mental 
representations implies the question as to how the physical implementation of 
meaningful information processes is actually achieved. If there is a symbolic 
description in the brain of the outside world, as implied by the cognitive conception o 
thinking (a description cast in symbols which stand for the various aspects of the 
world of which our senses make us aware), what language is this description in? 
What is the medium of thought? In the light of his examination of numerous cognitive 
theories, Jerry Fodor (1975) concluded that, because almost all theories about 
cognitive psychological processes implicitly assume these to be computational, there 
must be a medium in which sensory information is computed in order for these 
theories to be true. Hence, he suggested the existence of an innate language of 
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thought (LOT)
157
as a  representational system in which the computation of sensory 
information takes place. Fodor
158
 conceived of the LOT as a semantically complete 
language, which differs from natural language, but which contains all the conceptual 
resources necessary for any of the propositions that humans could ever understand, 
think or express. The LOT, according to Fodor, constitutes the foundation not only of 
thinking
159
, but of all cognition. 
Although few have followed Fodor in adopting this extreme hypothesis, some 
weaker form of a language of thought (LOT) view, i.e., that there is a mental 
language that is different from human spoken languages, is held by many 
philosophers and cognitive scientists. The cognitive conception of thought bears 
witness to this fact. Besides the necessity to account for a medium of computation, 
i.e. the nature of the physical symbol system, the LOT hypothesis is also inspired by 
the apparent similarity of thought and language with respect to systematicity and 
normativity
160
. This refers in particular to the structural similarities, which exist 
between language and thought, and the similarity that exists between linguistic 
meaning and mental content. Both are understood as resulting from the 
compositional structure of sentences. The compositional structure of language is 
conceived to be paralleled by the compositional structure of inner mental 
representations in the LOT, which are regarded as the “linguistic vehicles of thought”. 
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 This innate language is sometimes referred to as mentalese.
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Jerry Fodor is by no means the first to entertain the idea of a language of thought. In fact, the 
conception of thought which the young Wittgenstein propounded in the Tractatus, i.e.,   the idea that 
thinking is a kind of language, can be seen as an ancestor to the Fodorian idea of a LOT. In a
psychological/cognitive science context we also find ideas strongly reminiscent of a LOT in William 
James’s The Principles of  Psychology:
`...And in states of extreme brain-fag the horizon is narrowed almost to the passing word,- the 
associative machinery, however, providing for the next word turning up in orderly sequence, until at 
last the tired thinker is led to some kind of conclusion. (...) Nothing is easier than to symbolize all these 
facts in terms of brain-action.´(James W, (1890), Ch. IX , p.247ff).
Similarly, Noam Chomsky holds: `A naturalistic approach to linguistic and mental aspects of the world 
seeks to construct intelligible explanatory theories, taking as ´real´ what we are led to posit in this 
quest, and hoping for eventual unification with the `core´ natural sciences... . (...) In the present case, 
theories of language and mind that seem best established on naturalistic grounds attribute to 
mind/brain computational properties of a kind that are well understood ...’ See: 
Chomsky N (1995) `Language and Nature´ ,p.1, in: Mind,Vol.104.413
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The fully fledged language of thought hypothesis is that thinking consists, quite literally, in 
computational operations informed upon sentences of mentalese, an internal language with which 
human beings are innately endowed. For a creature to think on this view is for it to have rational-
symbol manipulation processes occurring in the mind/brain.
160
 While some aspects of the systematicity and normativity of thought will be commented on in the 
present chapter, a full appraisal of these features of thought can only take place in the context of 
considering the intentionality of thought (see chapter VI).   
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The above outline provides a sketch of the manifold believes and 
presumptions, which inform not only our home baked ideas about thinking but also 
their more scientific counterpart. The various believes and presumptions constitute a 
tightly woven and closely interconnected web of conceptual confusions and 
grammatical misunderstandings. Entangled in a web of confusions, philosophers and 
cognitive scientists were forced to adopt a point of view (PI§308), which itself gives 
rise to a host of “bad philosophical questions” and which leads to the further 
perpetuation of confusion. In order to dispel the conceptual confusion, which 
prevents a proper understanding of thinking and the nature of thought, the following 
discussion will subject these various beliefs and presumptions to a philosophical 
investigation. The main assumptions to be investigated are,
a) the idea that thinking is to be understood as a mental process,
b) the associated idea, that we always think in something (i.e. the LOT    
    hypothesis),
c) the idea that thinking goes on independently of speech, i.e. the picture we 
     have of thinking as an inner accompaniment of speech, an inner process    
     which can go on alone independently of the expression of our thoughts. 
2. The Polymorphous Character of Thinking: Thought in its Natural Habitat
In Z§112, Wittgenstein reminds us of the widely ramified network of the 
individual uses of psychological verbs. Consequently, when striving for an overview 
of the concept of thinking we must not expect a uniform employment, but rather the 
contrary (Z§112; see also: RPPII§194). An initial scan of the conceptual geography of 
the concept of thinking reveals a stunning variety of uses, ranging from the 
ratiocinative to the expression of opinions and beliefs, and from instances of 
association and reflection to idle rumination and imagining
161
. However, philosophers 
and cognitive scientists generally fail to acknowledge the “varieties of thinking” in 
161
 The following overview is partially indebted to Gilbert Ryles investigations into the concept of 
thinking (see: Ryle 1979) as well as Peter Hacker’s discussion of thinking in Hacker (1997b) and 
Bennett and Hacker (2003). 
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favour of the misguided investigation of the general case. By studying the general 
case, however, it is falsely assumed that the universal features of thinking and 
thought are investigated. This approach mistakenly combines one’s craving for 
generality with a flawed belief in the methods of science (BB18), i.e. by subscribing to 
the belief that an understanding of the phenomenon in question can only arise if one 
reduces the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of 
laws (see Chapter II). By focusing on one variety of thinking in favour of others, 
cognitive scientists tend to give undue prominence to one kind of thinking, while 
failing to acknowledge all the other instances which constitute thinking. Although the 
acquisition of the concept of thinking during the course of our lives is (usually) rather 
unproblematic, problems arise when we try to describe the circumstance under which 
the concept is acquired (Z§114). In order to facilitate the description of the manifold 
variety of thinking, it is helpful to start the investigation off by reflecting on the most 
familiar variety of thinking as ratiocinative problem solving. This picture of thinking 
has been perpetuated in Rodin’s famous sculpture Le Penseur.
Le Penseur, Ratiocinative Thought and related Forms of Thinking
At the heart of ratiocinative thinking, which could also be described as 
reasoned problem solving, lies the attempt to find the answer to a question or the 
solution to a problem. It has the characteristics of an activity, in so far as it can be 
engaged in continuously or intermittently, and in so far as it may be conducted 
methodologically, efficiently, promptly, swiftly or slowly,  or formally or leisurely. It 
culminates characteristically, in the success or failure to find an answer or solution. 
Finally, ratiocinative thinking may be done silently, as during occasions when one is 
“sunk” or “lost in thought”, but it may also involve speaking one’s thoughts aloud 
(e.g.: “Now, what would happen if I didn´t…”).
It is important to note, however, that silent thinking per se need not be 
ratiocinative. For example, I may try to remember who I was supposed to meet this 
afternoon, what Cécile asked me to pick up from Sainsbury’s, when I was supposed 
to call my mum, or where I was to supposed to go in case the fire alarm goes off. 
Similarly, I may think silently yet with eager anticipation of the skiing holiday Cécile 
and I are going on. Alternatively, I may think about what my life would be like had I 
120
never met Cécile. These instances of thinking, which involve neither reasoned 
problem solving nor remembering, may be thought of as imagining something, idle 
rumination or daydreaming. In such instances, thinking does not warrant the 
ascription of adjectives like methodological, effective, slow or swift as it is not directed 
towards a particular goal like answering a question or solving a problem. Depending 
on the individual, topic and context, these ruminations may be voluntary or 
involuntary (e.g. I may not be able to stop thinking about Cécile), or even compulsive. 
Non - Ratiocinative Thought and related Forms of Thinking
Moving away from the reasoned problem solving variety of thinking, there is 
the kind of thinking, which varies with the degree of complexity of the task at hand 
(i.e., thinking associated with non-meditative activities). Mechanical tasks and 
activities, like sweeping the floor, sorting out rubbish, or cleaning the bathroom may 
be engaged in without paying much attention to the task at hand, or without 
concentrating much on what one is doing. Thus, when one is engaged in such 
activities, one frequently does so without thinking. However, this does not mean that 
thinking has no place here. Rather, it means that one characteristically thinks of other 
things, as when cleaning my bathroom I think of the movie I will watch afterwards. To 
say that I clean my bathroom without thinking, simply is to say that I do so without 
paying much attention to the task at hand, and that my mind is occupied with other 
things. When I am conducting a neuroscientific experiment, however, I am carefully 
thinking of all the eventualities, which may endanger the success of the experiment, 
and I focus all my attention on the task(s) at hand. Thus, one might say that I put a lot 
of thought into the experiment. On the other hand, if I fail to do so, one might say that 
I am thoughtless, and go about my duties as a DPhil student mechanically, without 
due care and attention. The more complex or delicate a task, the greater the level of 
thought and attention it demands.  But in taking a thoughtful approach to the conduct 
of neuroscientific experiments, I do not talk to myself about the difficulties or 
problems, which may arise in the course of the experiment, for example. Rather, it 
just means that I am paying due attention and care.
Related to thought, which is associated with non-meditative activities, is the 
kind of thinking, which is involved when one attends to certain tasks or pursues 
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certain activities with cunning, skill, creativity or intelligence. This form of thinking is 
instantiated by the skilful diplomat contributing to the peaceful resolution of a crisis 
through the swift and intelligent reaction to changing circumstances, for example, or 
by the creative football player who can “read the game” and thus is able to play the 
decisive match-winning pass at the right moment. In other circumstances, this form of 
thinking may be exemplified by the sensitivity with which I recite a poem, or the 
originality of my rap rendition of “O sole mio”.  A form of thinking that is related to 
thinking as attending to a task or activity at hand, is speaking with or without thought. 
To be speaking with thought, for example, may be the careful presentation of an 
argument, viz. an occasion where one has considered all the factors relevant to the 
issue one is speaking of.  It is not, however, to accompany one’s presentation of the 
argument with an inaudible activity called thinking. By the same token, speaking 
without thought may be a case of failing to take into account all the factors pertaining 
to a certain issue, or a careless, unconsidered remark as when one compares the 
look effected by one’s girlfriends latest head gear to a racoon peering out from under 
a flower pot.  In both cases, it is not the absence of a process of thought, which might 
go on in the brain in parallel to one’s statements, and which renders them 
thoughtless. Rather, it is the fact that theses statements have been voiced without 
due attention to their cogency or effect.  
Beside those forms of thought that may be linked to activities of one form or 
another, there is the variety of thinking which takes the form of voicing an opinion, 
forming a judgement, formulating an assumption or making a supposition. Thus, 
depending on how one has arrived at what one thinks and the reasons one has for 
thinking it, one may think this and that according to one’s belief, opinion, judgement, 
supposition, assumption, assessment, evaluation or conclusion. “I didn´t think she 
was married”, voiced apologetically after one unsuccessfully tried to woe one’s 
supervisor’s wife at high table, indicates that one assumed or supposed, i.e. thought, 
that things are thus and so, for example. Of course, such a statement does not mean 
that one has given the matter due attention, and that after a prolonged period of 
reflection one has come to the conclusion that it is appropriate to pursue this rather 
than that lady. On the contrary, it indicates a distinct absence of thought.
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The kind of thought that comes in the form of thinking of something, as when 
one daydreams, imagines something or ruminates about something for example, has 
already been discussed above. However, there is also a form of thinking of 
something as something. For example, I may think of Dega’s painting Dancers in 
Blue as the perfect depiction of female grace and beauty without being chauvinist, or 
I may think of my brother Klaus as one of the best doctors around. Similarly, I may 
think of my forthcoming DPhil viva either as an excruciating grilling about my work of 
the last two years, or alternatively as a pleasant exchange of ideas on a topic of 
interest (depending on the time of day and level of Pimm’s sedation). As Peter 
Hacker points out, thinking of something as something is a way of viewing it or a 
manner of conceiving it, which may either be illuminating and helpful, or misguided 
and confusing
162
. Finally, there is a variety of thinking which consists in meaning 
something or other by what one said. This may take the form, for example, of making 
explicit to whom or what one was referring to, as in “When I said ‘his Jive is divine’, I 
was referring to Bryan Watson”, or “When I said ‘that’s nice’, I was thinking of your 
extended holiday leave”. Alternatively, it may also take the form of elaborating what 
one has thought, as when I said that “they suck”, I didn’t mean Oxford’s but 
Cambridge’s dancesport team. 
An important form of thinking, which has not yet been touched upon, is the 
form of thinking as believing. In certain circumstances, thinking and believing, can be 
used as synonyms when expressing an opinion, judgement or point of view. For 
example, to say that ‘pink becomes you’ is to say ‘ I believe that pink becomes you’, 
and the statement ‘I believe it’s going to rain tomorrow’, is tantamount to saying that ‘I 
believe it is going to rain tomorrow’. However, there also exist significant differences 
between the uses of think and believe.  First, certain uses of thinking stand in close 
proximity to certain kinds of activities. I.e., while I can be engaged in thinking through 
a problem, I can not be said to believe through a problem. To try and think of a 
answer is not to belief of an answer, and while I can think swiftly or slowly, ably or  
efficiently, these attributes have no place in the case of believing. On the other hand, 
while I can believe in Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny, I cannot think in Santa 
Claus or the Easter Bunny. Second, in certain circumstances the use of thinking 
rather than believing may indicate a degree of apprehension. Bede Rundle, for 
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example, has pointed out that the statement ‘I believe Kate is sincere’, may be 
thought of as conveying more faith in Kate than does the statement ‘I think that Kate 
is sincere’. While it may be granted that this suggestion weakens significantly if the 
emphasis is placed on the ‘I’ rather than ‘think’, there nevertheless seems to be a 
general difference. In contrast to thinking, believing seems to have a solemn ring to it. 
Thus, it appears to express a commitment to a position, opinion, or point of view that 
leaves no room for empirical proof, but signals an acceptance of something on the 
grounds of faith alone:
‘”I believe that God will provide” – not a happy context for ‘think’. It is a word (believe) favoured 
by politicians as well as by the clergy, there being a suggestion that it is to one’s credit that 
one believes, is prepared to take the plunge. Here we note that we can believe a person as 
well as what is said, a matter of placing faith in the speaker’s veracity.
163
’  
3. Consequences for the Cognitive Conception of Thinking and the Empirical 
Study of Thought
The above overview of the varieties of thinking not only highlights the 
polymorphous character of thinking, but also outlines the many manifestations of the 
(mental) life of human beings, with which the concept of thinking is profoundly 
entwined. The phenomena of thinking prove themselves to be widely scattered 
indeed (Z§110). The grammatical investigation highlights, that as regards the concept 
of thinking we must, like in the case of the concept of mind, avoid falling victim to the 
temptation of supposing that “where there is one word, there must be 
correspondingly, just one kind of thing.”  Bearing this principle in mind, is an essential 
preliminary for gaining insight into what the word means, and thus, for gaining insight 
into the essence of thinking (see e.g.: PI§371). The failure to acknowledge this, 
however, has lead many cognitive scientists and philosophers to illegitimate 
generalisations from the particular to the general case, as a result of which, they 
falsely concluded in favour of a unitary neurological basis of thinking
164
 (see chapter 
II). Highlighting the polymorphousness of thinking also illuminates the flaw in the 
cognitive science approach to the study of thinking, i.e. viewing one or two examples 
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of thinking as representative of the entire variety of phenomena of thought. Of 
course, once under the influence of cognitive psychology (see below) and once one 
has started to look for just one thing that corresponds to the word thought or thinking, 
one quite naturally tends to attend only to those manifestations of thinking that can 
be described as a process or activity (of the brain). However, in the light of our 
grammatical observations, the cognitive conception of thinking seems overly broad 
as even our most elementary investigation into the grammar of the concept thinking 
fails to provide any substantial support for a unitary phenomenon of thinking.
The above overview of the various uses of the concept of thinking enables us 
to free ourselves from overhasty generalizations and conceptual confusion. What 
counts as thinking (like what counts as rehearsing, obeying, or practising, or fighting, 
farming or playing, which are also polymorphous verbs) depends not only on what is 
said or done, but on the context or circumstances, the manner in which it is said or 
done, the purpose with which it is said or done, and the forms of evaluation (if any) of 
success or failure appropriate to what is said or done. Thinking and the expression of 
thought are inextricably linked. In addition, it must be noted that the polymorphous 
character of thinking also highlights the gross violation of the bounds of sense, which 
occurs in the wake of ascribing thought to the brain. In the light of earlier 
mereological observations (chapter III), however, cognitive scientists and 
philosophers, must remember that it is the human being, which thinks, not the brain. 
Moreover, the brain is not the locus of thought either. In contrast to the grandiose 
claims of neuroscientists like Gerald Edelman, for example, the crucial link between 
the concept of thinking and the expression of thought
165
 (see section 5 below, for 
details) implies that thoughts are not to be found in the brain. On can write down 
one’s thoughts in a diary (or convey them in any other form of written text for that 
matter), express them in poetry or song or in the form of graffiti on the wall of some 
toilet stall, but one can neither find them in heads nor in brains
166
. A thought is just 
what is expressible by an utterance or other representation, and from the fact that 
human beings may chose not to disclose their thoughts, it does not follow that what 
they think is to be found in their brains (see section 6 below for details). 
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Finally, cognitive scientists and philosophers need to be careful with the 
interpretation of metaphorical phrases like “Use your brains”.  Otherwise, they may 
be easily tricked into thinking that the brain is the organ of thought in the same sense 
in which the ear is the organ of hearing or the eye is the organ of sight. To say `Use 
your brains´ is tantamount to saying “Think!”, and is comparable to a metaphorical 
expression of affection like “I love her with all my heart”. Of course, it is true that 
without the very specific neural activities one could not think- but equally, without very 
specific neural activities one could not walk or talk either. Yet, no one would imply 
that we walk or talk with our brains. What goes on in the brain are neural processes, 
which are necessary conditions for the person, whose brain it is to be going through 
the relevant mental processes.
4. The Idea of Thinking as Mental Process
The cognitive view conceives of the interaction of mental representations as 
mental processes, and of thinking as the paradigm of a  mental process. Cognitive 
scientists and philosophers subscribing to the cognitive view hold, that the process of 
thinking is constituted by the manipulation, i.e. the transformation, of symbolic mental 
representations in the LOT. Given its close connection with the LOT hypothesis, the 
picture of an inner process of thought warrants examination. A general sketch of the 
concept of a mental process has already been provided in the previous chapter 
(Ch.IV, Sec.4.4). The following discussion will concentrate on the specific notion of 
an inner process of thought. 
In ordinary discourse, we are familiar with the use and application of the 
concept of a process. We competently apply it in the physical, chemical or biological 
domains as well as in the characterisation of certain human activities which involve, 
e.g., the sequential transformation of states or sequences of actions. Similarly, we 
are familiar with the use of the concept in the context of judicative, legislative, 
industrial or artistic contexts. However, the use of this picture of a process in the 
psychological domain leads by way of metaphor to metaphysics. The following 
discussion aims to show that this picture of an inner process does not so much 
constitute an illuminating analogy bur rather is the product of many 
misunderstandings. 
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First, contrary to the assumption of cognitive scientists a process of thought 
need not involve the manipulation and transformation of mental representations. 
Unlike the process of legalizing marihuana, which involves an ordered array of 
consecutive legal actions or the process of dialysis which involves the sequential 
separation of smaller molecules from larger molecules or of dissolved substances 
from colloidal particles in a solution by selective diffusion through a semipermeable 
membrane etc., the process of thinking need not involve transformations, changes or 
manipulations of any sort. Even if the notion of inner mental representations was 
intelligible
167
. What happens or takes place in someone’s head when thinking need 
not necessarily involve a consecutive assortment of stages in an inner process of 
thought. In fact, it is characteristic of thought that it is not accompanied by process-
like inner going ons. Although, there are some narrow confines in which the notion of 
a mental or psychological process can intelligibly be invoked, e.g. in the context of 
painful going ons or phases of depression and anxiety, confusion tends to ensue 
when philosophers and cognitive scientists invoke the notion of an inner process. 
Thinking, Wittgenstein points out, is not an incorporeal process, which lends life and 
sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach from speaking (PI§305). 
It is important to note that to question the link between thinking and the conception of 
an inner process is not tantamount to denying that people do think. Furthermore, it 
does also not imply that thinking is equivalent to speaking or doing as behaviourists 
might do (or any behavioural disposition for that matter) . To deny that thinking is an 
inner process is not to refute that a variety of words, images etc. may cross one’s 
mind. But to describe these goings on is neither a report of what one was thinking, 
nor of the reasoning of the conclusion one has reached as a result of thinking, nor a 
depiction of an inner process.
The genesis of the idea of a mental process of thought lies partly in the 
peculiar imagery conjured up by certain turns of phrase employed in everyday 
discourse, and partly in the speculative metaphysics underlying the cognitive view. 
First, it should be noted, that  it is perfectly sensible to suggest that we can speak 
with or without thought, or that we can speak mechanically or with empathy, 
compassion or understanding. However, the fact that we can speak thoughtfully or 
mechanically as a machine or a parrot might do, for example, does not necessitate
167
The flaws of this notion have been exposed in Chapter IV.
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the presence or absence of a process of thought, which sometimes accompanies 
speech and sometimes does not. As the overview of the concept of thinking 
illustrates, to speak with and without thought is tantamount to comparing someone’s 
utterance to the playing of a piece of music with understanding and empathy, i.e. 
whether someone gives an emotional rendition of a piece of music or just a 
mechanical performance (PI§341). This analogy highlights the fact that whether I do 
something thoughtfully or mechanically, whether or not I say something thoughtful or 
thoughtless or whether I have thought about a problem or question is not determined 
by reference to an internal process of thought, but by the way I behave. Importantly, 
this is not meant to negate the existence of a myriad of mental or neural 
accompaniments of thought. But such going ons are merely causal preconditions for 
a person having a thought. In a logical, i.e. conceptual, sense they are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a person having a thought.
These observations suggest that, contrary to the believes of many 
contemporary cognitive scientists and philosophers, it is not an inner process of 
thought, which warrants the ascription of thoughtful or thoughtless speech to a 
person. Rather, it is the expression of thought, i.e. the various behavioural criteria, 
which warrant the application of the attributes thoughtful or thoughtless to a person. 
One might say that to express one’s thoughts, to say what one thinks, cannot be a 
description, report or communication of an inner process or activity, because no such 
description of an inner process could have the consequences in the language game-
game of the expression of thought. Thought and its expression are crucially linked. If 
this sounds puzzling, it helps to remind oneself of the myriad of things a man must do 
in order for us to say he thinks (RPPI§563).
The content of thought is also critically linked to the expression of thought. 
What we think, is evident from what we say and what we do
168
. It is neither evidenced 
by the occurrence of an inner process of thought nor by entertaining mental images. 
Of course, mental images may cross my mind when I am thinking. But they are 
neither sufficient nor necessary for me to think. Again, this is in line with the 
understanding of the polymorphousness of thought, as evidenced by the overview of 
the concept of thinking. When I am toddling home in a drunken stupor after a long 
168
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night down the college bar, many a mental image may cross my mind, but I may no 
longer be able to think
169
. Moreover, I may think about a philosophical or 
mathematical problem without any images crossing my mind.  Thus, although mental 
images and neural processes for that matter, can be accompaniments of thought, 
they need not be. They may or may not give rise to thoughts. They also may or may 
not serve as mnemonic devices. In any case, however, they do not determine what I 
think, nor whether I think. And having them is not a logically necessary condition in 
order for me to think that thus-and-so
170
.
5.  The LOT Hypothesis and the Idea of a Medium of Thought 
The idea of a LOT is not a Fodorian invention. A brief look at the history of 
ideas reveals that a number of illustrious minds have endorsed the idea in the past in 
one form or another. Traces of the idea of a LOT can already be found in the writings 
of Augustine, for example, of whom Wittgenstein remarks that he 
‘…beschreibe das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache so, als käme das Kind in ein fremdes 
land und verstehe die Sprach des Landes nicht; das heißt: so als habe es breits eine Sprache, 
nur nicht diese. Oder auch: als könne das Kind schon denken, nur nicht sprechen. Und 
„denken“ hieße hier etwas, wie: zu sich selber reden.’ (PI§32)
‘… describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and 
did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only 
not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And “think” here 
means something like “talk to itself”.’ (PI§32)
Similar ideas have also been voiced, for instance, by Thomas Hobbes who remarked 
that
‘the general use of speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the 
Trayne of Thoughts, into a Trayne of words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the 
Registering of the Consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, 
and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they (the thoughts) were 
marked by.´ (LN, Ch.IV),
and by John Locke who held that 
169
This, for example, may be evidenced by the fact that I propose marriage to the college porter on 
duty as well as several other people I pass in the quad whilst stumbling home.
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 For a more detailed disussion of the content of thought see chapter VI.
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‘(1.)... Man, therefore, had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame 
articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language, for 
parrots and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, 
which yet, by no means are capable of language. (2.) ...Besides articulate sounds, 
therefore, it was necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal 
conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, 
whereby they might be known to others, and the thoughts of men’s minds be conveyed 
from one to another.’(E, Bk. III, Ch.I, Sec.1&2)
Locke’s lasting influence can be traced down to modern theoretical linguistics as 
exemplified by the writings of Ferdinand de Saussure
171
, for example. According to 
the British empiricist tradition, thinking is operating on the ideas or images of the 
mind, and speaking is quite literally a translation from this imagist language of 
thought into word language. This picture of thought found its way into modern 
empirical psychology via the writings of William James who held, whilst engulfed in 
the `study of the mind from within´
172
, i.e. introspectionist psychology, that the stream 
of thought is dissociated from speech.  Thought according to James 
‘always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.’
173
Similar ideas have also been propounded by Frege, who thought that sense (in this 
case conceived as an abstract entity distinct from the sign) is logically independent of 
language but gives language life. Finally, the young Wittgenstein of the Tractatus
believed that it is meaning or thinking which accompanies thoughtful non-mechanical 
speech and that this breathes life into otherwise dead and meaningless signs.
As this brief historical sketch shows, some form of the LOT hypothesis always 
seems to have exerted some influence over the most brilliant of minds. Its modern 
appeal, for example, is partly due to the fact that it appears to provide an explanation 
for a variety of linguistic phenomena, which human beings encounter in everyday 
171
 see e.g.: Hacker (1993), `Meaning and Mind´, Part I, p.179 (Footnote)
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James, `The Principles of Psychology´, Ch.VII p.185
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 ibid., Ch.IX p.219f
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life
174
, while also providing an account of the structure and systematicity(normativity) 
of thought (see Chapter VI):
‘The theory of propositional representation (i.e., the LOT hypothesis) corresponds to the 
frequent introspective sense of a distinction between, having an idea, and putting it into words. 
The distinction emerges `behaviourally´ in the `tip-of the tongue phenomenon´ where we have 
a concept clearly in mind, but experience a delay in retrieving the appropriate word for it.
Even in cases where we easily generate the English name for a concept (dog, chair, and so 
on) we often are not very good at giving its English definition. When asked to define even the 
most familiar concepts, we often find ourselves labouring.’ 
175
It is expressions like, `So what you really wanted to say was…´ (PI§334), which 
create the impression that while we look for the right words to express our thoughts, 
the actual `thinking´ is going on behind the words.  Similar ideas are inspired by 
questions of the following kind: If a native English speaker converses in a foreign 
language, for example, does he think his thoughts in English or in another foreign 
language? As in occasions in which language users struggle to find the right words, 
such questions invite contemplation and hypostatisation with regard to the   
“something” a language seems to be thought in (PG66, PI§335). For what one meant 
was already seemed to be present somewhere in one’s mind, even before we gave it 
expression. But as Wittgenstein pointed out, nobody would ask whether the written 
multiplication of two decimals runs parallel to the thought of the multiplication 
(PG§66). These examples highlight one of the distinguishing features of 
contemporary ways of thinking and contemplation, in so far as they are indicative of 
the mood of our times: One immediately responds to these kinds of problem by 
devising theories and hypotheses, rather than as Hertz
176
 and later Wittgenstein 
urged to aim for (conceptual) clarification (see Chapter II). 
174
 It should be noted, however, that originally the appeal of a representational theory of mind was not 
due to its plausibility as a explanatory theory of psychological phenomena, but rather, because it was 
compatible with the demands of a foundationalist epistemology (e.g. Descartes).
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 Stillings et al (1995), p.26f
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 Heinrich Hertz famously remarked ‘that some kinds of vexing problems are to be resolved, not by 
scientific explanation and hypotheses, but by clarification. Unclarity is often expressed by questions 
about the nature of a phenomenon, but what is needed, in some such cases, is not fresh information 
or sharper definitions, but a clearer understanding of existing information and definitions´. In the end, 
the questions troubling us often dissolve after such clarification. (See: Hertz (1956), p.iiif.)
In a similar spirit Ludwig  Boltzmann argued for the importance of gaining an overview, an 
argument that might have had some bearing on the Wittgensteinian idea of  ‘Übersicht’: `...a division of 
labour certainly helps greatly to promote rapid progress in science and is indeed indispensable for it; 
but just as certainly it harbours great dangers. For we lose the overview of the whole, required for any 
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The LOT Hypothesis Investigated
The two main flaws of the idea of a medium of thought are the notion that 
there are symbolic representations of the (outside) world in the brain, and the failure 
to acknowledge the intimate link between the concept of thinking and the expression 
of thought (see above). First, although it is true that the capacity to manipulate 
symbols is bound up with the capacity of thought, this is not because thought must 
take place in a medium of any kind. Rather, it is because the expression of thoughts 
in speech must be bound up like this. If the expression of thoughts was not intimately 
connected to symbol manipulation, the concept of thinking could be given meaning 
without reference to the rules of a language community (i.e. thinking could, for 
example, acquire meaning by means of ostensive definition). This however, is not 
possible.  It is the rules for the use of the concept of thinking and the criteria 
associated with these rules, which give the concept of thinking its meaning. Yet, in 
the absence of these rules and criteria, nothing counts as thinking. 
Second, the fact that the capacity for thought is bound up with the capacity to 
manipulate symbols is not because thoughts must be expressed in a language. 
Rather, it is because the expression of thoughts in speech must be. Events like the 
‘tip of the tongue phenomenon’, for example, deceive us into thinking that we are 
thinking in something. But, when I say that ‘the word is on the tip of my tongue’, all I 
am saying is that the right expression escapes me momentarily, and that I hope to 
find it soon. In the meantime the verbal expression does no more than certain 
wordless behaviour (PI II, p.219e). Similarly, to say “well, I do know exactly what I 
want to say, but I cannot find the right words to say it” when we struggle to give the 
right definition for a word or expression, is tantamount to saying “Just give me a sec, I 
just need a moment for the thought to come together”. We tend to compare the 
occasional search for the right expression to the efforts of one who is trying to make 
an exact copy of a line which only he can see. But this analogy is flawed, and the 
situations are not comparable. In the case of searching for the right expressions, 
mental activity aiming at discovering something essentially new or even just essentially new 
combinations of old ideas.’  (See: Boltzmann (1979), p.77)
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there is no line, no mental train of thought, which guides the verbal expression of 
what one wants to say  (RPPI §580).
 Third, while the LOT hypothesis would indeed explain the tip of the tongue 
phenomenon, it is neither the only explanation nor the most plausible one. When I 
am struggling to find the right word, I am not facing a translation problem. I am not 
asking myself which German, English or Italian phrase is the correct pendant to a 
mentalese expression which I entertain in my mind. Rather, in the first case I am 
trying to remember a sentence or phrase, which I believe captures the situation I am 
trying to describe adequately. In the second case, I am trying to come up with such 
an appropriate sentence or phrase. Thus, even these seemingly favourable cases do 
not force us to adopt the LOT hypothesis. In addition, the idea of a LOT seems also 
entirely implausible for the majority of cases in which we express our thoughts 
without hesitation.
Finally, must we always think in something, be it in the words of a particular 
language, images or mentalese, i.e. in some sort of symbolism or picture? While the 
fact that we can talk to ourselves in foro interno, as it were, may lend some appeal to 
this idea, talking to myself inwardly is, however, not the same as to think in a 
particular language. An interior monologue is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
thinking (see above). The question “what language do you think in?” arises only with 
respect to those individuals who, in addition to their native tongue, have also 
mastered a foreign language. To ask, “what language do you think in?”, is 
tantamount to asking whether you speak this foreign language fluently or hesitantly. 
Can you simply express what you want to say in the foreign language, or do you first 
have to be sure what you want to say, and then try to remember and express the 
equivalent in the foreign language. But it is important to realize, that this case 
provides no ground for extrapolating from the particular to the general. It does not 
necessitate the idea that one must first think in some sort of symbolism. This idea, 
which when taken to its extreme tends to precipitate in the form of pseudo scientific 
theories of the Fodorian variety, implies that one might always be mistaken about 
even the most simple and basic of one’s thoughts. This, however, is utterly 
implausible.       
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6. Mental Content, Thinking and Conceptual Abilities – A Revised 
Understanding of the Nature of Thinking and the Content of Thought    
The previous chapters have excavated, exposed and resolved the numerous 
confusions and misunderstandings underlying the notion of the mind as a biological 
information processor. In addition, the view of the mind as the capacity to acquire 
intellectual skills, viz. mental abilities, has been introduced as a plausible alternative. 
In accord with this proposed shift in perspective, and in the wake of the 
deconstruction of the cognitive conception of thought, thinking needs to be 
accommodated within this proposed (neo-)Aristotelian framework. To do this, the 
present section will investigate the role of concepts in thinking and suggest an 
understanding of thinking as the capability to exercise an interlocking network of 
rule-governed abilities. This account of thinking is developed out of the critical link, 
which exists between thinking and the expression of thought. 
The ability, or rather the set of abilities, which characterises thinking are 
manifest in those practices in which a human being masters a concept
177
 (or 
symbolic representations of any kind). These practices range from linguistic to non-
linguistic behaviours. Thus, thinking is to be understood as the mastery of a set of 
rule-governed abilities, which enable the subject of thought to pick out common 
features of the situations in which they are exercised. If thinking is understood in this 
way, we not only avoid the confusions and misunderstandings entailed by the 
cognitive conception of thinking, but we also make room for a plausible account of a 
structured and generalizable way of thinking about the world, which does not invoke 
the notion of a LOT (see also chapter VI).  Both the structure of thought and its 
exercise are grounded in those practices in which a human being masters a concept. 
The rules operative in these practices, determine not only the application of 
concepts, but also the role that the concept plays in thought. In grasping a concept, 
one becomes competent in a subset of articulated abilities, which link situations and 
combine to shape our activity in the world. In order to illuminate the connection 
between the ability to think and the ability to use concepts according to rule 
governed ways, and above all, of these abilities to the structure of thought, it is 
necessary to begin with an examination of the link between concepts and 
177
 Note: This can include verbal and non-verbal forms of communication and behaviour.
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judgements. Although the following section will briefly touch upon questions relating 
to the content, structure and normativity of thought a detailed examination of these 
issues will be deferred to the subsequent chapter. 
  6.1 Mental Content: On Concepts , Judgements and Structure
The following account of concepts and conceptual structure is based on both 
Kantian as well as Wittgensteinian ideas. In the Critique of Pure Reason (CrPR), 
Immanuel Kant argued that all human experience is conceptual.  Thoughts, are 
about things, and formed by the combination of concepts. For example the thought 
‘this dog is an English Bulldog’ involves the concepts ‘dog’ and ‘English Bulldog’. 
Without these concepts, the subject of experience, i.e. the thinker, cannot frame the 
thought. Thus, in order to think about a given object one needs to possess concepts, 
which apply to a given object. Concepts, it could be said, group objects according to 
whether they count as instances of this or that. According to Immanuel Kant, for 
example, concepts are based on judgements, which represent items of experience of 
discursive thought. For a human being to apply a concept is, according to Kant, 
tantamount to making a judgement that something counts as an instance of this or 
that: 
 ‘Concepts are functions based on acts of unity of judgement’ (CrPR B93) Whereas all 
intuitions as sensible rest on affections, concepts rest on function. By “function” I mean the 
unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation…Now 
the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of 
them… The knowledge yielded by understanding, or at least by the human understanding, 
must therefore be by means of concepts and so is not intuitive but discursive (CrPR B93)
178
In other words, for me to recognize the English bulldog chewing on my trainers as 
Giacomo, is for me to judge (on the grounds of coat colouring, size, behaviour etc.) 
that the English bulldog misbehaving is indeed the bulldog Giacomo and not, for 
example, the bulldog Achilles (although the bulldog Achilles is known to indulge in 
similar misbehaviours). Furthermore, Kant’s idea that functions unify different 
experiences by “bringing them under one common representation” implies, that a 
structured body of knowledge can be generated from these functions. Within this 
178
Intuition is a Kantian terminus technicus denoting the content of perceptual experience, viz. 
sensory matter structured according to the forms of space and time.
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structured body of knowledge conceptual connections between different situations 
can be discursively traced. Consequently, human experience obtains structure by 
virtue of its link to a conceptual structure, which itself constitutes a structured system 
of representation. As a result, once an object is related to a conceptual structure, the 
object can be used in discursive thought and feature in discourse. Thus, human 
thought is permeated with judgements as they figure both in the application of 
concepts, and in the determination or acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, viz.
proposition. Judgements can thus be said to have a dual role in thought. The notion 
of judgement also played a role in Wittgenstein’s thought. In the Investigations he 
states for example that
‘Zur Verständigung der Sprache gehört nicht nur eine Übereinstimung in den Definitionen, 
sondern (so seltsam dies klingen mag) eine Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen. ...’ (PU§242)
‘If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. …’ (PI§242)
Kant´s and Wittgenstein’s proximity regarding their views on judgements provides the 
basis for linking the Kantian notion of concepts with the Wittgensteinian ideas about 
following rules. This in turn allows for an account of the systematicity of thought, 
which is independent of a conception of a LOT
179
, while also making room for an 
account of the content of thoughts, i.e. mental content, which does not invoke the 
notion of mental representations. 
In both the Kantian and the Wittgensteinian context, the subject judges that 
this or that element of experience counts as an instance of a particular concept. It 
thus actively categorizes experience. Put in purely Wittgensteinian terms, the 
application of a concept follows distinctive norms, instantiated and regulated by the 
rules governing their use. Baker and Hacker, for example, point out that:
‘What we call ‘communication’ must be partly determined by a certain consensus about what 
is true and what is false. Why? Because definitions (or explanations) of meanings are rules for 
the use of words and because the understanding of a rule is manifested in two ways, namely 
179
It is important to remind oneself here, that the modern cognitive view conceives of the workings of 
the mind, the mental processes, as the result of causal impingements of the outside world. These 
causal impingements take the form of inner mental representations. However, this empiricist notion 
(derived from Locke and Hume) neglects the Kantian insight that human experience is conceptual. 
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in formulating or paraphrasing it and in applying or following it in practice (e.g. in making 
empirical judgements or giving descriptions (PI§240)).’
180
Thus, judgements are a means by which human beings assert whether a concept 
applies to an object or situation. The application of a concept implies a normatively 
constrained judgement, and to grasp a concept is to understand that there is a way of 
going right or wrong. Consequently, a human being can be said to have a concept if 
it displays a rule-governed way of behaviour, i.e. response, and if it can participate in 
a given language game according to a rule governed technique. The defining 
characteristic of a thinker who has mastered a concept is, when his natural pattern of 
responses becomes principled or rule-governed. Usually, this development takes 
place in an intersubjective network of activity provided by a language community. 
The ability of human beings to act in conformity with a rule has a dual aspect 
to it. On the one hand, a particular concept – once mastered – can figure as a 
structured element of thought, and on the other, by being incorporated in the already 
existing conceptual scheme, the concepts user’s ability to think about his experience 
and to communicate with other becomes richer and more sophisticated as the 
conceptual structure expands. Each newly acquired concept is connected to the 
already existing conceptual structure and assumes it’s own particular role. Thus,
‘…Das Licht geht nach und nach über das ganze auf’ (ÜG §141) 
‘…Light dawns gradually over the whole’ (OC §141) 
The present focus on concepts and judgements allows for an understanding of the 
structure of thought as resulting from the complex network of interconnected rule 
governed abilities, which allow human beings to pick out common features of 
situations in which they are exercised. The role a given concept plays in thought, is 
thus given by the way in which it characterises a number of different abilities:
‘The exercise of a given concept in an act of judgement is not in general a definite uniform sort 
of mental act; it does not even make sense to ask just how many concepts are exercised in a 
given judgement. Our chess analogy may be of service, in showing why this question is 
unreasonable. Playing chess involves a number of abilities, which are not only distinguishable 
180
 Baker & Hacker (1985), p.259
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but can actually exist separately; for one way of teaching chess would be to play first with the 
kings and the pawns and then add other pieces successively in later games. It would, 
however, be absurd to ask just how many of these abilities were exercised in a particular 
move. Our language about the concepts exercised in a given act of judgement makes sense 
or does not make sense in much the same way.’
181
6.2 Mental Content and Generalizability of Concepts
In Kantian terms, the grasp of a concept is conceded by acknowledging that 
the concept user unifies a number of different objects under one common 
representation, as it were. To acknowledge the mastery of a certain concept requires 
the ability to subsume objects under concepts in judgement. This ability is constitutive 
of mastering a concept. It is, as Wittgenstein would put it, part of mastering the 
grammar of a concept. Consequently, the grasping of the meaning of a concept, i.e. 
to master the rules for the use of a concept such as yellow, for example, commits the 
user of a concept (i.e. the thinking subject) to a particular response in an indefinite 
number of interrelated judgements. For example, if my friend’s three year old son 
Jaime can identify my Levi’s jacket as being yellow when asked whether there is 
something yellow in the room, but fails to identify as being thus my Fender 
Stratocaster, my Lakers sweater, and a rubber duck, which are in the room too and 
which also have a yellow colour, Jaime cannot be ascribed the mastery of the 
concept yellow. On the other hand, had he been able to pick out my Strat, my Lakers 
sweater and the rubber duck as being yellow, as well as my Levi’s jacket, his mastery 
of the concept could hardly be questioned. This example demonstrates that the 
structural role of concepts is crucially linked to their ability of functioning in
generalizable ways when a subject thinks about the world. In the present context, the 
generality of concepts can be further underlined if we ask what Jaime is thinking 
when he identifies the Levi’s jacket as being yellow, yet fails to identify the other 
objects as being of the same colour. His failure to identify all the yellow objects in the 
room implies that Jaime is unable to make (general) judgements about an object’s 
“yellowness”, as it were. Consequently, Jaime cannot be ascribed
182
 the thought ‘this 
jacket is yellow’, as the thought’s content implies the ability to make correct 
judgements about the yellowness of objects (or lack thereof).
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Geach (1957), p.15
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 Nor can he self-ascribe.
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For any subject to be ascribed the mastery of the concept of yellow, the 
subject must display appropriate responses to the colour of yellow and non-yellow 
items across a wide range of situations and contexts. This implies the ability to 
respond selectively to only those features or aspects of a situation or context, which 
contain instantiations of yellowness. The ability to discriminate between instances of 
yellowness and the lack thereof involves various judgements concerning the features 
of objects, and presupposes that the subject is capable of flexible control of attention 
as well as selectivity of response. Importantly, colour classifications are not 
mechanical as they do not just involve extrapolation from a paradigm, but rather may 
require the active search for the critical features in the objects a subject encounters. 
Consequently, it can be said that while the vehicle of a subject’s conceptual abilities 
is the brain, i.e. they are built on natural faculties, the conceptual abilities are not 
entirely produced by it, as subjects develop and elaborate their conceptual abilities 
through their exposure to a community of language users. That is, thinking subjects 
are trained in the application of concepts through the adoption of rule governed 
patterns of response, which themselves are founded on criteria circumscribing the 
correct use of the respective concepts. To grasp a concept is an ability to respond at 
will to a rule shaped through multiple applications. As such responses are feature 
selective according to the given inter- or intrasituational contexts, they have a 
potentially general use. Once a subject has developed a conceptual ability, and 
displayed proficiency in the use of concepts the subject can be ascribed (and self-
ascribe) the grasp of the conception in question. The mastery of a concept implies 
proficiency to express his judgements concerning a concept. It is in this way that a 
thought may be conceived of as what is expressible by an utterance or other 
representation. It is manifest in the variety of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours 
associated with the master of a given concept. As the connective analysis of the 
concept of thinking has highlighted, these manifestations have a distinctly 
polymorphous character.
In the wake of the present investigation, three main features emerge as 
characteristic of the content of thought, (i.e. mental content). First, the normative 
constraints on the content of thought imply an intersubjective nature of content. The 
normative constraints connect one’s self-ascription of a concept with the general 
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practice in which the general grasp of a given concept is ascribed. The manifestation 
of the correct use of a concept constitutes the basis for this ascription.  This aspect is 
also underlined by Strawson’s generality principle: 
‘…the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of 
which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.’
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For example, to predicate of myself the grasp of the concept ‘English bulldog’, 
involves making a judgement, which I ought also be able to make about other 
subjects. Consequently, the ability to judge that I grasp the concept ‘English bulldog’, 
is tied to my ability to judge that Klaus grasps the concept ‘English bulldog’ etc.. The 
link between self-ascription and the ascription of a concept to others, thus follows 
from the fact that mental ascriptions are a particular class of generalizable predicative 
concepts. Strawsons generality principle, implies that if one grasps a grasp of the 
concept ‘English bulldog’, for example, as predicative, then one ought in principle be 
able to judge whether this is instantiated by a range of subjects. Second, 
manifestability, is an essential feature of the grasp of a concept. Klaus can only be 
ascribed a grasp of the concept ‘English bulldog’ because his grasp is manifest in his 
application of the concept.  In addition, the link between the self-ascription of a 
concept and the ascription of a concept to someone else implies, that although the 
grasp of a concept need not be manifest on every occasion it is applied by a subject, 
manifestation is still the ground on which mastery of a concept is ascribed
184
. Finally, 
the present analysis provides an account of the structure of thought, independent of 
the notion of a medium of thought. This is in line with a recommendation made by 
Gareth Evans who suggests that the structure of thought should not accounted for in 
terms of a medium of thought, but in terms of thoughts ‘…being a complex of the 
exercise of several distinct conceptual abilities.’
185
 Structured thought about 
experience is manifest in and constituted by the exercise of those abilities, which 
allow for the selection of aspects of presentations and which allow for their 
generalization at will, so as to ensure the subsequent use of the outcome of these 
generalizations in an action guided manner. The structure of thought is reflected in 
considerations about what a subject must do if he is to be ascribed a mastery of a 
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given concept. Thus, the structure of thought is evident in the close connection 
between thought and its expression. To judge whether a concept counts as an 
instantiation of this or that, is to judge that it is both like and unlike various other 
things.   
141
7. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Absence of conceptual clarity is one of the main sources of speculative 
metaphysics. The preceding discussion underlines that, in moments of puzzlement 
and perplexity, philosophical speculation must be avoided in favour of conceptual 
investigations. Failing to do so will invariably lead to the construction of “houses of 
cards” (PI§118). The present investigation into the cognitive conception of thinking 
has shown this conception to be overly broad and simplistic, as it cannot be 
supported by the most rudimentary grammatical analysis. It neglects the 
polymorphous character of thinking, and consequently fails to provide a genuine 
insight into the nature of thinking and thought. Most importantly, the cognitive 
conception of thinking fails to acknowledge that thinking and the expression of 
thought are inextricably linked through the normative constraints governing the use of 
concepts and the various judgements involved in ascribing a concepts. While it 
seems ill advised to attempt giving a general definition of thinking in the light 
polymorphous character of this concept, one can nevertheless specify what has to be 
true of an individual for him or her to count as a thinking being. That is, an individual 
needs to be able to participate in an interlocking network of rule-governed abilities, 
which pick out common features of the situations in which they are exercised. This 
stands in stark contrast to the metaphysical conception of thinking as the processing 
of internal mental representations as promoted by the cognitive conception of 
thinking and the cognitive view. Thinking is not an inner process, as even within the 
narrow confines in which an association with a psychological process makes sense 
(e.g. during periods of grief, depression or anxiety), a description of the words or 
images that may cross one’s mind at that time does not count as a report of what one 
was thinking, nor is it a depiction of an inner process. And although mental images  
can be accompaniments of thought, it is important to note that they need not be. 
Similarly, although the specific neural activity of the brain is a necessary condition for 
a person to undergo mental processes and to entertain thoughts, it does not follow 
that these processes constitute thinking, anymore than neural activity in the visual 
cortex constitutes seeing.
In the wake of the flawed cognitive conception of thinking, the idea of a 
medium of thought in general, and the idea of a LOT in particular, are inevitable 
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extensions of the confusions informing the cognitive view. These ideas constitute a 
scientistic myth founded on numerous misunderstandings and misconceptions. It 
exemplifies how cognitive scientists and philosophers are taken in by conceptual 
confusion, and how this results in the construction of metaphysical theories, which 
give the impression of providing a picture of the deep underlying reality of things. In 
defusing and deconstructing these misleading pictures, however, one destroys the 
very foundation on which the cognitive conception of thinking and the LOT 
hypothesis are built. In contrasts to Fodor’s claims, the cognitive conception of 
thinking and the LOT hypothesis do not constitute the foundation of thinking or the 
explanation of cognitive phenomena in general for that matter. Thinking does not 
consist in computational operations upon sentences of mentalese but in the various 
forms of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours, which characterise the expression of 
thought. For a creature to think, is not to have rational-symbol manipulation 
processes occurring in the mind/brain, but to exercise conceptual judgement 
according to rules governing the use of concepts. In the context of the Aristotelian 
conception of mind introduced in the preceding chapter, thinking is best understood 
as an interlocking network of rule-governed abilities, which pick out common features 
of the situations in which they are exercised (see above). To have  a concept of x we 
must not only have a formal understanding of what x is…but also knowledge of what 
x is to be applied to.” The rules operative in these practices determine not only the 
application of concepts, but also the role that the concept plays in thought (“what it is 
for something to be an x”). The abilities, which constitute thinking, are structured and 
depend on a flexible selectivity of attention and response to the world. The exercise 
of these abilities comprises thought with content rather than merely a complex of 
causal influences, which explain the subject’s behaviour. Both the self-ascription, and 
the ascription of mental content to others have their origins in these abilities. All 
human beings are endowed with the capacity to develop these (congruent) abilities, 
which provide the foundation for the learning and exercise of rule-governed 
techniques, and which imply an agreement in judgements. This relation between 
thought, the expression of thought and rule governed abilities, allows for structured 
and generalizable ways of thinking, and provides the basis for a non-causal account 
of thought as well as linguistic content (see: chapter VI).
143
Chapter VI
Intentionality and the Cognitive View
1. Representationalism and Intentionality 
The modern representationalist stance embodied by the cognitive view has 
developed as a result of the inability of functionalist theories of mind to account for 
mental content. While functionalist theories of mind allowed mental states like being 
in pain, for example, to be multiply realized by defining types of mental states 
according to their functional role (thus improving substantially upon identity theories 
of mind), they failed to provide an account for intentional mental states as well as for 
sensations (see Chapter I). 
‘The functionalist thinks of mental states as causal intermediaries between perceptual inputs 
and behavioural outputs. This is an advance on thinking of them simply as physical states. 
But, for all that, functionalism still presents mental states as part of a system of causal pushes 
and pulls inside the head.’
186
Modern representationalist theories of mind recognized and addressed this problem 
by postulating, that in addition to their functional roles, mental states also encode 
meanings. This assumption made a significant contribution to the picture of the mind 
as a physical symbol system, and the LOT hypothesis. Because the content of 
mental representations can be described as attitudes or relations towards 
propositions it is also called propositional content, and the content laden mental 
states are often referred to as propositional attitudes (PAs). Within the context of the 
cognitive view, the possession of PAs by human beings is accounted for by the claim 
that the internal mental states (i.e. tokenings of inner mental representations) encode 
the respective propositional attitudes. Fodor´s language of thought hypothesis, 
discussed in the previous chapter is widely conceived of as the most thorough 
account of a physical symbol system within which inner mental representations are 
realized:
‘At the heart of the theory is the postulation of a language of thought: an infinite set of `mental 
representations´ which function both as the immediate objects of propositional attitudes, and 
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as the domains of mental processes.’ More precisely, the representational theory of mind is 
the conjunction of the following 2 claims: 1. (the nature of prepositional attitudes): For any 
organism O, and any attitude A toward the proposition P, there is a (computational/functional) 
relation R and a mental representation MP such that MP means that P, and O has A iff R to 
MP… . 2. (the nature of mental processes): Mental processes are causal consequences of 
tokenings of mental representations.‘
187
Moreover, it has also been pointed out that
‘…the feature of `propositional attitudes´ known as `intentionality´ itself forces upon us a 
theory of mental representations. The intentionality of a thought consists in the fact that verbs 
of propositional attitude are about or directed, in a curious way, upon the situation specified in 
the proposition they contain.’ 
188
The conception of mental processes as the causal consequences of tokenings of 
inner mental representations, i.e. mental states, as envisaged by Fodor (see above) 
is important because it provides the crucial link between mental representations and 
a causal reductionist explanation of human action and behaviour. Mental 
representations are conceived as the inner termini of the causal chains that instigate 
action. Consequently, they assume a causal functional role in the explanation of 
action, which is analogous to the role microscopic unobservables play in the 
explanation of the behaviour of macroscopic objects. The property of intentionality is 
the decisive feature in virtue of which mental representations are able to fulfil their 
causal role. Without the property of intentionality, it is thought, there can be no causal 
explanation of behaviour (see: Chapter I, Sec. 3.1, 3.2). 
Intentionality is a property of both content laden mental states, like beliefs, 
desires, hopes etc., and linguistic tokens like (written) sentences or utterances.  They 
can be about distant or non-existent affairs or they can be descriptions of, or 
utterances about, actual goings on. Although there is a close connection between the 
mind and intentionality
189
 it is important to note that not all content-laden mental 
states are intentional states. Mental states, like sensations of pain or pleasure, lack 
intentionality. In the present context, intentionality is to be understood as a property 
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of certain content-laden mental states
190
, as well as of linguistic entities, like 
utterances, expressions etc.. Moreover, because intentionality is characteristic of 
both certain content-laden mental states and linguistic tokens it appears to  provide a 
link between mental content and linguistic meaning. Because content-laden mental 
states can be expressed as propositional attitudes, and the expression of 
propositional attitudes by human beings is a way of communicating mental states 
through language, the expression of PAs provides crucial evidence for the ascription 
of mental states. It is in this way that mental content and linguistic meanings are 
crucially linked up.
To develop a satisfactory account of the intentionality of mental states and 
linguistic meaning has been a long standing problem within the philosophy of mind 
and contemporary cognitive science. To many, intentionality appears to be an utterly 
mysterious property. How is it that mental states, thought and language can be about 
something? The fact that intentionality seems to escape our usually highly successful 
explanations in terms of physical properties makes this feature even more puzzling. 
The sciences can easily explain a person’s height, mass, weight, colour of hair, eyes 
or skin etc., but they can’t explain my hope that I may dance with Cécile for OUDT 
this year, or my desire to strangle my new bulldog puppy Giacomo, because he has 
chewed up the body of my favourite Fender Stratocaster and left significant ‘bite-
marks’. And while the quality and character of my voice (i.e. its pitch, frequency etc.) 
can be analysed in physical terms, the fact that my wish to dance with Cécile 
concerns a non-existent state of affairs, and that my desire to strangle Giacomo is 
about a hypothetical action that would never actually be carried out, can not be 
explained in terms of natural science. A characteristic divide seems to exist between 
the properties of human beings and their minds. Consequently, the question how the 
property of intentionality fits into our naturalistic framework of nature, and how it can 
be integrated into our general scientific view of the world, forces itself upon us. 
In order to address these questions in a naturalistic manner, modern 
representationalism adopts a strategy of explanatory priority. It attempts to explain 
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or relations towards propositions.
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linguistic meaning as resulting from mental content and then to give a reductionist 
account of the latter. Naturally, this account gravitates around the notion of inner 
mental representations, which are thought to stand in causal relations to the world. 
Thus, mental content is naturalized by way of providing a causal explanation of 
content:
‘What we want at a minimum is something of the form ‘R represents S’ is true iff C where the 
vocabulary in which condition C is couched contains neither intentional nor semantic 
expressions.’
191
This approach is exemplified in the cognitive view in general and Fodor´s language of 
thought hypothesis in particular, where the explanation of mental content takes the 
form of a purely descriptive causal theory. The adoption of this explanatory strategy 
implies the assumption that inner mental representations possess natural, underived 
or intrinsic content (as opposed to conventional or derived content/intentionality) in 
virtue of the causal relations in which they stand. The meaning of language is then 
explained as deriving from the content of mental states
192
, which itself is explained by 
reduction to non-intentional phenomena. 
In addition, this reductionist explanatory strategy is also thought to provide an 
account for two further characteristic properties of mental content, besides 
intentionality: Its structure and normativity. The normativity of content is linked to the 
conceptualisation of intentionality by means of PAs and propositional content, as PAs 
specify a condition for the world to satisfy, if the attitude is to be fulfilled. In addition, 
mental states stand in logical and rational relations to each other
193
. Furthermore, it 
has been claimed that understanding a thought, i.e. entertaining a PA, is a structured 
ability in as much as it presupposes connections and links to other thoughts (or PAs). 
That is, if one is able to understand the thought like <this bulldog is naughty>, one 
must also be able to understand other thoughts which contain the concepts of 
bulldog and naughty, which convey, for example, that there are bulldogs that aren’t 
naughty or that there are other dogs besides bulldogs, which are naughty too. Both 
the normativity and the systematicity of content, and thus the normativity of thought 
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are explained by postulating the existence of causal relations between mental 
representations. 
The following discussion will examine the plausibility of the representationalist 
account of intentionality and the normativity and structure of content, which has been 
outlined above. Particular emphasis will be placed on examining the notion of 
explanatory priority and the hypothesized causal role of mental states. In the course 
of this investigation, some of the criticism and ideas regarding the conceptions of a 
medium of thought, mental states and the structure of thought discussed and 
introduced in preceding chapters will be revisited to the extent that they have a direct 
bearing on the issues examined in the present chapter. The alternative account of 
intentionality and mental content will draw heavily on Wittgenstein’s conception of 
language and his ideas about grammar and rules.
2.  Examining the Representationalist Account of Intentionality, and the 
     Normativity and Structure of Mental Content
Content-laden mental states are normative in that they prescribe what should 
satisfy them in advance. As Wittgenstein points out, 
‘Der Wunsch scheint schon zu wissen, was ihn erfüllen wird, oder würde; der Satz, der 
Gedanke, was ihn war macht, auch wenn es gar nicht da ist! Woher dieses Bestimmen, 
dessen, was noch nicht  da ist? Dieses despotische Fordern? („Die Härte des logischen 
Muß?.“)’ (PU§437)
‘A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a thought, what 
makes it true--even when that thing is not there at all! Whence this determining of what is not 
yet there? This despotic demand? ("The hardness of the logical must.").’ (PI§437)
But, can the normative relations that these states have to the facts or events that 
satisfy them still be accounted for, if mental states are identified with internal states of 
the mind or body, which posses non-relational properties? In order to settle this 
question two key premises of the cognitive view need to be investigated. First, the 
claim that mental content can be explained by the possession of internal mental 
representations. Second, the idea that there is a distinction between intrinsic and 
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derived intentionality. The distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality, 
provides a suitable starting point for the following discussion.
2.1 On the Plausibility of Distinction between Intrinsic and Derived    
      Intentionality
The motivation for adopting the distinction between intrinsic and derived 
intentionality arises out of the assumption that while thought requires no 
interpretation, signs, expressions and behaviour do. While thought is deemed to 
possess intrinsic intentionality, signs, expressions and behaviour are considered to 
possess merely derived intentionality, which necessitates interpretation. This 
distinction corresponds to a picture of language, which divides language into an 
inorganic part – the handling of signs – and an organic part – the interpretation of 
signs. It is believed, that it is the organic component of language – the interpretation 
of signs - in virtue of which live is breathed into otherwise dead signs of meaning 
(PI§431). Let’s examine each half of this distinction in turn.
The notion of derived intentionality is highly problematic. First, in the tradition 
of cognitive psychology, for example,  one might want to suggest that interpretation is 
achieved through the workings of some mental thought like process. Yet, the 
implausibility of such an explanatory strategy has been highlighted in the last chapter 
within the course of the discussion of thoughtful and thoughtless speech (see chapter 
V). Second, problems for this explanatory strategy also arise as the consequence of 
the assumption that signs, expression or behaviour are always in need of 
interpretation is, that the sharing and conveying of meaning is a. either a lucky guess, 
or b. entirely impossible. For example, on this account it is only possible for someone 
to share or convey the meaning of a sign or an expression by invoking more signs. 
Yet, these could also be given multiple interpretations. Consequently, explanation 
after explanation of the meaning of the previous explanation is required, leading to an 
infinite regress.  It thus appears impossible for the meaning of someone’s words, to 
be fully conveyed to others. There is always room for guesswork, always room for 
error and mistake. Wittgenstein, describes the dilemma thus:
‘Wenn wir einen Befehl geben, so kann es scheinen, als ob das Letzte, was der Befehl 
wünscht, unausgedrückt bleiben muß, da immer noch eine Kluft zwischen dem Befehl und 
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seiner Befolgung beleibt. Ich wünsche etwa, dass einer eine bestimmte Bewegung macht, 
scheint unzweideutig; bis auf die Frage: wie weiß er, dass er diese Bewegung machen soll? –
Wie weiß er überhaupt, wie er die Zeichen, welche immer ich ihm gebe, gebrauchen soll? –
Ich werde nun etwa trachten, den Befehl durch weitere Zeichen zu ergänzen, indem ich von 
mir auf den anderen deute, Gebärden der Aufmunterung mache, etc. hier schient es, als finge 
der Befehl zu stammeln an.
Als trachtete das Zeichen mit unsicheren Mitteln in uns ein Verständnis hervorzurufen. 
– Aber wenn wir es nun verstehen, in welchem Zeichen tun wir das?’ (PI§433)
‘When we give an order, it can look as if the ultimate thing sought by the order had to remain 
unexpressed, as there is always a gulf between an order and its execution. Say I want 
someone to make a particular movement, say to raise his arm. To make it quite clear, I do the 
movement. This picture seems unambiguous till we ask: how does he know that he is to make 
that movement?--How does he know at all what use he is to make of the signs I give him, 
whatever they are?--Perhaps I shall now try to supplement the order by means of further 
signs, by pointing from myself to him, making encouraging gestures, etc.. Here it looks as if 
the order were beginning to stammer.
As if the signs were precariously trying to produce understanding in us.--But if we now 
understand them, by what token do we understand?’ (PI§433)
In other words, if signs always have to be interpreted the full meaning of one’s 
words is never available to others, but rather has to be guessed. Explanations of 
meaning would never convey the full meaning of a sign or an expression. This, 
however, is absurd.
The problems associated with the intrinsic/derived distinction do not stop here, 
however. The problems regarding a representationalist explanation of intrinsic
intentionality non-withstanding (see below), the flip-side of the argument that one 
always falls short of conveying the full meaning of a sign or expression is, that 
oneself knows something more than one can actually explain. The conception of 
intrinsic intentionality seems to imply a form of private understanding of what it is that 
is supposed to be explained. We seem to have a deeper understanding of the 
explanandum than we can convey in the explanans (PI§209). Yet, this intuition 
cannot be substantiated. Our understanding of the meaning of a word is connected to 
our understanding of how to apply it (see chapter V). But this understanding is not 
derived by way of entertaining a form of private
194
 understanding in my head that 
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comes to me, e.g., in a flash. Consequently, any belief that someone can have a 
deeper understanding of one’s own meaning than other’s could possibly have is 
absurd:  
‘“Aber erklärst du ihm wirklich, was du selber verstehst? Lässt du ihn das Wesentliche nicht 
erraten? Du gibst ihm Beispiele, - er aber muß ihre Tendenz erraten, also deine Absicht.“ –
Jede Erklärung. Die ich mir selbst geben kann, gebe ich auch ihm.. – „ Er errät, was ich 
meine“ würd heißen: ihm schweben verschidene Deutungen meiner Erklärung vor, und er rät 
auf eine von ihnen, Er könnte also in diesem Falle fragen; und ich könnte, un dwürde, ihm 
antworten.’ (PI§210) 
‘”But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? Don't you get 
him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples,--but he has to guess their drift, to 
guess your intention."--Every explanation which I can give myself I give to him too.--"He 
guesses what I intend" would mean: various interpretations of my explanation come to his 
mind, and he lights on one of them. So in this case he could ask; and I could and should 
answer him.’ (PI§210)
There is no private token which one could have in mind, like a flash of understanding, 
for example, which governs the correct application of a sign or expression in this way. 
It is the rules for the use of sign or expression, which govern its application and which 
are learnt by exposure to a community of language users. Consequently, there is no 
reason to assume that one can have a deeper understanding of he meaning of the 
signs and expressions one uses than others. The meaning of a sign or expression is 
accessible to anyone, and intelligible to the same extent. The upshot of the present 
discussion is that the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality is 
implausible. On the one hand, it seems impossible for the signs and expressions, 
which are thought to possess derived intentionality, to acquire any content. On the 
other, the content of thoughts, which are supposed to possess intrinsic intentionality, 
remains a mystery, as it never can be fully conveyed.   
2.2 On the Philosophical Foundation of Intrinsic Intentionality: Investigating the   
      Plausibility of the Representationalist Account
The strategy contemporary representationalists employ in the attempt to 
explain the intrinsic intentionality of mental states is to postulate, that the intrinsic 
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intentionality of the inner mental representations encoded in the LOT underlies the 
intrinsic intentionality of mental states. That is, the content of internal mental 
representations is thought to explain the content of mental states. Yet, this raises the 
following question: What gives the inner mental representations their content? In the 
light of the previous discussion of an interpretive account of (mental) signs, it seems 
that an interpretative account of the intrinsic intentionality of symbolic inner mental 
representations would equally lead to an infinite regress. If mental content is encoded 
in a symbolic LOT which requires interpretation, then the correct method of 
interpretation would also have to be encoded. However, if we assume that any form 
of encoded content
195
 also stands in need of interpretation, this kind of explanation 
could only succeed via invoking another inner mental representation, which would 
also require interpretation and an infinite regress ensues.
It seems that a way out of this dilemma would be to take the view that mental 
representations are contents themselves, and as such do not require interpretation. 
For example, one might claim that mental representations do not require 
interpretation, as the representations are the contents of signs and symbols, rather 
than signs and symbols themselves. Thus, one would avoid an infinite regress simply 
by invoking the possession of inner mental representations. Yet, the flaw with this
explanatory strategy is that on close scrutiny, it fails to explain anything. 
Representationalism is an explanatory strategy, i.e. the cognitive view is a framework 
of explanation, which is thought to explain the possession of psychological attributes 
by human beings. However, merely taking the possession of inner mental 
representations as an explanans of mental content, fails to shed any light on the 
problem how mental content is possible. A mere wish, does neither provide a   
philosophically nor a scientifically satisfactory account of intentionality. One simply 
substitutes one set of words with another. Thus, as far as explanatory power and 
value is concerned,  the modern representationalist account explanation leaves as 
much to be desired as its classical counterpart. Although, at this point one may be 
tempted to object that these considerations are mere straw men, serving no greater 
purpose, it is noteworthy that Wittgenstein in the Blue Book found it worthwhile to 
spend some time on examining this line of thought: 
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‘…was wir erwarten, ist nicht die Tatsache, sodnern ein Schatten der Tatsache; gleichsam das, was 
der Tatsache am nächsten kommt. Wir haben gesagt, daß man damit die Frage nur einen Schritt 
weiter zurückführt. Diese Idee eines Schattens hat mehrere Ursprünge. Einer davon ist dieser: wir 
sagen: „Gewiß können zwei Sätze aus verschiedenen Sprachen denselben Sinn haben“; und wir 
argumentieren: deßhalb ist der Sinn nicht daßelbe wie der Satz“, und fragen: „Was ist der Sinn?“ Und 
wir machen aus „ihm“ ein Schattenwesen, eines der vielen, die wir erschaffen, wenn wir den 
Substantiven, denen kein körperlicher Gegenstand entspricht, Bedeutung geben wollen.
Ein anderer Ursprung der Idee, daß ein Schatten der Gegenstand unseres Denkens ist, ist 
dieser: Wir stellen uns vor, daß der Schatten ein Bild ist, dessen Intention nicht in Frage gestellt 
werden kann, das heißt ein Bild, das wir nicht deuten, um es zu verstehen, sondern das wir verstehen, 
ohne es zu deuten. Nun gibt es Bilder, von denen wir sagen würden, daß wir sie unmittelbar 
verstehen, ohne jede weitere Deutung. ...Der Schatten wie wir ihn uns vorstellen, ist ein Art Bild; er ist 
in der Tat einem Vorstellungsbild, daß sich vor unser geistiges Auge schiebt, sehr ähnlich; und dies 
wiederum ist einer gemalten Wiedergabe im gewöhnlichen Sinne nicht unähnlich. Einer der Ursprünge 
der Idee vom Schatten ist gewiß die Tatsache, daß in einigen Fällen das Sagen, Hören oder Lesen 
eines Satzes Vorstellungen vor unser geistiges Auge bringt; Vorstellungen, die dem Satz mehr oder 
weniger deutlich entsprechen, und die deßhalb in einem gewissen Sinne Übersetzungen dieses 
Satzes in eine Bildersprache sind. – Aber es ist absolut wesentlich, daß das Bild, als das wir uns den 
Schatten denken, das ist, was ich ein „Bild aufgrund von Ähnlichkeit“ nennen werde. Ich meine damit 
nicht, daß das Bild dem ähnlich ist, was es einer Absicht entsprechend Darstellen soll, sondern dass 
es ein korrektes Bild nur dann ist, wenn es dem ähnlich ist, was es darstellt. Für diese Art Bild könnte 
man das Wort „Kopie“ gebrauchen. Beiläufig gesprochen sind Kopien gute Bilder, wenn sie leicht mit 
dem verwechselt werden können, was sie darstellen.’ (BB
D
, p.63f.) 
 ‘…what we expect is not the fact, but a shadow of the fact; as it were, the next thing to the fact. We 
have said that this is only pushing the question one step further back. There are several origins to this 
idea of a shadow. One of them is this: we say "Surely two sentences of different languages can have 
the same sense"; and we argue, "therefore the sense is not the same as the sentence", and ask the 
question "What is the sense?" And we make of 'it' a shadowy being, one of the many which we create 
when we wish to give meaning to substantives to which no material objects correspond.
Another source of the idea of a shadow being the object of our thought is this: We imagine the 
shadow to be a picture the intention of which cannot be questioned, that is, a picture which we don't 
interpret in order to understand it, but which we understand without interpreting it. Now there are 
pictures of which we should say that we interpret them, that is, translate them into a different kind of 
picture, in order to understand them; and pictures of which we should say that we understand them 
immediately, without any further interpretation. …The shadow, as we think of it, is some sort of a 
picture; in fact, something very much like an image which comes before our mind's eye; and this again 
is something not unlike a painted representation in the ordinary sense. A source of the idea of the 
shadow certainly is the fact that in some cases saying, hearing, or reading a sentence brings images 
before our mind's eye, images which more or less strictly correspond to the sentence, and which are 
therefore, in a sense, translations of this sentence into a pictorial language.--But it is absolutely 
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essential for the picture which we imagine the shadow to be that it is what I shall call a "picture by 
similarity". I don't mean by this that it is a picture similar to what it is intended to represent, but that it is 
a picture which is correct only when it is similar to what it represents. One might use for this kind of 
picture the word "copy". Roughly speaking, copies are good pictures when they can easily be 
mistaken for what they represent.’ (BB, p.36f)
These remarks shed some light on the inherent appeal of the above lines of 
argument. By assuming that the last interpretation is a picture, which represents by 
virtue of its similarity to the real thing, this line of thought side steps the question as to 
the possibility of representations. Thus, the dilemma here is that while an explanatory 
model based on invoking the idea of an inner picture leads to an infinite regress, an 
explanation that does not involve a surrogate for mental content
196
 fails to be 
explanatory. 
Finally, the central representationalist claim that inner mental representations 
are the inner termini of the causal chains of action is incompatible with the 
identification of mental representations with content. This is because 
representationalism assumes that the causally relevant properties of inner states are 
due to their first-order physical properties. In order for mental representations to 
possess these properties, however, they are to be conceived of as concrete states of 
or within a body. Contents, on the other hand, do not have any physical properties. 
Only the bearers of content-laden mental states – i.e., human beings – do. Thus, if 
the above line of argument is pursued, mental representations could not fulfil their 
hypothesized causal role in the explanation of thought processes. 
On the Notion of Self-Interpreting Inner Mental Representations
In order to escape the problems following in the wake of the explanatory 
strategy outlined above, most contemporary forms of representationalism conceive of 
inner mental representations as self-interpreting. This approach is inspired by 
modern computer technology
197
. The general idea is that mental representations can 
be ascribed a role analogous to the role of the internal tokens or symbols which 
constitute machine languages. These internal tokens are bound by rules of syntax. 
196
 I.e., Inner mental representations.
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 Because computer technology provides the basis for this explanatory strategy contemporary 
representationalist theories of mind are often referred to as computationalist theories of mind.
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Like the higher-level input/output languages, which programmers use to program 
computers (e.g., Basic, Pascal, Fortran, C
++
), they possess a representational 
character. Yet, in contrast to these programming languages they do not necessitate 
interpretation by a compiler. If this was the case, one would end up with a ‘compiler 
regress’ because compilers are written in machine languages. However, due to the 
engineering design of computers, the internal tokens of machine languages are 
“understood” by computers without compilation. As a consequence, the causally 
relevant properties of the internal tokens or symbols correspond to their syntax by 
design. The correspondence between symbols and syntax is, as it were, assumed to 
be design immanent. As a result, it is the causal relations existing between the 
internal tokens or symbols of machine languages which underlie the syntactical 
interpretation of the higher level input. In The Language of Thought Fodor describes 
this scenario as follows: 
‘Real computers characteristically use at least two different languages: and input/output 
language in which they communicate with their environment and a machine language in which 
they talk to themselves…`Compilers´ mediate between the two languages…What avoids an 
infinite regression of compilers is the fact that the machine is built to use the machine 
language. Roughly, the machine language differs from the input/output language in that its 
formulae correspond directly to computationally relevant physical states and operations of the 
machine. The physics of the machine thus guarantees that the sequences of states and 
operations it runs through in the course of its computations respect the semantic constraints 
on formulae in its internal language.’
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Although this fancy bit of speculative psychology provides an outline of how mental 
representations could be governed syntactically, and also intimates how mental 
representations could instigate action by invoking the existence of causal relations 
between them, the computer analogy still leaves intentionality essentially 
unexplained. While it depicts how mental representations might be syntactically 
governed, it fails to answer questions regarding their semantics or their content. The 
central problem – to explain how inner states can be about anything – remains 
unexplained. Importantly, this issue is not solved by extending the computer analogy 
in suggesting a simple causal theory of mental content
199
. Even if one granted the 
198
 Fodor (1975) p.65f
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 While gong beyond the basic computer analogy, such a theory assume that mental representations 
not only to stand in causal relations to each other (e.g. internal causal relations, which assumedly 
constitute the syntax of mental representations), but also to objects in the external world.
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inclusion of the assumption that mental representations also stand in causal relations 
to the external world, the model would still fail to explain how the mental 
representations come to possess intentionality. In addition, it has also not 
demonstrated how the systematicity or normativity of content could be accounted for.
Fodor´s LOT hypothesis takes the form of a descriptive causal theory in order 
to address these issues further. Causal descriptive theories of content are inspired by 
the idea that effects can sometimes carry information about their causes. For 
example, the yellowish tone of David’s skin indicates liver dysfunction, or Samantha’s 
yellow teeth are indicative of excessive smoking and immoderate caffeine 
consumption. Yet, a simple causal theory, which identifies mental content with 
whatever causes, will not do as it fails to account for the normativity of content. In 
particular, causal theories fail to provide an account for situations in which 
entertaining a mental representation corresponds to a false belief. In the context of 
simple causal theories, misrepresentation would be impossible. In order to address 
this problem, Jerry Fodor has proposed that the causal relations, which constitute the 
content of mental representations, are to be defined as those relation upon which the 
causal relations which correspond to error, depend asymmetrically
200
. Here, the 
content of mental representations is determined by independent causal relations, 
while errors correspond to dependent causal relations. But is this really enough to 
account for the normativity of content? Not it seems, if one focuses on the aspect of 
systematicity. Despite the fact that Fodor’s theory fulfils the requirement’s of Evan’s 
Generality Constraint
201
 by invoking the idea of a LOT, it still seems to fall short with 
regard to the fact that contents stand in relations of support, compatibility and 
contradiction. This aspect of systematicity is problematic, as it provides further 
normative constraints. Consequently, a descriptive causal theory
202
, which only 
explains how misrepresentation is possible, is not enough. Rather, it also needs to 
offer an explanation of how one belief can imply, contradict or support another. Thus, 
if I observe that there is one bulldog (Achilles) sleeping at the top end of my bed and 
another bulldog (Giacomo) curled up at the bottom of my bed, I can rightly draw the 
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 See: Fodor (1987, 1991)
201
 Evans defined his notion of generality constraint as follows: ‘If a subject can be credited with the 
thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is 
G, for every property of being G of which he has a conception. This is the condition that I call “The 
Generality Constraint”.’ (see Evans (1980), p.104ff).’
202
I.e., an asymmetric dependence theory.
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conclusion that there are two bulldogs enjoying the comforts of my nightly refuge. 
Can Fodor´s descriptive causal theory provide an explanation for this rational 
systematicity? In the present case of logically related thoughts, it should be able to 
give an account of how the right logical conclusion is possible. But on close scrutiny, 
Fodor´s theory seems to lack the resources to do so. Although the distinction 
between independent and dependent causal connections among mental 
representations is useful in so far as the explanation of the correct result is 
concerned (because it allows to distinguish between the correct conclusion and 
random error), the idea that the demands of rationality and independent causal 
relations must coincide is not justified. This belief is implicit, however, in the 
distinction between independent and dependent causal relations between mental 
representations as it presumes that independent causal relations track the right norm. 
It is not unreasonable, for example, to imagine an individual who is disposed to 
making systematic errors in drawing the wrong conclusions from her thoughts 
(beliefs, views, convictions etc). There is no guarantee that causation and rationality 
will go hand in hand. Furthermore, a similar criticism also applies to the rule 
governing the representation or naming of observable states of affairs. The notion 
that whatever is the independent cause of a mental representation is part of its 
content is the initial driving force behind the asymmetric dependency theory. But its 
plausibility is questionable as there is no reason to assume that the independent 
cause of a mental representation is part of its content. Thus, correctness cannot be 
guaranteed merely in virtue of assumed characteristics of independent causal
relations. Consequently, in the overall scheme of things, the reductive explanation of 
mental content is questionable as purely causal processes consistently fail to account 
for the normativity of content and related aspects like its systematicity.
There are two lessons to be learnt here: On the one hand, explanations of 
content must not merely presuppose the very notion they aim to explain by 
presupposing the content of a mental sign or symbol. On the other hand, the kind of 
causal theory suggested by Fodor fails to account for both the normativity as well as 
the systematicity of content. Although, Fodor’s computational theory of mind is just 
one example of a causal theory of content
203
 (although a very poplar and influential 
203
 There are other causal theories of content, e.g. teleological theories. However, teleological theories 
share with causal descriptive theories of content the assumption that mental content can be explained 
by postulating internal mental representations that stand in causal relations to things in the world.
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one), and the previous discussion has not shown that reduction is utterly impossible, 
the lessons learnt from this investigation give such an endeavour very little chance 
for success. If anything, the burden to demonstrate that such an account is possible 
lies with the champions of such an endeavour. 
3.  On the Representationalist Account of the Intentionality of Linguistic 
Meaning
The problem of intentionality has troubled philosophers of the analytic as well 
as the continental traditions. Yet, it is within the tradition of analytic philosophy in 
particular, that intentionality has attracted considerable attention not only in the 
context of the mind, but also in the context of language. Analytic philosophers have 
come to think of intentionality as a property of language and linguistic behaviour as 
well as regarding it as a defining feature of mind and thought (beliefs, desires, etc). 
Statements, no less than beliefs can be about a something and posses content. For 
example, both my belief that “Edgar Dega’s painting Dancers in Blue is the perfect 
depiction of female grace and beauty without being chauvinist”, and my brother’s 
gleeful remark that (our puppy bulldog) “Giacomo has been chewing on your Strat 
again”, are characterised by being about something
204
. Consequently, the question
arises how the intentionality of thought and the intentionality of language are related? 
In the representationalist setting of the cognitive view, it is assumed that 
linguistic meaning derives from mental content, and that the latter can be naturalized 
(see above). By explaining the intentionality of language via the intentionality of 
thought one arrives at a reductionist account of both mental and linguistic 
intentionality. Descriptive causal theories of intentionality, as exemplified by Fodor 
(1975)
205
, hold that words stand immediately for inner mental representations in the 
mind of the speaker or hearer, and mediately for the items in reality, which are the 
original causes of the ideas with which the mind is furnished. On such an account, 
204
A state of mind and a matter of fact, respectively.
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 Note: Fodor’s position with regard to the explanatory strategy of linguistic and mental content is in 
fact somewhat ambivalent. Consequently, Fodor can’t quite be put into either the mentalist (e.g. 
Hume, Russell, Evans and Peacocke) nor the lingualist camp (e.g. Davidson, Dummett and 
McDowell). On the one hand, Fodor explains even simple behaviour by reference to a rich variety of 
complex thoughts and calculations, on the other he holds that these thoughts are sentences in a 
language of thought, a language which is not public but consists of physical tokens of computational 
types in the brain.  
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the intentionality of language is derived from the intentionality of thought and thought-
constituents. 
It is best to start the investigation into this question by examining the driving 
force behind the causal representationalist account. Two sources of puzzlement can 
be readily identified: First, bewilderment arises out of the fact that while we recognize 
words and sentences as spatio-temporal items, and thus as part of the furniture of 
the material world, we wonder how it is that a thing like a sound or a mark on paper 
can represent, i.e. be about something? Second, even more baffling seems the fact 
that we are not only able to talk about things that exist, but also about things that do 
not exist. And, not only can we represent things in language which are true, but also 
things which are not (e.g. PI§518). Thus, the question arises how it is that statements 
can be false, yet still be meaningful?
‘Wenn man fragt “Wie macht der Satz das, dass er darstellt?“ so könnte die Antwort sein:       
„Weißt du es denn nicht? Du siehst es doch, wenn du ihn benützt.“ Es ist ja nichts verborgen. 
Wie macht der Satz das? – Weißt du es denn nicht? Es ist ja nichts versteckt.
Aber auf die Antwort „Du weißt ja, wie es der Satz macht, es ist ja nichts verborgen“ 
möchte man erwidern: „Ja, aber es fließt alles so rasch vorüber, und ich möchte es gleichsam 
breiter auseinander gelegt sehen.“ (PI§435)
‘If it is asked: “How do sentences manage to represent?” – the answer might be: “Don´t you 
know? You certainly see it, when you use them.” For nothing is concealed. How do sentences 
do it? – Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden. But given this answer: “But you know how 
sentences do it, for nothing is concealed” one would like to retort “Yes, but it all goes by so 
quick, and I should like to see it as it were laid open to view.” (PI§435)
Bewildered, yet driven by a burning desire to give an account of intentionality, which 
can acclaim scientific credibility (PI§571), cognitive scientists readily postulated some 
kind of mental process, a causal mechanism, in order to explain this mysterious 
property of mind and language. On the one hand, this move is partly due to the 
subscription to the cognitive view. On the other, as psychological predicates of the 
kind I think, I believe, I hope, I want, I expect, I fear etc., indicate various different 
states of consciousness, and because these obtain independently of the use of 
language, cognitive scientists assume that signs per se are lifeless. It takes the 
activity of the mind (e.g. processes of thinking, meaning, understanding or intending) 
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by means of which signs obtain their intentionality
206
. Wittgenstein illustrates the 
appeal of the idea of mysterious mental processes with characteristic clarity:
‘Es scheint, daß es gewisse definitive geistige Vorgänge gibt, die mit dem Arbeiten der 
Sprache verbunden sind, Vorgänge, durch die allein die Sprach funktionieren kann. Ich meine 
die Vorgänge des Verstehens und Meinens. Die Zeichen unserer Sprache erscheinen tot on 
diese geistigen Vorgänge; und es könnte der Eindruck entstehen, dass es die einzige 
Funktion der Zeichen ist, solche Vorgänge hervorzurufen, und dass diese Vorgänge eigentlich 
das sind, wofür wir und interessieren sollten....Wir sind versucht zu denken, dass die Aktion 
der Sprache aus zwei Teilen besteht; einem inorganischen teil, dem handhaben von Zeichen, 
und einem organischen teil, den wir verstehen, Meinen, Deuten und denken dieser Zeichen 
bezeichnen können. Diese letzteren Tätigkeiten scheinen in einer seltsamen Art von Medium 
stattzufinden, dem Geist.’ (BB
D
, p. 18f.)
‘It seems that there are certain definite mental processes bound up with the working of 
language, processes through which alone language can function. I mean the processes of 
understanding and meaning. The signs of our language seem dead without these mental 
processes; and it might seem that the only function of the signs is to induce such processes, 
and that these are the things we ought really to be interested in…We are tempted to think that 
the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an 
organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, 
thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind. (BB
E
, 
p.3)’
Further puzzlement is added by the fact that while I do not have to interpret my 
thoughts in order to find out what I think, believe, expect, fear etc. the situation 
appears to be different when I am at the receiving end. The same appears to be true 
with regard to the interpretation of words. While I do not have to interpret my own 
words, when I express what I think, believe, expect, fear etc., it appears that my 
interlocutor needs to do so. That is, when I hear and understand the remarks of 
another person (e.g. when I break out in panic after my brother has reported 
Giacomo’s mutilation of my Strat), in the context of the cognitive view, it  seems that I 
do so in virtue of an underlying mechanism of understanding.
‘ “Wenn ich sage ‘Ich habe Schmerzen’, weise ich nicht auf eine Person, die Schmerzen hat, 
da ich in gewissem Sinne gar nicht weiß, wer sie hat.“ Und das lässt sich rechtfertigen. Denn 
vor allem: Ich sage ja nicht, die und die Person habe Schmerzen, sondern „Ich habe...“. Nun, 
206
 See: Hacker (1996) p.3
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damit nenne ich ja keine Person. So wenig wie dadurch, dass ich vor Schmerzen stöhne. 
Obwohl der Andre aus dem Stöhnen ersieht, wer Schmerzen hat.
Was heißt es denn: wissen, wer Schmerzen hat? Es heiß z.B., wissen, welcher 
Mensch in diesem Zimmer Schmerzen hat: also, der dort sitzt, oder, der in dieser Ecke steht, 
der Lange mit den blonden haaren dort, etc. – Worauf will ich hinaus? Darauf, dass es sehr 
verschiedene Kriterien der Identität der Person gibt.
Nun, welches ist es, das mich bestimmt, zu sagen ich hab Schmerzen? Gar keins.’ 
(PI§404)
‘When I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I 
have no idea who is." And this can be given a justification. For the main point is: I did not say 
that such-and-such a person was in pain, but "I am....." Now in saying this I don't name any 
person. Just as I don't name anyone when I groan with pain. Though someone else sees who
is in pain from the groaning.
 What does it mean to know who is in pain? It means, for example, to know which man in this 
room is in pain: for instance, that it is the one who is sitting over there, or the one who is 
standing in that corner, the tall one over there with the fair hair, and so on.--What am I getting 
at? At the fact that there is a great variety of criteria for personal 'identity'.
           Now which of them determines my saying that 'I' am in pain? None. (PI§404)
‘Muß ich einen Befehl verstehen, ehe ich nach ihm handeln kann? – Gewiß! Sonst wüsstest ja 
nicht, was du zu tun hast. – Aber vom Wissen zum Tun ist ja wieder ein Sprung! (PI§505)
‘Must I understand an order before I can act on it?--Certainly, otherwise you wouldn't know 
what you had to do!--But isn't there in turn a jump from knowing to doing?’ (PI§505)
Importantly, while all understanding appears to involve some sort of interpretation 
within the shadow of this picture, misunderstanding is thought to be the result of 
misinterpretation, and the failure to understand is thought to be the result of a failure 
to interpret.
Throughout the history of philosophy, various suggestions have been made 
with regard to the nature of a mechanism of understanding. Classical empiricist 
philosophers favoured an imagist account of communication
207
, in contrast to the 
computationalist account of modern cognitive science. The modern version involves, 
for example, the attribution of implicit knowledge by virtue of a theory of interpretation 
to members of a language community. Such a theory, it is believed, is grounded in 
207
I.e., by conceiving of speech as a means to engender images or idea in the mind of the hearer.
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the abstract computational mechanism by means of which the meaning of an 
utterance is computed. Common to both traditions, however, is the notion that in 
order for mere signs to be conveyed successfully interpretive acts of understanding 
accompany the hearing or reading of those signs.
“Zwischen dem Befehl und der Ausführung ist eine Kluft. Sie muss durch das Verstehen
geschlossen werden.“ „Erst im verstehen heißt es, dass wir DAS zu tun haben. Der Befehl –
das sind ja nur Laute, Tintenstriche.-“ (PI§431)
"There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled by the act of 
understanding." "Only in the act of understanding is it meant that we are to do THIS. The 
order--why, that is nothing but sounds, ink-marks.--" (PI§431)
In the grip of this picture, the pressing question seems to be by what 
mechanism does the mind generate and exercise these representational powers? 
Yet, the futility of descriptive causal theories has been outlined above. Again, we are 
also reminded of the implausibility idea of a process thought, which was thought to 
underlie thoughtful and thoughtless speech. The prospect for success of the 
endeavour to give a general account of linguistic content by reference to another 
hypothesized mental process (i.e. understanding) thus seems doubtful at best. 
However, for the sake of clarity and completeness it is not only necessary to track 
down the confusions underlying the modern account of linguistic content, but also to 
rob them of their appeal by dispelling the underlying misunderstandings.
3.1 Understanding the Life of Signs – On Mental Symbols and Physical 
Processes
The representationalist characterisation of mental states as ontologically 
independent freestanding states of mind and body, applies to the understanding no 
less than to intentional mental states in general. This conception raises the question  
what the connection between my understanding a certain concept and my correct 
application of the concept consists in. In other words, when we understand an 
expression that has been explained to us, what happens that enables us to go on 
and use the expression correctly? As outlined above, representationalists attempt to 
explain, linguistic meaning – the life of signs – through the execution of (causal) 
mental processes such as, e.g., intending and understanding, implemented in the 
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physical symbol system of the mind. But is it plausible to assume that the possession 
and processing of mental symbols provide the foundation of understanding? If we 
imagine, for example, that we were trying to continue a mathematical series of the 
sort n+2, our understanding of what the numbers in this series should be could not 
consist in having a formula constituted by mental symbols in the mind. Neither could 
it consist in reminding oneself continuously that the differences between successive 
mathematical series should be the same. This is because both the formula, a well as 
the reminder could be misinterpreted and misapplied. The correct use of such mental 
signs is in the same need of specification as the correct use of written signs. 
Consequently, it is not possible to explain the understanding that governs the 
continuation of a written series by invoking the notion of mental signs and symbols. It 
is not possible to account for the understanding of a rule, which governs the use of a 
concept or (as in the example above) of a written mathematical series, by invoking 
the idea of a physical symbol system in the mind. This is a key objection against the 
representationalist endeavour in as far as it posits the question what would determine 
the correct interpretation of a particular mental state (i.e. how would I know what 
state I am in) if the understanding is identified with entertaining an inner mental 
representation or the interaction of various mental representations? The very 
question one sets out to explain remains unanswered.
‘Wir versuchen nun, den seelischen Vorgang des Verstehens, der sich, scheint es, hinter 
jenen gröbern und uns daher in die Augen allenden Begleiterscheinungen versteckt, zu 
erfassen. Aber das gelingt nicht. Oder, richtiger gesagt: Es kommt gar nicht zu einem 
wirklichen Versuch. Denn auch angenomen, ich hätte etwas gefuden, was in allen jenen 
Fällen des Verstehens geschähe,- warum sollte das nun das Verstehen sein? Ja, wie konnte 
denn der Vorgang des verstehen versteckt sein, wenn ich doch sagte „Jetzt verstehe ich“, weil 
ich verstand? Und wenn ich sage, er ist verstckt,- wie weiß ich denn, wonach ich zu suchen 
habe? Ich bin in einem Wirrwarr.’ (PI§153)
‘We are trying to get hold of the mental process of understanding which seems to be hidden 
behind those coarser and therefore more readily visible accompaniments. But we do not 
succeed; or, rather, it does not get as far as a real attempt. For even supposing I had found 
something that happened in all those cases of understanding,--why should it be the 
understanding? And how can the process of understanding have been hidden, when I said 
"Now I understand" because I understood?! And if I say it is hidden--then how do I know what 
I have to look for? I am in a muddle.’ (PI§153)
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‘Aber halt!- wenn “jetzt verstehe ich das System” nicht das gleiche sagt, wie “mir fällt die 
Formel....ein“ (oder „ich spreche die Formel aus“, „ich schreibe si auf“, etc.) -  folgt daraus, 
daß ich den Satz „jetzt verstehe ich...“, oder „jetzt kann ich fortsetzen“, als Beschreibung eines 
Vorgangs verwende, der hinter, oder neben dem des Aussprechens der formel besteht?
Wenn etwas „hinter dem Aussprechen der Formel“ stehen muß, so sind es gewisse 
Umstände, die mich berechtigen, zu sagen, ich könne fortsetzen,- wenn mir die Formel 
einfällt.
Denk doch einmal gar nicht an das Verstehen als „seelischen Vorgang“! – Denn das
ist die redeweise, die dich verwirrt. Sondern frage dich: in was für einem Fall, unter was für 
Umständen sagen wir denn „Jetzt weiß ich weiter“? Ich meine, wenn mir die Formel 
eingefallen ist. –
In dem Sinne, in welchem es für das Verstehen charakteristische Vorgänge (auch 
seelische Vorgänge) gibt, ist das verstehen kein seelischer Vorgang. (Das Ab- und Zunehmen 
einer Schmerzempfindung, das Hören einer Melodie, eines Satzes: seelische Vorgänge.) 
(PI§154)
‘But wait--if "Now I understand the principle" does not mean the same as "The formula.... 
occurs to me" (or "I say the formula", "I write it down", etc.)--does it follow from this that I 
employ the sentence "Now I understand....." or "Now I can go on" as a description of a 
process occurring behind or side by side with that of saying the formula?
If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is particular circumstances, 
which justify me in saying I can go on--when the formula occurs to me. 
Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.--For that is the expression which 
confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, 
"Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?--
 In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are 
characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process.
 (A pain's growing more and less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental 
processes.)’ (PI§154)
Furthermore, even if understanding a concept was accompanied by some 
mental process or other, understanding itself could not consist in that process, 
because such a process would be neither necessary nor sufficient in meeting the 
normativity constraint of content. Rather, the justification for the claim that someone 
has grasped a rule must be founded on the success in applying the rule. This can be 
clarified by considering the case of reading. The ability to read cannot be defined by 
any characteristic mental accompaniment or process, as it is an unmediated relation 
of text and speech only. The driving force of this claim rests on the fact that the ability 
to read is justified on the grounds of repeated manifested success. And so is the 
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understanding of a word. Whether, I have understood a word or not is shown in the 
way I apply it, i.e. whether I consistently apply the word according to the rules for its 
use, or whether I fail in doing so.  Neither a mental phenomenon nor a mental 
process, which someone who learns to read may entertain, is necessary or sufficient 
in settling the question what determines someone’s ability to read. In other words, 
rule following cannot be accounted for in terms of accompanying mental processes.
Finally, to think of the understanding as a (mental) process, constitutes a 
transgression of the grammar of the concept to understand. The mistake under 
scrutiny here is, in Rylean terms, a category mistake. And, as Wittgenstein himself 
points out, it is as mistaken to conceive of the understanding as a mental process as 
it is to conceive of the number three as an object (PG§42). The nature of this error is 
best highlighted by investigating the use of the concept in everyday language
208
. It 
has been pointed out earlier, for example, that processes are characterised by a 
sequence of events or actions, which may or may not be interrupted, repetitive, 
elegant etc. (see chapter IV). The quintessence of these reflections was that 
processes take time. It has also been acknowledged that Wittgenstein was far from 
denying the existence of mental processes, if such talk was meant to refer to a 
process like, for example, reciting E.A. Poe’s The Raven in my mind on my way to 
the library, or assessing the size for the market of golf balls in the US (in my mind), 
whilst waiting for Cécile at the cinema. These few remarks suffice to underline the 
claim that understanding is not a (mental) process, in the sense implied by the 
cognitive view. Although, it is true that when I attend a philosophy lecture, or watch a 
dancesport competition, I undergo a different experience (or set of experiences), 
which are crucially different from those experienced by someone who has not studied 
philosophy, or who is not well acquainted with the sophistications and intricacies of 
Modern Ballroom and Latin dancing. Importantly though, these experiences are not 
characteristic marks or criteria of understanding. They may vary from case to case, 
and from person to person. Even if such experiences were characteristic of 
understanding, it would not constitute understanding, as others do not ascertain 
themselves of my understanding of philosophy or dancesport by discovering what 
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 Note: In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s identifies and discusses a number of 
misconceptions regarding the understanding (e.g. the conception of understanding as an experience, 
disposition etc.). However, the following will only survey examples of understanding, which pertain to 
the conception of understanding as a mental process, which is of direct relevance to the investigation 
of the cognitive view.  
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processes accompanied my listening to the lecturer or my watching the couples on 
the floor.  A mental process is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding (see 
also above). 
What indicates whether I possess an understanding of philosophy may be 
determined, for example, by my ability to answer questions pertaining to the subject 
coherently and intelligently, or whether I can assess and explain the relative 
significance and virtues of different philosophical positions (or lack thereof).  
Alternatively, whether I possess any expertise with regard to Ballroom and Latin 
dancing, may be displayed in conversations about the quality and proficiency of 
Beata’s backstep(s) in the Rumba, or the rhythmical expressivities of Bryan’s cha-
cha-cha or Pino’s Tango, which I frequently engage in with my friends. Moreover, 
whether Nick, Tim, Dave or I have any understanding of Ballroom and Latin dancing 
may (to the connoisseur) also be evident in the aspects of the dancing, which we 
appreciate versus the aspects, which we may fail to appreciate
209
.  These examples, 
underline the crucial difference between the criteria indicating understanding and the 
criteria indicating what is going on in my mind or brain. Somebody who is interested 
in finding out whether I understand anything about philosophy or dancesport, for 
example, is not interested in what is going on ‘inside me’, as it were, i.e. what I am 
undergoing. What that somebody is interested in lies in what I can do. In contrast to a 
process, understanding something is not interruptible, like my recital of The Raven or 
my assessing of the US golf ball market (which is). Wittgenstein points out that, 
‘Man sagt wohl überhaupt kaum, man habe etwas seit gestern “ununterbrochen” geglaubt, 
verstanden, beabsichtigt. Eine Unterbrechung des Glaubens wäre eine Zeit des Unglaubens, 
nicht z.B. die Abwendung der Aufmerksamkeit von dem Geglaubten, z.B. der Schlaf. 
(Unterschied zwischen „knowing“ und „being aware of“.) (Z§85)
‘One hardly ever says that one has believed, understood, intended something 
"uninterruptedly" since yesterday. An interruption of belief would be a period of unbelief, not 
e.g. the withdrawal of attention from what one believes--e.g. sleep.
(Difference between 'knowing' and 'being aware of'.)  (Z§85)
209
 Although it is practically impossible not to note Beata’s fine aspects, i.e. qualities, which are evident 
even to those uninitiated to the world of competitive dancesport.
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The same goes for understanding. The best approximation to an interruption of the 
process variety in the case of understanding is the temporary loss of understanding, 
or failure to understand, but not an interruption of the process due to withdrawal of 
attention
210
. With these examples in mind, one is able to appreciate the folly in the 
association of the understanding with a process more clearly. My sudden 
understanding of Cécile’s rapid French, which I usually struggle with, is neither an 
articulated process like Cécile’s speaking in French (e.g. the utterance of a 
sentence), nor is it an unarticulated process. It is not a process at all. Similarly, 
understanding the intricacies of Modern Ballroom and Latin dancing is an ability, 
which has been gradually acquired over time, rather than a process with a 
characteristic beginning, middle and end. Finally, my sudden understanding of the 
rules of the game, which the children outside my window are playing and which I 
failed to grasp on initial observation, is not something, which goes on, as processes 
do. It may happen in an instant, and last as short or as long as I care to watch or care 
to remember.
Although the present discussion of the representationalist strategy regarding 
the conception of understanding as a mental process provides some crucial insights 
into the nature of the misunderstandings informing this view, an investigation into the 
confusions of this conception would not be complete without trying to understand the 
origins of this illusion. First, as Peter Hacker points out, the temptation to conceive of 
understanding as a process is partly due to the similarity between the beginning of a 
process and the dawning of understanding. Yet, although the genesis of one’s 
understanding of something or somebody may be accompanied by a characteristic 
experience as on occasions when “the penny drops”, this event does not mark the 
beginning of a process. Furthermore, while the gradual acquisition of an ability may 
be process like
211
, as in the case of mastering a complex technique, for example, the 
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 See: Baker & Hacker (2005), p.370 
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 For example, in cases where this involves the mastery of a calculus such as the multiplication 
table, a system of rules like those underlying the conjugation of Latin verbs. In these cases, the 
relative state of proficiency can easily be described as insufficient, not bad, moderate, good, excellent 
etc, and thus like a process can be partitioned into distinct phases. In other cases, however, as in the 
acquisition of expertise in Ballroom or Latin dancing, the gradual acquisition of understanding is less 
process like. Although, my understanding of aspects of Ballroom and Latin dancing may equally be 
said to be insufficient, moderate, good, or excellent, the transition between the respective phases is a 
lot less clear cut than in the case of mastering a calculus. Binary value, I either have it, or not. And 
while there may be a definite beginning to my acquisition of expertise in Ballroom and Latin dancing, 
on the day when I too my first steps on a dance floor, for example, the development of my 
understanding is an ongoing thing.    
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process is not the understanding. Rather, the understanding is the successful 
outcome of the process
212
. Second, there is the temptation of conceiving of 
understanding other people as involving interpretation, and hence to think of 
understanding as a process (see 2.1 above). Yet, it is not possible to interpret a 
sequence of signs that is unintelligible to one. One can only ask for it to be translated 
or deciphered by someone familiar with the underlying ‘grammar’ of the symbolism. 
Interpretation thus presupposes understanding, but it cannot explain. While 
interpreting is an activity or process, understanding is not
213
.  
3.2 On the Nature of the Understanding
The concept of understanding is a fluid one, Wittgenstein observed early on in 
his reflections on the subject (PG§5). The broad ramifications and opaque 
boundaries of the use of the concept alluded to by Wittgenstein in this remark, call for 
patience when investigating its grammar, and stipulate a careful scrutiny of those 
concepts, which stand in close proximity. The first steps towards gaining an insight 
into the nature of the concept of understanding have already been taken, by 
undermining its association with a mental process. This part of the present 
investigation has highlighted the proximity of the concept of understanding with the 
concept of ability:
‘Die Grammatik des Wortes “wissen” ist offenbar eng verwandt der Grammatik der Worte 
„können“, „imstande sein“. Aber auch eng verwandt der des Wortes „verstehen“. (Eine 
Technik „beherrschen“.) (PI§150)
‘The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But 
also closely related to that of "understands". ('Mastery' of a technique,).’ (PI§150) 
There exists a definite affinity between the words “can”, “is able to” and 
“understands”. Yet, while this remark goes some way in underlining the suggested 
relationship between understanding and ability, the identification of understanding 
with an ability turns out to be a overhasty generalization on close scrutiny, which is 
thus to be avoided
214
. Like abilities, understanding what a word means lacks genuine 
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 Baker & Hacker (2005), p.370
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 ibid. p.371
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 See also: Baker (2003), p.357
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duration. This is in contrast to the fore mentioned processes as well as to mental 
states or experiences, for example. A person who understands, is able to do certain 
things, Baker and Hacker
215
 remind us. Yet, they emphasize that to simply categorize 
understanding, as ability is misleading. Rather, they highlight the fact that 
Wittgenstein was more comfortable with the idea of thinking of understanding as 
being akin to an ability. This formulation acknowledges that understanding indicates 
ability in the majority of its uses, but leaves plenty of room for the exemptions to the 
rule, as it were
216
.
First, if understanding is conceived of as an ability proper, it is not an ability to 
do one single type or class of things. This is an important differentiator, which sets 
understanding apart from a number of abilities, even though this does by no means 
extend to abilities in their entirety. As German is my mother tongue, I obviously have 
little difficulty in understanding sentences formulated in German. This is exhibited, by 
my ability to paraphrase them, explain them, translate them, respond to them in 
appropriate ways etc.. Likewise, a politician who understands people can make 
himself popular, can appreciate their wants and needs, can recognize their motives 
and win their favour in an election, for example. This variety of abilities instantiates 
the various shapes and forms which understanding may take, and thus highlights the 
numerous criteria signalling understanding.
Second, it has been pointed out that understanding tends to be more passive 
than some of the abilities who have the same object
217
. While I am able to 
understand Italian, my ability to speak Italian is, comparatively speaking, non-
existent. Thus, while I can understand an Italian sentence, and explain what it 
means, I may still be unable to speak Italian. Similarly, the fact that there are more 
high profile Ballroom and Latin judges than there have been World Champions in 
these discipline indicates, that understanding Ballroom and Latin dancing is not the 
same as the ability to dance a World Class Tango, Foxtrot, Cha-Cha or Jive. 
Moreover, it is important to note that there are degrees of understanding, which are 
not manifested in the degrees to which an ability is possessed. For example, it is 
unfortunate but true that despite my continuously increasing understanding of 
215
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Ballroom and Latin dancing, is not matched by my ability to dance a (better) cha-cha-
cha, or Jive. Degrees of understanding do not necessitate increased proficiency in 
some activity. Thus, while the grammar of the concept of understanding runs parallel 
to the concept of ability for a while, the understanding is not identical with an ability.
Understanding is not a mental process
218
, but is best conceived of as enjoying a 
close relationship with being able to do something
219
. 
4. Mental and Linguistic Content Revisited
Thus far, the present investigation has shown the implausibility of the claim 
that the correct application of concepts over time is based on a mental process of 
understanding. In the previous chapter an outline of a positive account of mental and 
linguistic content has been sketched. In the context of this account, concepts were 
identified as the building blocks of content and the crucial role of the subject of 
experience as a concept user has been highlighted (see chapter V). The following 
discussion will underline and further substantiate these insights by suggesting an 
understanding of the normativity of mental and linguistic content as being shaped in 
interpersonal contexts of rule guided activities. 
4.1 Rules and the Normativity of Content
Following in the footsteps of Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the 
previous discussion of judgements and concepts has emphasized the fact that a 
concept is a normatively constrained function of judgement, which are tied to rule-
governed practices involving the terms of a natural language. For someone to grasp 
a concept, is for someone to respond in a principled or rule-governed way, and to 
acknowledge that there is a way of going right and going wrong. The mastery of a 
concept is displayed by exercising one’s ability to judge the applicability or 
inapplicability of a given concept across various situations and circumstances. On 
this view, concepts are independent of the mind of any given subject. They are 
neither Platonic entities nor private Cartesian ideas. Above all, they are not inner 
mental representations processed in a language of thought. Rather, a subject 
218
 Nor a metal state, or experience (see footnote 24, for details).
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masters a concept, when he applies rule-governed techniques of responding to the 
world. For example, if in responding to the behaviour of my English bulldog Giacomo 
I use the word ‘Giacomo’ to describe what he is doing, and my use of the word is 
correct and displays the correct links to other areas of discourse, I can self-ascribe 
the mastery of the word ‘Giacomo’
220
. The mastery of a concept, is essential to the 
ascription and self-ascription of propositional attitudes (PAs) involving a given 
concept. These constrains imply not only that there is a link between understanding 
and manifestation (on the basis of which the subject of experience has been 
characterized as an identifiable entity engaged in interpersonal activity) which 
accounts for the normativity of content, but also suggest a non-causal view of mental 
explanation and account of human action (see 4.2 below). One’s tendency to apply a 
certain concept can be well or ill grounded, and in using a concept one 
acknowledges and is answerable to a norm which governs whether one is right or 
wrong in applying the concept in question. Norms also govern the judgements in 
which a thought (comprising conceptual elements) is assessed for its truth. The 
subject judges that an item counts as an instance of a concept he is using, like 
‘guitar’, for instance,  and also judges whether the conceptually framed thought like 
e.g., ‘this guitar is a 1952 Gibson Les Paul Goldtop’, is true. In both cases the 
judgements implicitly answer to prescriptive norms.
At this point, it is important to be aware of the distinction between following a 
rule and merely responding in conformity with a rule. A subject who follows a rule, 
models his responses on the set of rules endorsed by fellow subjects of a given 
language community. A subject holds himself answerable to this set of rules, i.e. set 
of prescriptive norms. In doing so the subject not only acknowledges that there is a 
difference between going right or going wrong but also that his tendency to respond
thus and so can be evaluated for its correctness. Consequently, a subjects behaviour 
(under normal circumstances) is generally aimed at fulfilling a normative regularity. In 
contrast, someone might just feel an overwhelming urge to utter the word ‘guitar’
whenever such an instrument captures his glance. However, unless the subject is 
able to provide other members of the same language community with additional 
220
 Note: The links concerned do not constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for (self-) 
ascription of the mastery of a given concept, since the fact that ‘Giacomo’ is the name of an ‘English 
bulldog’ may be part of the full grasp of the word ‘Giacomo’, but may not be known by a child who is 
not yet able to distinguish between different breeds of dogs (although a child may correctly identify 
Giacomo as a dog), nor may it be known by adult individuals who don’t know a lot about dogs. 
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evidence
221
 for his mastery of the word  ‘guitar’, the automatic utterance of this word 
per se does not count as evidence for the subjects ability to apply the word ‘guitar’ 
correctly. Under such circumstances, it is quite plausible that while a subject acts in 
conformity with a rule, he does so unwittingly.  Thus, to answer to a prescriptive norm 
implies a certain self-awareness and self-control, which enables a subject to respond 
according to a shared standard of correctness. To master a concept is to possess a 
certain form of understanding, e.g. to master the concept of ‘English bulldog’ is to 
understand what it is for something to be an ‘English bulldog’. Consequently, to 
master the concept ‘English bulldog’, one must not only have an understanding of 
what an English bulldog is, what such a dog looks behaves like etc., but also know 
what the concept ‘English bulldog’ is to be applied to. 
The Intentionality of Language - Linguistic Meaning
‘Man kann für eine große Klasse von Fällen der Benützung des Wortes Bedeutung – wenn auch 
nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung – dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist 
sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.’ (PU§43)
‘For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can 
be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. …’ (PI§43)
The later Wittgenstein’s reflection on language provided the grounds on which his 
insights about the philosophy of psychology cold flourish. Wittgenstein’s ideas about 
concepts and rules were crucial to the earlier discussion of thinking and mental 
content as they not only provided us with an understanding of the intentional aspect 
of the mental, but also provided us with an account of the normativity and structure of 
mental content. In some of his lectures given in the early 1930s, Wittgenstein 
proposed an understanding of linguistic meaning, i.e. the meaning of words or 
concepts, as being determined by the rules for the use of that word (see: AWL 30), 
and as conceiving of the use of words in speech as a rule-governed activity. As 
outlined in chapter II, the rules for the use of a word constitute its grammar
222
.  In 
221
 An awareness (or unawareness) of mistakes of the application of the word ‘guitar’ , might count as 
such evidence for example. 
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‘To grammar belongs everything that determines sense, everything that has to be settled 
antecedently to questions about truth.’ Baker &Hacker (2005), p.145
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other words, the meaning of a word is given by explanations of meaning, which in 
turn are rules for the use of the word or concept in question (see e.g. PG 23, 133). 
Thus, rather than deriving their meaning from mental representations, words, 
concepts, linguistic expressions and utterances are given meaning by the rules 
governing their use. By linking meaning to rule governed practices which are 
endorsed by a community of language users (sharing a range of human activities or 
form of life) it is possible to give an account of linguistic meaning and the 
intentionality of language that is free of the confusions informing the notion of derived 
intentionality emerging in the context of the cognitive view. Linguistic meaning, thus 
understood, is intersubjective. Its relation to truth and falsehood is constituted by 
those practices through which the use of a word is defined and refined. Both the 
acquisition and the refinement are public and regulated by norms which regulate and 
guide the response of the individual.
4.2  Mental Explanation, Human Action and the Cognitive View
The dominant model of mental explanations is based on the notion of 
causality. It aims to explain human agency by reference to antecedent mental states 
and events, which stand in a causal relationship to human action. This explanatory 
strategy follows from one of the basic tenets of the cognitive view, the idea that 
mental representations constitute the inner termini of the causal chains that instigate 
action, thus implying some sort mechanical interaction between mental 
representations. In the guise of methodological solipsism
223
, for example, an agents 
mental events and states are thought of as the causes of actions. Furthermore, it is 
thought that the cognitive role of a given mental event or state determines its role in 
the explanation of action. Of course, the account of human agency proposed by the 
methodological solipsist, is incompatible with an analysis of mental content in which 
content ascriptions involve the world, and in which a subject’s responses to objects is 
developed through the acquisition and application of rules for the use of concepts
224
. 
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 Note: Methodological Solipsism has its origins in Hilary Putnam’s ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’. 
According to this view, the mental state of an individual does not presuppose the existence of another 
subject. It only presupposes the existence of the individual who is in a mental state of some sort. Thus, 
methodological solipsism ties mental ascriptions and their contents to (mental) states (i.e. tokenings of 
metal representations, in the context of the cognitive view)  in the thinker. 
224
 Note: The following discussion will only investigate the position of the methodological solipsist with 
regard to mental explanation and agency. While an important contribution to these issues has been 
made by Donald Davidson, a discussion of his ideas is beyond the scope of  the present investigation. 
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As PF Strawson has pointed out mechanical transactions are fundamental to our 
notion of causality. Consequently, it is not surprising that whenever the notion of 
causality is invoked, the notion of mechanical interaction is not far behind. It is in this 
way that some advocates of causal theories of mental explanation have, by way of 
metaphor, been lead to metaphysics:
‘…we should regard mechanical transactions as fundamental in our notion of causality in 
general….It is not then to be wondered at that such transactions supply a basic model when 
the theoretical search for causes is on; that we look for causal mechanisms; that, even when it 
is most clearly metaphorical, the language of mechanism pervades the language of causes in 
general, as in the phrases “causal connection”, “causal links” and “causal chain”.
225
This remark indicates that causal explanations only get a grip in cases where 
mechanical links between states and events provide a coherent story, e.g. in the 
context of an account where mechanical processes connect states and events. Yet, if 
one searches for corresponding mechanical links in the context of mental states and 
events a metaphysical mismatch ensues. In the preceding discussions of thinking 
and mental content it has been repeatedly highlighted that thoughts and their content 
depend on the way a subject uses concepts to structure his activity. But this aspect is 
not captured by an account in which (spatio-temporal) states and events interact with 
each other in a causal manner.  This line of argument has already been adopted by 
Kant, who also refuted the idea that content laden mental states, i.e. PAs, are causal 
states and that they obey physical laws. Wolff, for example, has pointed out that 
according to Kant, the paradigmatic case of rational action is a case in which a. I form 
a concept of some event, object or state of affairs, which I choose to bring into being, 
and b. I do something, which I believe will actualise that which my concept 
represents. Thus, subjects act in order to realize a certain goal or end. A subject that 
acts thus, acts according to its thoughts. Importantly, however, it acts in accord with 
his thoughts qua representations with cognitive significance, and not in accord with 
thoughts qua mental events, which have a temporal location and thus, phenomenal 
causes and effects
226
. Furthermore, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that:
225
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‘…in judging free actions wit regard to their causality we can only get as far as the intelligible 
cause, but not beyond it. (CrPR, B585)’
227
This view is compatible with the results of the recent investigation into thought 
and thinking, which suggested that thoughts are not bits of reality, and that having a 
thought is not possessing some thing which stands in a material relationship to other 
extra-mental things, but is rather to be understood as an interlocking network of rule-
governed abilities (if one feels the need to give a “general account” of thinking). On 
the other hand, Kant disputes that explanations of action necessitate references to 
rational determinations or reasons of the acting subject. Rather, in the light of Kant’s 
reasoning an explanation of action needs to put the reasoning subject at the centre, 
by focusing on his judgements, i.e. his use of concepts, as the source of action.  
A correct explanation of action, necessitating reference to the actual reasons 
underlying a subjects behaviour, highlights the connection that exists between the 
ascriptions others make of an acting subject and the subject actions as such. This 
connection is not mechanical, as the subject must freely hold those reasons, whose 
force is normative and not physical or deterministic. Just as in thought, judgements 
are made according to the normatively constrained applicability of concepts rather 
than according to mere causal conditions, so, in action, the subject’s physical activity 
is formed and directed by his conception of the world. These conceptions are, of 
course, constructed out of concepts. Consequently, if concept use proceeds without 
compulsion and if it is responsive to the claim of reason, it imparts this same feature 
to action. If one accepts that the ability to use concepts is governed by prescriptive 
norms, one implicitly concedes that both theoretical and practical reason involve 
‘oughts’ and not just dispositions to move thus and so. This awards a special status 
to mental ascriptions, in so far as they have properties which are unlike those of 
physical states. To a certain extent ascriptions of knowledge or of beliefs and desires, 
for example, involve a subject’s ‘making up his mind’, as it were. In contrast to 
physical states, which can be discovered by evaluating and analysing mind-in 
dependent evidence, mental attributes come into being when a subject ‘makes up his 
mind’. In the case of belief, for example, one not merely reacts, but rather has to 
227
 Note: ‘By freedom, on the other hand, I mean the power to begin a state  on one’s own. (…)reason 
creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act – without, i.e., needing to be 
preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law 
of causal connection.’ (CrPR B561f.) 
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answer to a given norm, e.g. to form a belief on the basis of (true) evidence, as one 
takes it to be. Consequently, whenever one forms a thought, belief, intention, or 
desire one could say to oneself ‘I do feel inclined this way, but is that how it should 
be?’. Importantly, if one experiences a degree of uncertainty as to where one stands 
then one will not experience thus because one is unable to obtain certain facts about 
certain states inside oneself. Rather, in the light of certain norms, one was not yet 
able to come to a decision. This aspect points at an interesting connection with moral 
judgements. In self-ascriptions and mental ascriptions (to others) like in moral 
judgements, there are implicit prescriptive norms to which the subject’s inclination 
must be sensitive. Because one’s recognition of such a norm is part of mental self-
ascription, one finds reason or spontaneity, i.e. the ability to act thus and so for 
reasons rather than as a result of antecedent conditions  (CrPR B561f.), at the centre 
of our mental life. When acting, a subject structures his activity in accordance with 
rational determinations.        
The present analysis emphasizes the fact that talk of thought and action 
concerns the rational control, by a thinker, of his own activity, and thereby explains 
how it reveals his mental life. A mental explanation appeals to the ways an agent 
reasons and thus it concerns the rules which articulate his activity. The nature of 
reasoning displayed by human beings, and consequently the structure and content of 
mental explanation only emerge when one considers them as rational and social 
beings. Mental explanation tells us which concepts are being used to shape an 
action. Concepts involve rule-governed links between a subject’s behaviour and the 
world and thus determine the way that an action is sensitive to that world. The same 
concepts make linguistic interaction with a subject possible. By suggesting an 
explanation of action which centres on what an agent thinks about things rather than 
providing a description of a causal chain, the ascriptions involved and the ways they 
fit together appeal to a far richer conception of human beings and their relations than 
those that would be allowed within the constraints of the cognitive view. 
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5. Concluding Remarks
The present chapter investigated the reductionist account of intentionality 
inherent in the cognitive view, which attempts to explain linguistic content as resulting 
from mental content and then to give a reductionist account of the latter. In addition 
to scrutinizing this notion of explanatory priority and the hypothesized causal role of 
mental states inherent in this account, the plausibility of this explanation with respect 
to the normativity and structure of content was examined. It was demonstrated that 
the representationalist distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality is 
implausible as it involves either an infinite regress or implies that one could never 
fully convey the full meaning of a sign.  Furthermore, the discussion highlighted the 
normative structure of language and mind. Participating in a language game is 
tantamount to acquiring a (human) mind. Linguistic meaning cannot be explained as 
the result of the animation of otherwise dead signs by acts of understanding as has 
been postulated by Fodor, for instance. Fodor’s attempt to naturalize mental content 
through the provision of a causal explanation
228
 in the context of his LOT hypothesis 
fails. Mental content cannot be explained as a result of freestanding internal mental 
representations. Words are not injected with meaning through acts of understanding. 
Instead, their meaning is their use. Mental states are not internal freestanding states 
of the mind, which have to be connected via mechanisms with the world, but are 
intrinsically relational states. Freestanding internal representations cannot account for 
the normativity of content. They either presuppose what they set out to explain or fail 
to sustain normativity.
228
In Fodor’s particular case this took the form of a purely descriptive causal theory.
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Chapter VII
Concluding Remarks 
1. The Cognitive View Revisited 
The present investigation subjected the basic tenets and fundamental 
premises underlying the explanatory framework adopted by cognitive scientists - the 
cognitive view – to a detailed philosophical investigation. The philosophical ideas of 
the later Wittgenstein provided the backbone of this investigation. In the light of the 
numerous flaws, confusions and misconceptions, which this study has uncovered, 
the cognitive view emerges as an entirely inadequate framework within which the 
possession of psychological attributes by human beings could be explained. The 
discussion in chapter III excavated the most basic claims which cognitive scientists 
and philosophers make about mind and brain, before proceeding to demonstrate that 
many of these common and accepted ways of thinking about and explaining mental 
phenomena make use of a degenerate form of Cartesianism (crypto-Cartesianism, 
brain/body dualism). This degenerate form of Cartesianism is exemplified, for 
instance, by the widespread tendency to ascribe psychological attributes to the brain 
and parts of the brain. However, by investigating the grammar of psychological 
predicates it has been shown that such ascriptions constitute a violation of 
mereological principles, which imply a transgression of the bounds of sense. 
Importantly, these violations tend to conceal the fact that the proposed explanans 
does in fact not explain anything, thus leaving cognitive scientists and philosophers 
with an illusory understanding of many mental phenomena. Following the discussion 
of mereological errors in cognitive science chapter III also highlighted the profound 
interconnection existing between the tendency to violate the principles of mereology 
and the numerous misconceptions and conceptual confusions inherent in the 
intuitively appealing and widely spread picture of the human mind as a private entity, 
to whose contents one has privileged access through introspection. It was shown that 
the mythology underlying this Inner/Outer picture, is the result of profound conceptual 
confusions regarding the nature of introspection, privacy, and the nature and 
foundation of language. In the course of investigating this mythology, it was 
highlighted that claims like “I know that I am in pain”, for example, are not epistemic 
but grammatical claims. Thus, contrary to popular believe different people can have 
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the same experience, share the same feeling etc., as inner states stand in need for 
outward criteria. The analyses and investigations conducted in this chapter were 
based around examinations of Kenny (1984, 1989) and Bennett and Hacker (2003) 
and thus covered territory, which may have been familiar to some. However, in order 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the variety of confusions and misconception 
underlying the cognitive view as well as their subtle yet intimate interconnections, it 
was of the utmost importance to start the present investigation by following in the 
footsteps of these principal investigators. 
Chapter IV, continued the conceptual investigation initiated in the preceding 
chapter, by investigating the concept of mind and highlighting the fact that contrary to 
the cognitive view, which views the mind as a biological information processor, minds 
are not entities of any kind. Rather, if one feels pressed to give a general account of 
mind, it is best to adopt an Aristotelian position and think of the mind as the capacity 
to acquire intellectual skills. To think otherwise constitutes a transition from the 
metaphorical to the metaphysical. Furthermore, the discussion of chapter IV identified 
the mind-body problem and the problem of the explanatory gap as two examples of 
the type of confusion and problem the entity view of the mind gives rise to. In 
abandoning the entity view of the mind, however, the mind body problem as well as 
the explanatory gap, dissolve and vanish from view. After concluding the examination 
of the entity view of the mind, the notion of mental representations was subjected to a 
thorough scrutiny. This part of the discussion revealed that the cognitive scientist’s 
understanding of mental representations as (symbolic) descriptions (in the ordinary 
sense of this term) is fundamentally flawed, as descriptions in this sense are not to 
be found in the brain. For something to qualify as a symbol, it must have a rule-
governed use. Despite intuitions to the contrary, neural activity in the brain, however, 
does not qualify as a symbolic description of any kind as it lacks a rule governed use. 
For something to be a symbol there must be correct and incorrect ways of applying it 
(i.e. the concept of a symbol is correctly only applied to those forms of expression to 
which a standard of correctness can be applied). The neurons of the brain, however, 
do neither know nor do they not know what any array of symbols means. Similar 
difficulties were highlighted and discussed with regard to the notion of 
representations and maps. As in the case of symbolic representations such systems 
of representation imply the agreement upon and the usage of conventions, i.e. rules 
179
of representation. And, as in the context of the notion of symbolic representation, 
there exist no conventions of representation, which are not vindicated by their 
intentional use by individuals, and which makes them able to apply these 
conventions. Yet, neither brains nor neurons can be said to employ symbols (or maps 
for that matter) as they neither know nor are ignorant of what the symbols or maps 
mean. Similarly, both brains and neurons can neither be said to follow nor can they 
be accused of failing to follow rules for the use of symbols. Thus, while certain 
features or stimuli in ones sensory field can indeed be mapped, (that is causally 
correlated with), onto the firings of cortical neurons, indicating an inductive 
correlation, talk of mental maps in the sense of neural “communication of meanings 
by topological analogies”, constitutes a transgression of the bounds of sense. Finally, 
chapter IV also examined the notion of storing representations in the brain, a claim 
that is integral to the cognitive view (see above). However, the discussion showed 
that the notion of a stored representation can only make sense if the representation 
can be accessed and is available to a person, which could read and recognize the 
representation and potentially tell somebody what it is a representation of. But
cognitive scientists and philosophers have yet to specify the criteria for identifying 
what counts as storing a landscape representation, for example, in the brain. Yet, as 
they use the concepts of representation and storage in their customary way when 
talking about the storage of representations in the brain they unwittingly transgress 
the bounds of sense.     
Chapter V focused on examining the notion of thought and thinking inherent in 
the cognitive view, viz. the cognitive conception of thought, which portraits thinking as 
the processing of mental representations in a language of thought (LOT). However, 
as the conceptual investigation of this chapter showed, the cognitive conception of 
thinking fails to take into account the polymorphous character of thinking, instead 
providing an account of the nature of thought which could not be supported by the 
most rudimentary philosophical, i.e. grammatical, analysis. Above all, it ignores the 
crucial link between thinking and the expression of thought, a link which is forged 
through the normative constraints governing the use of concepts in thought, and the 
various judgments involved in the ascription of concepts. In line with the Aristotelian 
conception of mind proposed in chapter IV, it was suggested to conceive of thinking 
as the ability to participate in an interlocking network of rule-governed abilities. 
180
Through the exercise of this ability, i.e. by “thinking” an individual is able to pick out 
common features in those situations in which the rules are applied and exercised. 
Thinking does not consist in computational operations upon sentences of mentalese,
but in the various forms of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviors, which characterize 
the expression of thought. For a creature to think is not to have rational-symbol 
manipulation processes occurring in the mind/brain, but to exercise conceptual
judgment according to rules governing the use of concepts. The abilities, which 
constitute thinking are structured and depend on a flexible selectivity of attention and 
response to the world. The exercise of these abilities comprises thought with content 
rather than merely a complex of causal influences, which explain the subject’s 
behavior. Both the self-ascription, and the ascription of mental content to others have
their origins in these abilities. All human beings are endowed with the capacity to 
develop these (congruent) abilities, which provide the foundation for the learning and 
exercise of rule-governed techniques, and which imply an agreement in judgments. It 
is this relation between thought, the expression of thought and rule governed 
abilities, which allows for structured and generalizable ways of thinking. 
Chapter VI, examined the account of intentionality inherent in the cognitive 
view, which attempts to explain linguistic content as resulting from mental content 
and then to give a reductionist account of the latter. In addition to scrutinizing this 
notion of explanatory priority and the hypothesized causal role of mental states 
inherent in this representationalist account, the plausibility of this explanation with 
respect to the normativity and structure of content was examined. In the course of the 
following discussion, it was demonstrated that the representationalist distinction 
between intrinsic and derived intentionality is implausible as it involves either an 
infinite regress or implies that one could never fully convey the full meaning of a sign.  
The failure to recognize the normative dimension of language and mind was thus 
identified as the fundamental error of the representationalist stance. In the context of 
the cognitive view (linguistic) norms have mistakenly been regarded as metaphysical 
claims. This is how otherwise banal ordinary statements could be transformed into 
metaphysical pictures of a deep underlying reality hidden behind the everyday 
surface. By demonstrating that language is normatively structured, and by 
highlighting that participating in a language game is tantamount to acquiring a mind, 
the discussion emphasized that linguistic meaning cannot be explained as the result 
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of the animation of otherwise dead signs by acts of understanding as envisioned by 
Fodor, for example.  Fodor´s infamous LOT hypothesis constitutes an attempt to 
naturalise mental content through the provision of a descriptive causal explanation. 
Yet, as the discussion of chapter VI showed, mental content cannot be explained as 
a result of freestanding internal mental representations. Words are not injected with
meaning through acts of understanding. Instead, their meaning is their use. Mental 
states are not internal freestanding states of the mind, which have to be connected 
via mechanisms with the world, but are intrinsically relational states. Freestanding 
internal representations cannot account for the normativity of content. They either 
presuppose what they set out to explain or fail to sustain normativity.
As these discussions illustrate, the cognitive view has been built on a host of 
flawed and misconceived presumptions and premises. Furthermore, it proves itself to 
be not only the product of conceptual confusion and metaphysical speculation, but is 
also to be regarded as a source of further philosophical confusion and 
misunderstanding itself, thus distorting contemporary thought about the mind and 
human nature (see section 3 below). Consequently, it cannot be regarded as an 
adequate explanatory framework, within which the mind and mental phenomena 
could be profitably studied. Any “insights” derived within the context of this framework 
hitherto, should be re-considered and re-evaluated with the utmost care, as they are 
more likely to betray illusion than understanding. The preceding discussions also 
underline that at its most general, cognitive scientists endorsing the cognitive view 
tend to fail in achieving their ultimate goal, - the understanding and explanation of the 
possession of psychological attributes by human beings. This is mainly due to the 
uncritical adoption of a questionable philosophical legacy, and a general 
misunderstanding of the nature and limits of science (and philosophy). These flaws 
are not so much the result of failing intellectual capacity, but the detrimental effect of 
a misguided believe in the powers of science and a consequent spread of scientism, 
which has hampered the education of scientists of various disciplines. Bemoaning 
this fact in 1944, Albert Einstein wrote to a friend:
“I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as 
a history and philosophy of science. So many people today – and even professional 
scientists – seem to me like someone who has seen thousands of trees but never seen a 
forrest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of 
independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. 
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This independence created by philosophical insight is – in my opinion – the mark of 
distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth.”
229
As the present investigation highlights, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
230
, by 
impressing on us the importance of conceptual clarity, enables us to seek this 
independence and free ourselves from the prejudices and misconceptions we have 
inherited from our scientific ancestors successfully. 
2.On the Possibility of a Science of the Mind 
If one accepts the critique of the cognitive view as an inadequate framework 
for the explanation of the possession of psychological attributes by human beings, 
has one thereby accepted the impossibility of a scientific study of mind? Not 
necessarily. The answer to this question largely depends on what kind of conception 
of mind provides the framework of investigation for scientists, and on whether the 
nature and limits of science (and philosophy) are understood correctly. What the 
present investigation of the cognitive view underlines, however, is that problems and 
questions about the mind, which were created by conceptual confusion and 
perpetuated through the creation of bad philosophical theories, cannot be addressed 
by empirical scientific means, regardless of how sophisticated these might be. 
In the process of describing their discoveries, cognitive scientists presuppose 
a host of psychological concepts. It is important to bear in mind that, in order to 
determine what is true or false about any given phenomenon, it is necessary to start 
out with descriptions, which make sense. In order for empirical investigation to 
culminate in the genesis of understanding (and not illusion), it depends on conceptual 
clarity, for which philosophical speculation is no adequate substitute. 
Misunderstandings regarding the nature of science (and philosophy), the failure to 
acknowledge the crucial distinction between factual and conceptual questions 
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Heinrich Hertz, who exerted a significant influence on Wittgenstein’s thinking wrote in the preface to 
his Principles of Mechanics that “ …some kinds of vexing problems are to be resolved, not by scientific 
explanation and hypotheses, but by clarification. Unclarity is often expressed by questions about the 
nature of a phenomenon, but what is needed, in some such cases, is not fresh information or sharper 
definitions, but a clearer understanding of existing information and definitions´(see: Hertz (1956),  
p.1ff).
183
combined with a flawed metaphysical conception of human mind and nature and the 
crippling effects of a latent crypto-Cartesianism, can be identified as the major flaws, 
which have thwarted the latest attempt to devise a science of the mind
231
, - a 
cognitive science. The cognitive view bears witness to this fact.  
In stark contrast to the cognitive view, Aristotle’s characteristically biological 
(rather than metaphysical) conception of mind is uninfluenced by and free of the 
conceptual confusions and philosophical problems giving rise to the former and the 
explanations derived from it are free from their crippling effects. Conceiving of the 
mind as a capacity to acquire intellectual skills may thus be considered the first step 
towards creating such a “science” of the mind. Although endorsing Aristotle’s 
conception, by itself, does neither prevent nor eliminate misconceiving the powers 
and limits of scientific investigation, it would certainly set such investigation on sure 
footing. Aristotle believed, that the attributes of all kids of individual beings are to be 
explained by the particular ways in which the essential form or structure of the 
species to which they belong is realized in the particular matter of which they are 
made. Any differences between kinds of beings are to be accounted for 
predominantly by differences in their forms or essential organization. Thus, 
investigations of the neural events and processes underlying the exercise of such 
characteristic human abilities as thinking, perceiving, remembering or imagining, can 
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 The project of creating a science of the mind has made several false starts, beginning with the first 
modern efforts to study the world of ideas in the same manner as the physicists of the era were 
studying the world of matter in the 17
th
 century (e.g. Locke 1690, La Mettrie 1748, Hume 1749), and 
ranging to the efforts made by 20
th
 century psychologists during the first cognitive revolution, which 
marked the end of a behaviourist psychology and created the cognitive view. These efforts also 
marked the abandonment of a positivist psychology in favour of a realist conception. 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, many theorists occupied with developing a science of the 
mind, were misled into thinking that the only permissible phenomena fitted to be material to be studied 
in a psychological science, would be publicly observable entities. They mistakenly supposed that such 
were the phenomena of the paradigmatic physical sciences, inorganic chemistry and Newtonian 
mechanics. This led to the restriction of legitimate categories of phenomena to those for which could 
be physically specified such conditions, states of the environment as were detectable with the five 
senses (usually only vision was employed), and bodily movements as could be registered by some 
inhuman apparatus. What is more, both classes of phenomena were thought of as capable of being 
partitioned into independent or dependent variables. This suggested that there ought to be some 
surveyable relationship between types of measurable events originating in the environment and 
equally measurable types of events originating in the organism and some, possibly complex but in 
principle discernible, set of laws that connected the two. The idea of explanation in psychology was 
also assimilated to modes and models of explanation assumed (wrongly) to be in use in physical 
science, apt to generate law like predictions linking simply specified antecedents and measurable 
outcomes. These links were often presented as causal relations, although in a truly positivist spirit all 
that was usually claimed was the existence of a statistical correlation between stimulus event types 
and response event types (See: Harre & Gillett (1994), p.2f).
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shed light on the question which neural states, events and processes are empirical 
necessary conditions for human beings to be able to exercise their intellectual 
abilities. The neural processes of the brain, are necessary conditions for the person, 
whose brain it is to be going through the relevant mental processes. Such 
investigations, free from the kind of misconceptions the cognitive view is cursed with, 
have the power to help human beings understand why they are as they are, why they 
possess their characteristic powers and what goes on in their brains when they are 
exercised. And it is this kind of understanding, not the nowadays widespread 
neuromythology, which harbors the promise of enabling us not only to gain an insight 
into the neurobiological foundations of the mind, but also of devising successful 
treatments for the various dysfunctions of the central nervous system that currently 
haunt our kind.
Although, endorsing an Aristotelian conception of mind would be an important 
step towards a science of mind, free from conceptual confusion
232
, a future 
successful science of mind would also need to be able to accommodate more than 
one model of explanation. The discussions in chapter V and VI, for example, suggest 
that there is a need to look at psychological phenomena dynamically, viz. as 
attributes of the unfolding of orderly patterns of meaningful action (directed by a 
network of rule-governed abilities). This opens up the possibility of there being other 
models for explaining the orderly progression of events characteristic of the 
psychology of human beings, than the mechanistic cause-effect relationship 
borrowed from a superficial conception of the natural sciences, as is currently the 
case. A further detailed discussion of such a hybrid science of the mind, is, of course, 
prevented by the limited scope of the present chapter and thesis, as it would involve 
a careful consideration of the necessary scientific method and underlying scientific 
theory. Such a discussion would need to include a discussion of the presuppositions 
that enter into the construction of a scientific taxonomy and the principles underlying 
the creation and use of models (both analytical and explanatory), hypothesis and 
theories, in order to provide a foundation for the analysis and understanding of public 
and private processes and procedures by which people use the available ‘symbolic 
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 Note: Although, this does not mean that such a science would be immune to any conceptual 
confusion that might rear its head in the future. As long as mankind continues to think, we are likely to 
fall victim to conceptual confusion. Thus, there will always be a need for critical conceptual 
investigation.   
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resources and techniques’ (i.e. language and linguistic behavior) to interact socially 
and accomplish cognitive tasks. On the grounds of this analysis, abstract analytical or 
descriptive models (based on Wittgenstein’s ideas of language) of the ways people 
accomplish these tasks could be developed. These would be based on abstractions 
from the task descriptions themselves. Importantly, however, unlike the metaphysical 
claims implicit in the cognitive view the models of mental processes to be developed 
would have no existential, i.e. ontological, implications. Finally, it would need to be 
shown how such models could be used to guide research in a new, and different  
“cognitive science”. Such a revised and revamped cognitive science would thus be a 
hybrid science
233
, which endorses an explanatory pluralism, leaving room for more 
than one type of explanation.
3. The Cognitive View and Human Nature
‘There is an entire mythology embedded in our language’ (BT, p.434), 
remarked Wittgenstein, who ascribed this insight to the German writer, dramatist and 
critic Paul Ernst. As the preceding chapters showed, this mythology is most clearly 
discernable in the words, idioms and turns of phrase employed in our talk about the 
mind and mental phenomena. However, as our conceptions of the mind and the 
mental have always constituted an integral part of our conception of human nature
234
, 
it is of no surprise that the mythology surrounding the mind today also crucially 
influences not only our understanding of the mental but also our self-conception as 
human beings. 
The cognitive view of the mind discussed throughout this thesis has retained a 
large part of its Cartesian and empiricist legacy, and in doing so contributed to the 
perpetuation of the respective mythology regarding the mental (see: Chapter I), while 
also significantly shaping our contemporary conception of human nature. Descartes 
infamous duality of mind and body has provided the framework of thought about 
human beings, their minds and their bodies since the 17
th
 century. According to his 
conception of human nature, human beings were conceived to be mental substances 
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 Although never fully developed, a hybrid psychology had already been envisioned by Wilhelm 
Wundt towards the end of the 19
th
 century. 
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 Human nature~ (dt.) menschliche Natur, Menschenbild
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(minds) conjoined to material bodies.  Relations of two-way causation were held to 
obtain between these two categorically distinct things.  Mental attributes (thought)
were believed to characterize the mind, physical attributes (extension) to characterize 
the body. Furthermore, Descartes famously held that the I is identical with my mind 
(since I can doubt the existence of my body, but not the existence of the cogito), 
identified the mind with consciousness (narrowly construed and misunderstood, for 
details see: Bennett and Hacker (2003)), associated consciousness with the private, 
while putting forward a conception of indubitable knowledge founded on the idea that 
the mind is a private realm to which the subject has privileged and infallible access. 
Although Descartes’ conception was offered as a more correct representation of 
human nature and the principles that had guided the explanations of human thought, 
feeling and action hitherto, his ideas constituted a gross misconception and have 
forced a wholly inadequate framework for the representation of human nature on us.  
It was highly unfortunate that Descartes’ vision replaced not only flawed empirical 
Aristotelian ideas (along with Renaissance Vitalism and Neoplatonism) but also the 
sound and sensible Aristotelian conception of mind
235
, which had provided the first 
conceptual framework for the investigation of human psychology. In contrast to the 
unitary substance envisioned by (scholastic) Aristotelian thought, human beings 
became to be conceived of as a composite entity, and are now, largely due to the 
influence of cognitive science in the latter half of the 20th century, more or less 
identified with the brain.  As our conception of human nature and of what it is to be a 
human being is closely linked to our conception of a person
236
, which has a strong 
legal, moral and social dimension, the results and interpretation of research in 
cognitive science can have a profound impact on the moral and legal status of 
human beings. This is exemplified in current debates arguing about the status of 
human beings as free agents, that have ensued in the aftermath of neuroscientific 
experiments studying voluntary action, and which are hotly debated in academic 
circles as well as the feuilletons of the press. Some scholars of German criminal law, 
for example, have been particularly concerned about the suggestion that free will is 
an illusion, as the notion of free will is crucially linked to the notions of responsibility 
and guilt applied in this context (e.g., Kröber 2004, Lüderssen 2004 also: Roth 2004). 
Wolf Singer has put the dilemma thus:
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 As Peter Hacker puts it: “A classic case of throwing the baby out with the bath water!” (personal 
communication)
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 Note: To be a person is, among other things, to be a subject of moral rights and duties.
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‘Die moderne Hirnforschung ist dabei, mit ihren analytischen Werkzeugen in die 
innersten Sphären des Menschseins vorzudringen. Das Fortschreiten auf diesem Weg 
bewirkt tiefgreifende Veränderungen unseres Menschenbildes, folgenreichere vielleicht als 
die kopernikanische Wende und die Darwinsche Evolutionstheorie. Denn diesmal werden 
nicht mehr nur unser Ort im Kosmos und unsere biologische Bedingtheit hinterfragt, 
sondern die Begründung unserer Selbstwahrnehmung als freie, geistige Wesen.’
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The following discussion will provide a brief example of how the cognitive view 
contributes to a distorted view of human nature, by reflecting on some aspects of the 
current debate about freedom of the will following the publication of 
neurophysiological studies by Benjamin Libet. Although this topic would merit an 
extensive discussion in itself, the following will contend itself with providing only a 
short sketch of the current debate. This will suffice, however, to demonstrate that due 
to its widespread acceptance as the explanatory framework of cognitive scientists, 
the cognitive view has exerted a detrimental influence on our self-conception as 
human beings. In addition, it will be shown that the debate, which ensued in the wake 
of Libet’s experiments, is a quasi-inevitable result of endorsing the cognitive view, as 
well as the product of conceptual confusions surrounding the thinking about voluntary 
action. Given the power, influence and appeal of modern cognitive science it is thus 
by no means a trivial matter whether we are getting our explanatory framework for 
the explanation of the possession of psychological attributes by human beings right.
The Cognitive View, Free Will and Voluntary Action
Over the last few years the philosophical discussion surrounding the topic of 
the freedom of the will, has been strongly influenced by the results of research 
conducted in cognitive science. The experiments, which instigated and provided the 
main momentum for this debate, were carried out by the neurophysiologist Benjamin 
Libet, who was originally interested in the relationship between neural activity and 
sensation thresholds (e.g. Libet 1999, Libet 2004). Libet’s initial experiments centred 
largely around the determination of the degree of neural activity necessary to trigger 
somatic sensations. However, this work soon included work on human 
consciousness.   His most famous set of experiments seemed to show that 
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unconscious electrical activity in the motor-cortex (the so-called readiness potential 
(RP)
238
) precedes conscious decisions to perform volunatry acts, and thus has by 
many been taken as a scientific demonstration of the illusory character of free will, as 
unconscious neural processes appear to precede and cause willed acts. Importantly, 
these willed acts are retrospectively expreienced as consciously motivated by the 
subject
239
.
In order to gauge the relationship between the readiness potential ('RP') and 
subjective feelings of volition and action experimentally, Libet required an objective 
method of marking the subject's conscious experience of the will to perform an action 
in time, and afterward comparing this information with data recording the brain's 
electrical activity during the same interval. Thus Libet used a cathode ray 
oscilloscope, which had been adjusted to act as a timer, and whose output was a 
single dot that could be made to travel in a circular motion, rather like the  
movements of a hand around a clock face. This timer was set so that the time it took 
for the dot to travel between intervals marked on the oscilloscope was approximately 
forty-three milliseconds. As the angular velocity of the dot remained constant, any 
change in distance could easily be converted into the time it took to travel that 
distance. To monitor brain activity during the same period, Libet used an 
electroencephalogram (EEG). Libet and co-workers would ask each subject to sit at a 
desk in front of the oscilloscope timer. They would affix the EEG electrodes to the 
participant’s scalp, and would then instruct the subject to carry out some small, 
simple motor activity, such as pressing a button, or flexing a finger or wrist, within a 
certain time frame. No limits were placed on the number of times the subject could 
perform the action within this period. During the experiment, the subject would be 
asked to note the position of the dot on the oscilloscope timer when "he/she was first 
aware of the wish or urge to act". Pressing the button also recorded the position of 
the dot on the oscillator, this time electronically. By comparing the marked time of the 
button's pushing and the subject's conscious decision to act, researchers were able 
to calculate the total time of the trial from the subject's initial volition through to the 
resultant action. On average, approximately two hundred milliseconds elapsed 
between the first appearance of conscious will to press the button and the act of 
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A pre-motor potential, the readiness potential is considered to be a manifestation of the contribution 
of the neocortex to the pre-motor planning of volitional movement.
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189
pressing it. The scientists also analyzed EEG recordings for each trial with respect to 
the timing of the action. It was noted that brain activity involved in the initiation of the 
action, primarily centered in the secondary motor cortex, occurred, on average, 
approximately five hundred milliseconds before the trial ended with the pushing of the 
button. That is to say, researchers recorded mounting brain activity related to the 
resultant action as many as three hundred milliseconds before subjects reported the 
first awareness of conscious will to act. In other words, apparently conscious 
decisions to act were preceded by an unconscious buildup of electrical charge within 
the brain, the readiness potential
240
. Thus, some interpreters have come to think that, 
as the RP precedes the conscious experience of the intention to act, it seems as if 
the decision to act has already been made by the time the subject becomes 
conscious of this decision. It was concluded that the decision to act is made by 
unconscious neuronal processes, i.e. by the brain, rather than the conscious subject. 
Consequently, a host of philosophers and cognitive scientists have come to regard 
the notion of free will as a mere illusion
241
, starting a fierce debate within academic 
circles as well as among members of the interested public
242
. Libet himself, on the 
other hand, proposed a less radical interpretation, suggesting that “free will“ has only 
veto power. Thus while human being don’t posses the ability to create and voluntarily 
change the world around them, they nevertheless are able to stop certain things from 
happening.  
Crucial to the interpretation of these experiments was the “volitionist” 
conception of willing and human action subscribed to by Libet (and other cognitive 
scientists). According to this philosophical doctrine, which was also held by David 
Hume, William James, and Bertrand Russell, for example, a movement is caused by 
the mental phenomenon of willing. Willing was construed as a mental occurrence (i.e. 
the occurrence of an idea or image of the desired movement), commonly referred to 
as a volition. This conception figured prominently in the experimental design of 
Libet’s experiments in the form of William James’s ideo-motor theory of voluntary 
action. William James notably conceived of willing not as something one does but as 
something that occurs to one. According to James, willing is entertaining a 
representation or an idea, so called willed intentions, in the mind. Thus, an idea of a 
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certain action (e.g. raising my arm) is able to instigate one’s motor centre. James 
deemed such ideas of movement, i.e. willed intentions or volitions, as causally 
responsible for voluntary action. Wiliam James synthesized these ideas in his ideo-
motor theory of voluntary action: 
“ In this vain, ideo - motor action is defined as the sequence of movement upon the mere 
thought of it (i.e., upon the formation of willed intentions), as the process of volition. 
Wherever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the mind, we 
have ideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing between the conception and the 
execution.”
243
The Jamesian conception of voluntary action is embedded within the classical 
Cartesian/empiricist representationalist framework of mind, a trademark of which is 
the conception of representations as causal agents. Libet’s thinking, in ascribing 
phenomenal qualities to voluntary action, is firmly rooted in this tradition, although the 
representationalist framework his studies are interpreted in is, of course, the cognitive 
view. 
The discussion which ensued in the wake of Libet`s studies, soon spread from 
neuroscientific and philosophical forums over to the wider academic community and 
the public. Numerous news magazines and newspapers have published articles and 
interviews with authorities in neuroscience, philosophy and the law, in the attempt to 
provide an accurate account of the nature and implications of these findings and the 
scholarly discussions surrounding them. The suggestion that our experience of free 
will and free agents might merely be an illusion has (rather unsurprisingly) delivered a 
decisive blow to our self-conception as human beings. As remarked in chapter I, the 
questions which cognitive science pursues are indeed intimately tied to the very heart 
of our human self-conception, as the answers it strives to provide seem to hold the 
promise of a deeper understanding of human nature and rational agency. 
The various critical voices featuring in this discussion have quite rightly 
(though it would seem with somewhat limited success) highlighted the numerous 
philosophical flaws inherent in the conception of voluntary action endorsed in these 
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experiments. The most well-known (and powerful) of which is the infinite regress
inherent in the conception of voluntary action
244
. In addition, various flaws in the 
design of Libet’s experiment have been highlighted, the most prominent of which is 
the criticism that Libet actually failed to measure the variable he set out to measure 
(i.e. the experience of intending to act). Rather than measuring the conscious 
experience of the intention to act, Libet has by some been criticized for actually 
measuring the consciousness of the consciousness of the experience of intending to 
act
245
.  
However, I suggest that the debates surrounding the conception and nature of 
voluntary action or other design inherent flaws of Libet’s studies touch only upon part 
of the problem. In fact, to a certain degree the discussion surrounding the 
interpretation of Libet’s experiments and the underlying conception of willed action 
may be regarded as a mere side issue, although an important one. Yet, the real fuel 
which keeps the fire of this debate burning, is not so much comprised by the question 
as to how to interpret Libet’s data, but by the flawed and utterly misconceived 
representationalist framework, the cognitive view, which accommodates Libet’s 
misconceived experimental design and conception of willed action in the first place. 
This aspect has hitherto gone unnoticed. Viewed from this angle, the debate that 
ensued in the wake of Libet’s studies is merely an inevitable extension of having 
adopted a flawed framework for the explanation of mental phenomena. Without 
endorsing a representationalist conception of the mind, there would be no room for a 
volitionist conception of willing and no room for the (mis-)interpretation of Libet’s 
results as evidence for the illusory nature of our experience of free will. It is the 
prevalence of the cognitive view as the explanatory framework of cognitive science, 
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 If every act is preceded by a “volition” we may ask, what causes this volition. Not only bodily (like 
lifting a finger in a PET scanner), but also mental operations and activities (like performing mental 
arithmetic, reciting a poem in the mind or reflecting on a problem) may be voluntary These are on a 
par with willed intentions themselves. Thus, if the answer is no, they are not voluntary, then how can 
the acts be voluntary? If the answer is that they are voluntary,  then the theory held by James, and 
Libet requests that these operation and acts must themselves be instigated by the formation of prior 
volitions, and those from other volitions and so on ad infinitum. (See e.g.: Ryle 1990, Kenny 1989)
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Even if one overlooks the infinite regress argument, the variable  “Experience of intending to act” is 
not really the variable that Libet actually wanted to measure, because what is measured is not the 
conscious experience of the intention to act, but the consciousness of the consciousness of the 
experience of intending to act. Although, that may seem overly petulant, this fact is never the less of 
crucial importance given the minute time scale experimenters are dealing with in these studies. This 
error may be called the “Cogito fallacy”: The failure to notice, that the experience of enjoying a 
conscious experience presupposes that one already entertains a conscious experience!
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which has given rise to a misguided debate, which does nothing but contribute to a 
distorted view of human agency and human nature. Given the fact that our 
conceptions of the nature of human agency and human nature influence central 
concepts of criminal law such as responsibility and guilt, it is not only important to 
point out misguided philosophical conceptions of action and flawed experimental 
design in Libet’s studies
246
 but also the flaws inherent in the explanatory framework 
within which these issues are discussed. Only by tackling these issues at their very 
root, can we ensure that our understanding of the brain advances, and avoid the 
misinformation of the public by continuing the cultivation of a deplorable 
neuromythology. The present investigation and deconstruction of the cognitive view 
and the subsequent suggestion of the Aristotelian alternative constitutes a significant 
step in this direction
247248
.  
246
 And in follow up studies conducted in the wake of Libet’s initial experiments, which may have 
avoided some crucial errors of design, but still endorse a flawed concept of willed action as well as the 
cognitive view.
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Aristotle characterized the mind in terms of the powers not only of the intellect but also in terms of 
the powers of the will. The mind is not only a cognitive capacity, but also a volitional „capacity“. Thus, 
the human will can be understood the ability to act for reasons. Its freedom derives from the special 
characteristics of practical reasoning, which are tied to our conceptual structure.
248
Viewed from the suggested Aristotelian perspective human beings are animals with a distinctive 
range of abilities (i.e. the abilities that are distinctive of human beings are abilities of intellect and will).  
Though they have a mind, they are not identical with the mind (or the brain) they have.  Though they 
have a body, they are not identical with the body they have.  Nor is a human being a conjunction of a 
mind and a body that causally interact with each other.  Like other animals, human beings have a 
brain on the normal functioning of which their powers depend.  But a human person is not a brain 
enclosed in a skull.  A mature human being is a self-conscious agent, with the ability to act, and to 
react in thought, feeling and deed, for reasons
These capacities and their exercise give to human beings the status of persons.  While human 
being is a biological category, person is a moral, legal and social one.  To be a person is, among other 
things, to be a subject of moral rights and duties.  It is to be not only an agent, like other animals, but 
also a moral agent, standing in reciprocal moral relations to others, with a capacity to know and to do 
good and evil.  Since moral agents can act for reasons, and can justify their actions by reference to 
their reasons, they are also answerable for their deeds.  To be a human being is to be a creature 
whose nature it is to acquire such capacities in the course of normal maturation in a community of like-
natured beings. (From personal communications with Peter Hacker)
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